[靈命省思] 他偷不走 你心底的平安光芒

【他偷不走 你心底的平安光芒】

Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path (Psalm 119:105).

 

大約10個月前,在台北通勤換成了響應環保的電單車,也促成家裡把原來給我開的歐洲小鋼砲轎車捐給慈善機構,因為家裡這樣是徹底用不到兩台汽車了。

電單車速的一個特色,是對沿途有更貼近的路況觀察可以反應。諸如就地停下陪伴老人過馬路,或是挪走掉在地上對汽機車造成交通障礙危險的安全帽之類,是我一向瀟灑的都會行俠自然風。

不過要說最習慣做的,還是幫忙拔下路邊車主遺忘的摩托車鑰匙。從那時起算到現在,我已幫拔過三次。最近一次是禮拜一客座參加一友好單位春酒聚會的時候。我打算停巷內位置的隔壁,一整串未拔的鑰匙留在摩托車龍頭上。這台白色摩托車龍頭下手套箱看起來藏不住那麼大串的鑰匙,於是我順手把它們塞入他車墊下扣著的安全帽內盔中。

我以為如此日行一善,應該不會遭被人偷鑰匙一類的厄事,偏偏佛教的陰德善報定理是如此不管用。
──晚上回家騎著電單車要開燈時,車桿上照明用的LED燈就給人順手牽羊了!

半年來,我的車身改裝部品被偷拆過兩次。第一次是個大陸淘寶買的水壺掛。被偷時我是有點生氣,但因為它比較顯眼、車子又在外擺上了幾天,那才值個不到100元台幣的東西,你要就給你唄。

可這次LED小燈被偷,我是真的火了。第一時間OS:「台灣的某些人是神經病嗎?」這個LED同樣我也只買100多塊,你賺不到什麼,卻影響了別人夜視行車安全。

我已經兩度拴在車上的部品被偷,到底是什麼樣的人要一直做這種事?

夜騎回家路上,經過中正運動中心人行道前,突然一個閃閃的LED燈光源切過我右前側。我於是停在了那發這光的自行車旁邊。

按它一下,閃光變常駐光。再按一下,燈就關了。居然這麼巧,跟我失去的一樣是三段開關的自行車LED燈,只不過這個燈的光線強度、製造品質,都比我剛丟掉的那個好多了。

我突然想起有個西方神話寓言,是關於樵夫掉了金斧頭還是銀斧頭的。他說都不是;是掉了鐵斧頭。神讚揚他誠實,就把金斧頭、銀斧頭都賜給了他。

於是我又看了一下運動中心前自行車上那個豪華LED燈,決定再按它一下。它開始閃,就像一開始我經過它時一樣。我拍了張照。然後再按兩下,燈滅了。從此它不會繼續招順手牽羊的人注目、或是一直電力耗盡,影響車主回來騎乘時的夜視安全。

自己之這麼做,就像這幾個月來一直幫摩托車拔鑰匙的動作一般,是我一向瀟灑的都會行俠自然風。

──儘管,我剛被偷了燈,也沒有因此就得到了鑲金或鑲銀的LED燈;但當自己沒有把那個豪華LED燈的一眨一眨,作為「拔走我,讓你有光可以指引你平安回家吧!」的挑逗信號時,我忽然發現,
那閃閃發光指引我回家的,
乃是心底的那份人性良知與內在平安。
正如詩人有話說:

你的話是我腳前的燈,是我路上的光。 (詩篇 119:105)

這份光芒、這份平安,是誰也偷不走的。

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Publicités

[文摘] 安全感、愛的對象和能力

Source Link: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/WomenTalk/M.1426664977.A.A63.html (主要引用來源)

Harville Handrix在《相愛一生》中提出,兩個人會互相吸引,最重要的的條件是什麼?是認為對方能夠滿足我心中的那些渴望。什麼渴望?讓我們先試著想像一個畫面:我們身上背著成長過程中的種種不滿足與缺憾而長大,而那些不滿足與缺憾就像一個一個的洞,我們帶著這些洞活著。

當我們看見一個人,一個我認為可以幫助我填補這些洞的人時,我們會很容易被他/她們所吸引。而由於那些洞通常來自於幼年時期需求的不被滿足,所以我們很容易把對方跟照顧者混淆在一起。

我們幼年都會經歷過一段成長必然伴隨著的傷痛與缺口,那些最原始的傷痛(來自原生家庭的),每個人都不太相同。有的人是缺乏關愛,因而導致對他人有強烈依附的需求,不過也有同樣缺乏關愛,但表現得社交畏懼或退縮等情形。

我們進入一段關係時,可能是無意識(unconscious)因為某些內在驅動力的驅使,通常不會考慮到太多原因,而多半是某些美麗的想像:「啊!這個人能夠滿足我什麼什麼」。

而除了內在需求被滿足的需要以外,我們對一段關係也有其他的基本需求在:我在這段關係中,能夠有充分表達自己想法、情緒的空間,能夠容許自己好與壞的兩面性,能夠更加地被認識,以及更認識自己的對象。

總的來說,當我們確定「跟這個人在一起時,我能有足夠的空間表現我自己、提出要求時,我覺得我是安全的」,也就是安全感被建立起來後,我們會很自然地想要變得更好,不只為自己,更多的是為對方。

不過值得注意的是,內在無意識、屬於缺憾滿足的「照顧需求」,與有意識的、關乎成年後人格發展的「安全感需求」;與「愛的對象」和「愛的能力」兩者都有關係。

關係中的安全感要被建立,也是在先有「我想為對方改變」這個意願出現的情況下,才更可能改善一段關係。這個想改變的意願,是一種「愛的能力」,與建立一段安全的關係,就像是螺旋梯一樣,相輔相成的。
但精神分析社會學者Erich Fromm注意到,「愛的對象」之選擇,在20世紀發生了巨大的變化…

人們之所以抱著愛無須學習的態度,還有另一個前提,那就是人們認為愛的問題是對象的問題,而不是能力的問題。人們以為去愛是簡單的,尋找一個正確的對象,讓我們去愛或被愛卻是困難的…

人們廣泛的在尋求浪漫式的愛情,把愛情當作是個人性的、過後才可能導致婚姻的自由觀念,必然大大加強了愛之對象的重要性,而使得愛的能力在相形之下被人忽略。

與這因素密切相關的,還有當代文化中另一個特色:

當代整個文化都奠基在購買慾上,奠基在交易互惠的觀念上。現代人的快樂在於觀看店鋪櫥窗時的驚喜,在於能買便買的購買行為所產生的興奮之中。他/她看人也用類似的眼光,對於男人來說,一個具有吸引力的女孩子,是他所要追求的獎品,對女人來說,一個具有吸引力的男人也是如此。「有吸引力」,意思就是一份漂亮的品質包裝,裡面所包裝的,是一些通俗的、在人格市場上被人們所求購的東西。

(The Art of Loving, 1956)

[文摘] Stanley Hauerwas on Alasdair MacIntyre: « Secularly » post-liberal

Source Link: THE VIRTUES OF ALASDAIR MACINTYRE by Stanley Hauerwas (2007. 10)
On MacIntyre as anti-techno-bureaucratic postliberal
The constructive character of MacIntyre’s work is apparent in his understanding of the philosophical task. A philosopher, he insists, should try to express the concepts embedded in the practices of our lives in order to help us live morally worthy lives. The professionalization of philosophy into a technical field”what might be called the academic captivity of philosophy”reflects (and serves to legitimate) the compartmentalization of the advanced capitalistic social orders that produce our culture of experts, those strange creatures of authority in modernity.
Conservatives and liberals, [however], both try to employ the power of the modern state to support their positions in a manner alien to MacIntyre’s understanding of the social practices necessary for the common good.
 
On MacIntyre’s virtue ethics as universal (non-sectarian) and theologically « non-confessional »
Those who fear MacIntyre’s position might commit him to some form of confessional theological position should be comforted by his adamant declaration that his metaphysical position, his account of natural law, as well as his understanding of practical reason and the virtues are secular. By secular I take him to mean that his argument that some overall good is necessary for our actions to be intelligible does not entail any theological convictions that are not available to anyone.
Aristotle provided MacIntyre with an account of why our actions require a conception of an end as well as the social and political conditions necessary to sustain a life formed by the virtues constitutive of that end that is simply lacking in modern moral practice and theory.
The “plain person” is the character MacIntyre has identified to display the unavoidability of the virtues. Plain persons are those characterized by everyday practices such as sustaining families, schools, and local forms of political community. They engage in trades and professions that have required them to learn skills constitutive of a craft. Such people are the readers he hopes his books may reach. Grounded as they are in concrete practices necessary to sustain a common life, they acquire the virtues that make them capable of recognizing the principles of natural law and why those principles call into question the legitimating modes of modernity.
On MacIntyre as « post-modern » and post-liberal
General dismissals of MacIntyre too often rest on a fundamental failure to understand the interconnected character of his work. His criticisms of modernity are often thought to reflect a nostalgic and unjustified preference for the Middle Ages.
[But] MacIntyre’s critique of modernity is hardly wholesale rejection. Ethics and Politics ends with a fascinating defense of the virtue of toleration and free speech. From MacIntyre’s perspective, the presumption that one might be capable of standing somewhere to reject modernity is the kind of peculiarly modern attitude his work is meant to disabuse. MacIntyre, moreover, understands that there is no past to which we might return. He notes that we are all “inescapably inhabitants of advanced modernity, bearing its social and cultural marks.” Accordingly he acknowledges that his understanding of the tradition of the virtues and the consequences for modernity of the rejection of that tradition is one that is possible only on this side of modernity.
Alasdair MacIntyre (From Wikimedia)

[文摘] What Reason Can Know and What Government Should Legislate: A Rejoinder to Arkes by Robert T. Miller

Source Link: http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/08/13732/

 

Robert T. Miller, an eminent Aristotelian-Thomist law scholar, bring a well-reasoned postliberal public theology to the table of Hobby Lobby.

the argument goes as this:

1. Some people have complained that the judges in the Hobby Lobby case have ‘put the main and decisive accent on the « theology » of the litigants or the « sincerity » of their « beliefs », instead of using a discipline of reason for legal guidance on the deliberation of moral matters.

2. The loophole created, as these people would argue, is that « when someone believe something with sincerity, it is better that thing is not forbidden by law. »

(Nicholas Wolterstorff and some Neuhausians would see there is some intrinsic good in such a « dense libertarian » liberal-democratic civil society, though, vis-a-vis Rawlsians.)
3. But Miller has helped us in the discussion by rightly distinguishing the « Abstract Reason » and « the Reasoning of Particular Individuals. » He argues that

conferring on public officials a general power to inquire into moral or religious truths is dangerous because such people are no better than anyone else at sorting out true beliefs from false ones and they are just as likely as everyone else to think that ideas different from their own are unreasonable or perverse.

This does not mean that sound reason does not exist or that truth is unattainable. But truth will not side with a certain group of deliberative people all the time, and for this reason we have to do something to prevent a certain group of people from always having the final say on matters of truth.

An analogy will help. The natural sciences are the work of reason, and over the last few centuries human beings have made astonishing advances in understanding the natural world. On the basis of this success, no one doubts that human reason can discover scientific truths. But a person would have to be daft to support, on this basis, setting up a committee of eminent scientists with the power to decide, in a way binding on other people, which scientific propositions are true and which are false. The reasons are obvious: even professional scientists, when dealing with purely scientific questions, are subject to common human failings, including pride, envy, and all manner of prejudices, which can readily lead them into error. The history of science is replete with such examples, such as the early twentieth-century physicists who resisted the big bang theory because of its perceived theistic implications.

If this is true of natural science, how much truer is it of morality and religion, where the inquirer’s biases and self-interest will have much greater influence on his reasoning? We all know people (often ourselves) who have adjusted their moral beliefs when they have become inconvenient. We all know people (often ourselves) who hold certain moral views for no better reason than that we learned them from our parents. For such reasons, and because of the inherent difficulty of many moral and religious questions, there is scant basis to think that any particular person is likely to reach correct results on a given question, even when there is a unique, rationally determinable answer to the question. This is why there is so much disagreement on normative questions, even among intelligent and informed people of good will.

4. In devicing governmental institutions, therefore, it’s critically important

  • to make it difficult to enact laws without very broad support (broad support reduces the chance of error),
  • to allow errors to be corrected relatively easily
  • to have a system of checks and balances that requires approval by different officials answerable to people in different ways before effecting laws

5. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), under which Hobby Lobby was decided, is part of such a system in that it provides additional protection for religious freedom.

Under our [U.S.] Constitution, enacting a federal law requires the assent of both houses of Congress and the concurrence of the president (subject to Congress’s overruling a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote of both houses). This system by itself affords real protection to minorities whose religious practices may be restricted by legislation: they have the opportunity to participate in the political process at various points to affect the legislation. Beyond that, however, RFRA provides that, if a federal law substantially burdens a person’s exercise of his religion, the government must convince a court that applying the burden to the plaintiff furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means available. This is a protection of religious freedom over and above the protections available to minorities in the ordinary legislative process.

The keywords are: « convince », « compelling governmental interest », and « least restrictive means available. »

In the procedure, people adversely affected by the law will be allowed at least two chances of hearing. The first one is at the legislative stage before the proposed law has been finally signed by the president. This is what is usually called ‘lobbying.’ The second one is at the juridical stage- thanks to RFRA, when the judges will review if such a a federal law that burdens a person’s exercise of his religion could be proven to furthers a substantive governmental interest by the least restrictive means available.

6. Miller’s sophisticated argument lies right between his statements that

  • judges are not good at determining moral and religious truths
  • it is good that judges are entitled [by RAFA] to determine whether a law furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means on individual religious freedom

For to have judges to determine what « substantive interest » and « least restrictive means available » are is not the same to empower them to determine « moral and religious truths », namely, whether a law is « justified or unjustified » , good or bad, right or wrong, wise or foolish.

This does not mean that when evaluating « interest » and « means of restriction » the judges will never touch moral issues and make moral judgments, but with these guidelines, the institutional utterance of forceful words will tend to be much more regulated and accountable. The goal is exactly to cabin the judges’ discretion in ways that will tend to produce the best reasonable results on average.

7. « There are some immoral actions that it would be immoral to make illegal. » This is Miller’s central contention, and it is also one of the central contention of postliberal public theology. As the Aristotelian-Thomist postliberal McIntyre’s virtue ethics would tell us, « To Become Virtuous, One Must Choose Good Actions Freely. »

Part of becoming virtuous, part of becoming a good human being, is identifying and choosing good actions for oneself. If one’s neighbors, or the state, or even God himself were always at hand to point the way and then coerce a man into doing good and avoiding evil, virtue would become impossible: a man might always choose good actions, but he would not become a virtuous man.

Surely there are gravely immoral conduct causing grievous harm to others that on morally grounds should be legally restricted (such as murdering), but we do not for morally permissible reasons force the rich people to give a fraction of their wealth to the poor, or to restrict the right to marriage to couples who demonstratively to have mature quality of love.

« The classic tradition has made room for ‘prudence’—for not applying the principles of right in their stringency to every case” because sometimes “it’s necessary for statesmen to make an accommodation with evil for the sake of compressing it, as the American founders did with slavery. »

This ‘prudence’, or φρόνησις in the original Greek language, is what we should soundly bite and reflect upon.