分析師 Bill Browder 稍早受 CBC 訪問時就直接戳破這個說法：「普丁不是那種你熱身出招（starting low），就會知所進退改變心意的人。所有觀測研究他的人都知道這點。」
「既然認定普丁此刻已做出侵犯雷池之舉，而歐美打算用銀行（bank）而非戰車（tank）嚇阻，就不可能搞所謂的擠牙膏策略。要畢其功於一役就要祭出絕招（ »There is no sort of up-scaling it. At this point, everything should be thrown at him. »）。」[1]
SWIFT 被認為是一招歐美不想用上的「七傷拳」。台經院今天舉行景氣動向記者會，會中所長吳孟道指出，「把俄羅斯剔除 SWIFT，金融市場會大亂」，德國不希望做這件事、美國也不樂見歐洲經濟成長將受到打擊，波及自身。
卡内基莫斯科中心智庫 Alexander Gabuev 研判，這次訪問交換的雙邊默契一定程度上堅定了普丁的行動盤算。
他在《經濟學人》的引述中表示，照目前的北京對烏俄事態的對應，普丁已經有了被西方封鎖之後的經濟後門。北京台面上或許會配合國際發表對俄制裁，然而私下接收俄國的各種貿易轉單的渠道多的是（ »expect China to adhere to the legal requirements of any Western sanctions, such as not banking with blacklisted oligarchs. Nonetheless China will find plenty of ways to keep business flowing. »）。
「這兩國過去都在經貿往來逐步降低美元依賴，也是為了這樣一日在做準備。（And the two countries have steadily reduced their reliance on the dollar to settle trade, part of Russia’s efforts to insulate itself from American sanctions.）」[3]
在過去那個保守主義氛圍，主業會的過度緊迫拉下線他們有一套稱作「愛心轟炸（ »love bombing »）的拉攏交戰法則；施禮華更宣揚學員要「自殺式傳教」（ »you must kill yourselves for proselytism »）。
« An amazing investigation! Thorough and stupendously well-researched by an author that, not only understands Latin, Spanish and Italian, but has in-depth experience of Opus Dei, the R.C. Church, Vatican politics, high finance, banking and, significantly, political intrigue in the Western World. …This book is not a conspiracy theory but an statement of fact supported by authentic documentary evidence incriminating Opus Dei over a period of some 80 years. » – Richard Kinder (Goodreads reviewer) « Absolute must read: Vatican Personalities & Politics. At the present, Opus Dei is a network of old boys who seek to disown Vatican II and disembowell those who disagree with their Gnostic agenda. …. One should note that the cross-fertilization between Freemasonry and Opus Dei is just hinted at in this book. » – M KIRK-DUGGAN (Amazon reviewer)« This is the most comprehensive book about Escriva, especially his life in Rome. It’s truly nice to be able to see the Founder from the perspective of a woman (Pilar Urbano). And she writes with warmth and literary skills. Translation into English from Spanish is also excellent. » – Peverall Dubois (Amazon reviewer) « I have read other biographies and memoirs of St Josemaria Esciva, this book touched on moments of his life that had been written about before (and many that weren’t) but it did not seem like i had read about them; Urbano’s story-telling style and personal experience of Escriva gave me new insights & perspectives into this saint, something i had not expected but am very grateful for. » RedDawg (Amazon reviewer) « This book paints a vivid picture of the life of Saint Josemaria Escriva during the last three decades of his life living in Rome. Through delightful anecdotes from men and women who lived with him, we learn from him, are inspired by his example, his faith, and his charity. The best introduction to the life of this great saint. » Jesus Izaguirre (Amazon reviewer)
圖說：主業會內部對於性別觀念的思想封建落後。雖然信仰團體操持的德性無須以世俗觀念中的「進步」為美，但組織文化封閉、權威集中，將容易導致將壓迫和歧視視為聖潔、失去與外部對話的能力也箝制內部不同意見的暢通表達。（截圖來源：Opus Dei: The Pope’s Right Arm in Europe by Gordon Urquhart via Catholics for a Free Choice）
« Carmen del Tapia’s exposition of the supposed bad character of St. Josemaria –temper, obsession, crude language– is contradicted by hundreds of other testimonies of people who knew him personally, and also knew Carmen del Tapia. …To read this book is to spend time reading propaganda …I am sure Opus Dei itself forgives her and prays for her, smiling all the way. » –Sayanz (Amazon reviewer)
« For anyone that has been a « numerary » member of Opus Dei, the facts that the author describes constitute no surprise. …The very detailed description …has made me so vividly recall the asphyxiating atmosphere that I once lived when recruited by Opus Dei at the age of fourteen. The book reflects the great fraud of the Opus Dei praxis which consists in …tremendous though subtle psychological pressure, the member gradually abdicates his/her own will and renounces to making his/her own decisions even on very small details of his/her life. …With all my love for current and former Opus Dei numerary members who at very early age have undergone a recruitment and indoctrination process that has caused them anxiety and distress, I want to say that « Beyond the Threshold » is a true testimony of what Opus Dei has meant in the life of many. » – jpuerta@es.oracle.com (Amazon reviewer)
雖說一面之辭不可盡信，但算上去這已經是1990年代第三本重磅揭露主業會內部惡性文化與施禮華神父個人爭議的書籍了，且有別於前耶穌會成員Michael Walsh 帶有偏見和過時印象的Opus Dei: An Investigation into the Secret Society Struggling for Power Within the Roman Catholic Church（1992）、《紐約客（The New Yorker）》1994年10月號資深記者David Remnick 探入天主教會秘辛的初試啼聲之作 « The Pope in Crisis« 、調查記者Robert Hutchison 客觀詳盡、資料引述豐富、但仍是從外部切入 Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei （1998）一書，這是來自施禮華神父身旁至今最貼身、最資深人士，在這位主業會創辦人過世20年後撰寫的個人回憶。
偏偏在Robert Hutchison 、María del Carmen Tapia 兩本揭露主業會創辦人醜聞的書籍出版隔年，保守派教宗若望保祿二世就再度拉寬「封聖」標準，並加速準備讓施禮華神父封聖之路上的一切路障排除。2002年，若望保祿二世獨排眾議為施禮華神父封聖，多方溢美稱其「應被列在基督教偉大的見證人之林」。
Under the leadership of Cardinal Kim, the Catholic church took a remarkably active leadership role, always ready to criticise the government and its perceived brutal use of force against government opponents. Outraged, the KCIA, the South Korean political police, arrested Bishop Daniel Chi Hak-sun, one of Cardinal Kim’s lieutenants and an outspoken critic of the military rule, but had to release him soon, bowing to pressure from local Catholics groups and from overseas. （Lankov [2014]）
——我在原文中參考了這份歷史，在圖說註腳也提到金壽煥樞機是韓國公民歷史中享譽的「民主人權的守望者」。事實上，最近一份1974年的外交文件解封，是當時總統朴正熙曾施壓梵帝崗開除池學淳的原州主教地位撤職。當年他在7月起起草發表「良心宣言」，被政府他時他被判監禁十五年。然而梵帝崗代表 Luigi Dossena曾到訪南韓親自談判。協議內容我們不得而知，但結果是池學淳被監禁一年後就獲釋。
哈佛大學生 Will Matheson (2018) 論文當中寫道：1952年、1956年及1960年選舉都舞弊疑雲的李承晚就是高調的新教徒，其政權中有4成的基督徒，高於當是韓國基督教人口比例的4倍。「在韓戰解放後的政治舞台上，韓國領導人中超常比例是基督徒。這個狀態有助於理解為什麼新教教會群體會與那個專制政府如此緊密。」（Matheson [2018], 7）
「戰後，美國政府支持教會作為社會組織，擁有經濟和社會資本的人同時擔任教會和政治領袖。因此，許多教會領袖都投身於李承晚統治下的政府。這也創造了宗派領導人相互競爭的動態，時而會顯露宗派主義（Park and Pak 2011b）。這種狀態解釋了為什麼民權運動期間「在新教群體的 11,582 名神職人員和 17,793 間教會中，只有 542 名牧師和 831 間教會參與了民權示威的行動」（Park and Pak 2011，“Protestant Christians and South Korea Politics, 1948-1980s：” 183)。
In the context of the pro-democracy movement, then, the Protestant church as a whole took a passive stance. However, a subsection of the church split with the majority and played a vital role in the movement. （Matheson [2018], 7）
Matheson文中引用的首爾崇實大學基督教研究系歷史教授朴正信（박정신）是更詳實的，他在 Protestantism and Politics in Korea （University of Washington Press, 2015）第七章 » Protestant Christians and South Korean Politics, 1948–1980s » 十分值得閱讀。
Why did the Protestant church consistently support the regime? What specific form did this support take, and what in particular did the church support? What bearing did the church’s approval have on the continuation of Rhee’s rule? Did the church undergo any change, politically or historically, by supporting his regime? These questions will be addressed by considering what brought the Protestant church into a leadership position in South Korean politics and society.（Park [2015], 174）
Under Park Chung-hee, some Christian leaders dared to raise their voices against the government. Kim Chaejun, Mun Ikhwan, Pak Hyonggyu, Mun Tonghwan, and An Pyongmu, all Christian theologians or ministers, risked imprisonment when they called for social justice, respect for human rights, and democracy, but the majority of Christians went the easy way of supporting the regime.The political attitude of the absolute majority of church members was identical to that of their fellow Christians during the Syngman Rhee period. （Park [2015], 174）
Despite these activities, the political stance of the majority of church members was one of inaction during Park’s rule. Claiming that the church should concern itself only with saving souls, most Protestant leaders tried to draw attention away from political realities, including, of course, the government’s action. The church also stressed the apostle Paul’s teaching that all political powers are ordained of God and that one should obey civil authorities. The church also continued to make a case for anticommunism. The communists were the real enemy of Christ, and so to uphold a government that combated communism was to do the will of God. The political inaction of the majority of Korean Christians was actually a political position that, actively or passively, supported the regime that a tiny group of their fellow Christians were criticizing.（Park [2015], 183-4）
Whenever the KNCC criticized the government, the KCCC defended the regime and denounced liberal Christian activists. Whenever the regime’s reputation suffered at home or abroad, the kccc supported the government and its policies. Denouncing the liberal Christians who dared to raise their voices against the regime, the kccc claimed that “the Bible teaches Christians to pray for the secular powers and to obey them,” that “the antigovernment propaganda and demonstrations of Christians are not Christian acts based on biblical teachings,” and that “in South Korea there is religious freedom, contrary to the claim of the liberal Christians.”（Park [2015], 187）
Unlike organizations such as the Catholic Church, these six denominations do not necessarily act in concert under one centralized policy or directive.102 Usually, a political statement issued by the KNCC is supported morally or nominally, but not actively or organizationally, by the six affiliated denominations.
Christian liberals in the 1970s and 1980s dared to raise their voices against the government, but they did so against the general current of Protestant opinion. This is one of the reasons that it was not liberal pastors, but rather liberal Christian intellectuals (the so-called kigwan moksa) working in church-related agencies such as seminaries, schools, the YMCA, and radio stations, who became the leading Christian activists. Such individuals were free from direct control and pressure by a congregation.
The liberal Christian elite in Seoul used the names of their denominations in protesting dictatorial rule, but they could not mobilize their churches and congregations for their cause; they could not even receive much moral support from their fellow Christians. The liberal Christian movement of the 1970s and 1980s remained a weak elitist activity and an urban or “Seoul” phenomenon.
As we have seen earlier, the weakness of liberal Christian activism can be seen clearly in the very nature of church organization as a social institution. Lay leaders with higher social status and greater financial means tend to avoid controversial political issues and to accept the existing political reality. Against such an orientation by congregational leaders, it was difficult for liberal ministers to participate in political action alongside other liberal theologians and clergymen. It seems that most Korean clergymen, sensitive to the attitudes of their congregations, became more concerned with church management and job security than with social and political affairs.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) was quite vocal in advocating democracy and social justice and criticizing violations of human rights, but the organization did not represent all Protestant groups. For example, see the introduction to Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems, ed., Documents on the Struggle for Democracy in Korea (Tokyo: Shinkyo shuppansha, 1975), pp. 1–28. The writer errs in describing the anti–Park Chung-hee movement centered in the kncc in the 1970s as a campaign of the Christian churches as a whole.（Park [2015], 95, 246）
When military rule finally came to an end in 1987 and Korea at long last became a democracy, the Catholic church was widely credited for its role in this seismic change. Needless to say, such perceptions significantly boosted its popularity: Church leaders were seen as relevant, dedicated and ready to risk their life and freedom for a great cause. Indeed, while Catholic churches across the globe face increasing difficulties and dwindling numbers of believers, the Korean church is thriving. In the mid-1990s the Catholics constituted merely 6 percent of the total population, but in twenty years the number nearly doubled, reaching 10 percent.（Lankov, [2014]）
Kim Nyung 於華盛頓大學的博士論文更是以「1974-89：天主教會對威權體制的政治抗爭」為主題，認為梵諦岡第二次大會後給予的國際支持，將反抗政治威權、與弱勢同在視為比「國族主義狂熱」更重要的天主信徒使命，給予天主教會源源不絕「先知性」守望社會的道德勇氣和實踐策略。
Park, Chung-Shin (2015). Protestantism and Politics in Korea. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Gi-Wook Shin et. al. (2007). South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report. The Korea Democracy Foundation & Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.
// I just talked to one of their commanders n they r hopeful to conquer this area within a week in case talks fail. // （Source: Maham Banori, Aug 23, 2021, via Twitter）
副總統沙雷於17日推特宣稱，加尼出逃後，他就是代位元首。並逃往潘傑希爾谷地與小馬蘇德會合。不過根據稍早21日最新照片動態，沙雷（右一）在當地與忠誠於原政府的志士們一起架網子打排球，心情輕鬆愉快。（Photo by Yalda Hakim via Twitter）
![The Man of Villa Tevere by [Pilar Urbano]](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/51cEuU691dL.jpg)
林德貝克的贈言 Patrimoine de Lindbeck 