分析師 Bill Browder 稍早受 CBC 訪問時就直接戳破這個說法：「普丁不是那種你熱身出招（starting low），就會知所進退改變心意的人。所有觀測研究他的人都知道這點。」
「既然認定普丁此刻已做出侵犯雷池之舉，而歐美打算用銀行（bank）而非戰車（tank）嚇阻，就不可能搞所謂的擠牙膏策略。要畢其功於一役就要祭出絕招（ »There is no sort of up-scaling it. At this point, everything should be thrown at him. »）。」[1]
SWIFT 被認為是一招歐美不想用上的「七傷拳」。台經院今天舉行景氣動向記者會，會中所長吳孟道指出，「把俄羅斯剔除 SWIFT，金融市場會大亂」，德國不希望做這件事、美國也不樂見歐洲經濟成長將受到打擊，波及自身。
卡内基莫斯科中心智庫 Alexander Gabuev 研判，這次訪問交換的雙邊默契一定程度上堅定了普丁的行動盤算。
他在《經濟學人》的引述中表示，照目前的北京對烏俄事態的對應，普丁已經有了被西方封鎖之後的經濟後門。北京台面上或許會配合國際發表對俄制裁，然而私下接收俄國的各種貿易轉單的渠道多的是（ »expect China to adhere to the legal requirements of any Western sanctions, such as not banking with blacklisted oligarchs. Nonetheless China will find plenty of ways to keep business flowing. »）。
「這兩國過去都在經貿往來逐步降低美元依賴，也是為了這樣一日在做準備。（And the two countries have steadily reduced their reliance on the dollar to settle trade, part of Russia’s efforts to insulate itself from American sanctions.）」[3]
Under the leadership of Cardinal Kim, the Catholic church took a remarkably active leadership role, always ready to criticise the government and its perceived brutal use of force against government opponents. Outraged, the KCIA, the South Korean political police, arrested Bishop Daniel Chi Hak-sun, one of Cardinal Kim’s lieutenants and an outspoken critic of the military rule, but had to release him soon, bowing to pressure from local Catholics groups and from overseas. （Lankov [2014]）
——我在原文中參考了這份歷史，在圖說註腳也提到金壽煥樞機是韓國公民歷史中享譽的「民主人權的守望者」。事實上，最近一份1974年的外交文件解封，是當時總統朴正熙曾施壓梵帝崗開除池學淳的原州主教地位撤職。當年他在7月起起草發表「良心宣言」，被政府他時他被判監禁十五年。然而梵帝崗代表 Luigi Dossena曾到訪南韓親自談判。協議內容我們不得而知，但結果是池學淳被監禁一年後就獲釋。
哈佛大學生 Will Matheson (2018) 論文當中寫道：1952年、1956年及1960年選舉都舞弊疑雲的李承晚就是高調的新教徒，其政權中有4成的基督徒，高於當是韓國基督教人口比例的4倍。「在韓戰解放後的政治舞台上，韓國領導人中超常比例是基督徒。這個狀態有助於理解為什麼新教教會群體會與那個專制政府如此緊密。」（Matheson [2018], 7）
「戰後，美國政府支持教會作為社會組織，擁有經濟和社會資本的人同時擔任教會和政治領袖。因此，許多教會領袖都投身於李承晚統治下的政府。這也創造了宗派領導人相互競爭的動態，時而會顯露宗派主義（Park and Pak 2011b）。這種狀態解釋了為什麼民權運動期間「在新教群體的 11,582 名神職人員和 17,793 間教會中，只有 542 名牧師和 831 間教會參與了民權示威的行動」（Park and Pak 2011，“Protestant Christians and South Korea Politics, 1948-1980s：” 183)。
In the context of the pro-democracy movement, then, the Protestant church as a whole took a passive stance. However, a subsection of the church split with the majority and played a vital role in the movement. （Matheson [2018], 7）
Matheson文中引用的首爾崇實大學基督教研究系歷史教授朴正信（박정신）是更詳實的，他在 Protestantism and Politics in Korea （University of Washington Press, 2015）第七章 » Protestant Christians and South Korean Politics, 1948–1980s » 十分值得閱讀。
Why did the Protestant church consistently support the regime? What specific form did this support take, and what in particular did the church support? What bearing did the church’s approval have on the continuation of Rhee’s rule? Did the church undergo any change, politically or historically, by supporting his regime? These questions will be addressed by considering what brought the Protestant church into a leadership position in South Korean politics and society.（Park [2015], 174）
Under Park Chung-hee, some Christian leaders dared to raise their voices against the government. Kim Chaejun, Mun Ikhwan, Pak Hyonggyu, Mun Tonghwan, and An Pyongmu, all Christian theologians or ministers, risked imprisonment when they called for social justice, respect for human rights, and democracy, but the majority of Christians went the easy way of supporting the regime.The political attitude of the absolute majority of church members was identical to that of their fellow Christians during the Syngman Rhee period. （Park [2015], 174）
Despite these activities, the political stance of the majority of church members was one of inaction during Park’s rule. Claiming that the church should concern itself only with saving souls, most Protestant leaders tried to draw attention away from political realities, including, of course, the government’s action. The church also stressed the apostle Paul’s teaching that all political powers are ordained of God and that one should obey civil authorities. The church also continued to make a case for anticommunism. The communists were the real enemy of Christ, and so to uphold a government that combated communism was to do the will of God. The political inaction of the majority of Korean Christians was actually a political position that, actively or passively, supported the regime that a tiny group of their fellow Christians were criticizing.（Park [2015], 183-4）
Whenever the KNCC criticized the government, the KCCC defended the regime and denounced liberal Christian activists. Whenever the regime’s reputation suffered at home or abroad, the kccc supported the government and its policies. Denouncing the liberal Christians who dared to raise their voices against the regime, the kccc claimed that “the Bible teaches Christians to pray for the secular powers and to obey them,” that “the antigovernment propaganda and demonstrations of Christians are not Christian acts based on biblical teachings,” and that “in South Korea there is religious freedom, contrary to the claim of the liberal Christians.”（Park [2015], 187）
Unlike organizations such as the Catholic Church, these six denominations do not necessarily act in concert under one centralized policy or directive.102 Usually, a political statement issued by the KNCC is supported morally or nominally, but not actively or organizationally, by the six affiliated denominations.
Christian liberals in the 1970s and 1980s dared to raise their voices against the government, but they did so against the general current of Protestant opinion. This is one of the reasons that it was not liberal pastors, but rather liberal Christian intellectuals (the so-called kigwan moksa) working in church-related agencies such as seminaries, schools, the YMCA, and radio stations, who became the leading Christian activists. Such individuals were free from direct control and pressure by a congregation.
The liberal Christian elite in Seoul used the names of their denominations in protesting dictatorial rule, but they could not mobilize their churches and congregations for their cause; they could not even receive much moral support from their fellow Christians. The liberal Christian movement of the 1970s and 1980s remained a weak elitist activity and an urban or “Seoul” phenomenon.
As we have seen earlier, the weakness of liberal Christian activism can be seen clearly in the very nature of church organization as a social institution. Lay leaders with higher social status and greater financial means tend to avoid controversial political issues and to accept the existing political reality. Against such an orientation by congregational leaders, it was difficult for liberal ministers to participate in political action alongside other liberal theologians and clergymen. It seems that most Korean clergymen, sensitive to the attitudes of their congregations, became more concerned with church management and job security than with social and political affairs.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) was quite vocal in advocating democracy and social justice and criticizing violations of human rights, but the organization did not represent all Protestant groups. For example, see the introduction to Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems, ed., Documents on the Struggle for Democracy in Korea (Tokyo: Shinkyo shuppansha, 1975), pp. 1–28. The writer errs in describing the anti–Park Chung-hee movement centered in the kncc in the 1970s as a campaign of the Christian churches as a whole.（Park [2015], 95, 246）
When military rule finally came to an end in 1987 and Korea at long last became a democracy, the Catholic church was widely credited for its role in this seismic change. Needless to say, such perceptions significantly boosted its popularity: Church leaders were seen as relevant, dedicated and ready to risk their life and freedom for a great cause. Indeed, while Catholic churches across the globe face increasing difficulties and dwindling numbers of believers, the Korean church is thriving. In the mid-1990s the Catholics constituted merely 6 percent of the total population, but in twenty years the number nearly doubled, reaching 10 percent.（Lankov, [2014]）
Kim Nyung 於華盛頓大學的博士論文更是以「1974-89：天主教會對威權體制的政治抗爭」為主題，認為梵諦岡第二次大會後給予的國際支持，將反抗政治威權、與弱勢同在視為比「國族主義狂熱」更重要的天主信徒使命，給予天主教會源源不絕「先知性」守望社會的道德勇氣和實踐策略。
Park, Chung-Shin (2015). Protestantism and Politics in Korea. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Gi-Wook Shin et. al. (2007). South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report. The Korea Democracy Foundation & Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.
戈帕爾是《重新思考阿富汗》紀錄片中受訪的阿富汗問題專家之一。本月5日他結合了新舊採訪，寫了一篇長篇報導 The Other Afghan Women 在《紐約客》—— 標題中的 The other 在英文片語不僅是另一群、另一邊的意思，在這更是指揀選二分剩下、被人當作餘思（afterthought）冷落不顧的一群；本文下標依此而生。
報導中她講述她的普什圖童年時，戈帕爾捨棄了夾敘夾議。我想他或許假設讀者有一個背景資訊的版本可以對照著詮釋這名女子所關聯的政治背景。但其實讀者不一定有。例如，從以上段落對蘇聯的馬列政黨政變帶來的表面進步（如女子教育）似乎過於印象正面；好像是鄉下不肯接受「進步制度」才革命、抓著自己控制婦女的家父長權力才會革命。這部分我是十分推薦 David Edwards (2002). Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad. Berkeley, CA: UC press, 一書。
// I just talked to one of their commanders n they r hopeful to conquer this area within a week in case talks fail. // （Source: Maham Banori, Aug 23, 2021, via Twitter）
副總統沙雷於17日推特宣稱，加尼出逃後，他就是代位元首。並逃往潘傑希爾谷地與小馬蘇德會合。不過根據稍早21日最新照片動態，沙雷（右一）在當地與忠誠於原政府的志士們一起架網子打排球，心情輕鬆愉快。（Photo by Yalda Hakim via Twitter）
威克里夫對黑死病後的世界是極度悲觀，他在1356年完成牛津大學莫頓學院（Merton College）學位時寫了一篇小論文：〈教會的末期（The Last Age of the Church）〉。論文觀察到神職人員在黑死病疫情中的死亡率特別高（缺乏運動又老的文人），反而是那些幹粗活的的低下階層有更高機率存活。
林德貝克的贈言 Patrimoine de Lindbeck 