便當門事件的真話與零和(邱慕天)

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便當門事件的真話與零和

Source Link: http://www.awakeningtw.com/awakening/news_center/show.php?itemid=41446

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【台灣醒報記者邱慕天特稿】20世紀法國哲學家傅柯(Michel Foucault)有一本著作《傅柯說真話》探討了古希臘時期「說真話」(parrhesia)的概念。傅柯認為,說真話是一項社會行動,更是一項與自我關係非常密切的倫理行動。最近,不論是菲律賓對殺人的抵賴和矯飾,還是董小姐等人陷台灣形象於不義的厚顏辯駁,都提醒了這個社會我們所最欠缺的是說真話的勇氣。

傅柯書中有一個段落提到,當希臘人確定某人是「說真話的人」(parrhesiates)的身份之後,便不會有人質疑這個人說話的真實性。當然,這套有關發言主體與發言內容完全契合的溝通思維,「已經不再能在我們的現代認識論框架中出現。」

當代世界中受到侵蝕的真話有兩類。一類是政治上的真話,一類是生活裡的真話。政治上的真話很難聽到,掌權者有為了維持社稷穩定與發展國家戰略的難處與苦衷,為著涉及千萬人生死,或關乎社會公平正義與人權的事上,必須犧牲部份個人的言論自由與自我告白的意念,對此,人們多能表示一定程度的容忍與理解。

但傅柯特別指出的,是在民主社會生活裡講真話也變成一種政治的遊戲。從個人床笫隱私、到生意往來、朋友交際,大多人藉著語言的虛假和修辭來達成他們認為有價值和正確的意圖:大話、假話、空話,與謊話。

跟菲國一樣說謊

菲國公務船射殺台灣漁民事件,引起台灣群情激憤。相較於菲國官方含糊其詞,謊話連篇,台灣島內的「拒賣菲勞便當」事件也在本月14日到15日之間,一連在社群網站臉書上出現三篇,分別來自任職科技業秘書的董小姐、立報/四方報的鄭姓記者,與就讀神學院的潘傳道。

仔細檢視,三位不相識的人(?)所po的文章不僅時間相近、地點都在台北、基本情節完全一致,竟然還都是標榜第一人稱的親身經歷,說是在外出買便當的時候,遇到便當店老闆敵視菲律賓勞工,不但拒賣,並且辱之以狗。三人都見義勇為地打抱不平,不但買了便當相贈,更在與移工的對話過程中,記錄了他們幾天來遭到台灣人惡待的種種。

這些巧合究竟是時事所營造的共同想像,還是真有一確實的源頭事件版本,至今還是一起羅生門。

疑點重重的三篇文

事件在網路上傳開討論後,第一時間就被網友指出各式各樣的疑點:台灣便當店老闆怎有能力一眼辨識移工的國籍?菲籍移工從來就不特別愛吃台式自助餐,為何被辱後還執著在便當店外徘徊?菲籍移工的中文能力多半極為有限或趨近於無,如何能和便當店老闆來回對話,甚至向作者分訴遭遇?

事件真實性遭到質疑和追查後,鄭姓記者最先將臉書文章關閉,但透過上司四方報總編輯張正的公開轉貼和〈夜訪便當店老闆〉一文擔保事件真實性後,仍繼續和網友攻防。潘傳道則在轉貼達到2千次之前就將文章隱藏,並且連連變換臉書的名稱,避開注意。

令人啼笑皆非的戲劇化

影響最大、立場最強硬、也最先被迫承認造假的是董小姐。她的文章在兩天之內就被轉載八萬多次,並且成為外籍勞工間、外國媒體所知悉的版本。不僅她自己多次在回應中強調「便當就是我本人買的」、「再度與便當店老闆見面,在他的(幾乎)下跪懇求下,承諾絕不供出店名」、「以人身安全擔保事件屬實」,還對「文章已經被翻成英文,影響力擴及國外」表示得意,連她的幾位朋友都出面幫腔筆戰,最後更在電視台專訪中,要全國觀眾相信她。

最戲劇化的是,在內政部長李鴻源指示警署查辦下,董小姐終究不至於在刑事局面前繼續扯謊,供稱整起事件是「聽說」來的。數小時之內,立報也及時發表聲明,承認鄭姓記者的故事造假,也屬「聽說」,甚至「夜訪便當店老闆」的內容都是鄭設局欺騙。潘姓神學生雖然自此在網路上隱匿行蹤,且沒有公開可見的發言,卻也馬上面對警方約談,承認他也是「聽說」。

加油添醋的危險
與潘傳道同樣具有傳道身份,並且同為神學院校友,筆者可以肯定預備在教會講壇證道的一大難處,就是帶不出足夠的親身經歷印證所傳講的神學教導。將自己經歷的事件加油添醋,或將寓言當作真實事件來訴說,都是講者可能存在的誘惑,目的是讓聽眾能得到更多的鼓舞。
 
但是這種做法,使得應當是「說真話的人」(parrhesiates)的記者、傳道,容易以便宜行事的方式,避開了「說真話」行為所要擔負的生命政治(bio-politics)賭注:亦即,親歷事件現場的「道德運氣」(moral luck)、和如蘇格拉底般為之「殉道」(martyrdom)的覺悟。

過度的善意

只是在這樣的故事中,我們仍必須先肯定,他們對「善」的執著可能比一般台灣人都多,如果這幾位人士不是對於台灣人將仇恨轉嫁到移工身上極度關心和焦慮,便不可能產生出這些文章。

試想,如果是以第三人稱見聞「拒賣菲勞便當」事件,為何不如實闡述狀況就好?〈四方報〉更是一份以移工社群為主要關懷的報紙,鄭姓記者不但有管道、動機、和義務追查並深入報導這個「獨家新聞」,若真是「聽說」,怎麼會落得在臉書造謠,甚至請人假扮便當店老闆佈局欺騙自家總編輯?

會將自己化身成行善主角,正是因為那就是自己心裡無時無刻想要伸張的善念。那絕對不是「聽說」。

套句網路上「鍵盤偵探」的說法,「董小姐聽便當店隔壁桌說的,立報記者也說是聽說的,所以那天是潘傳道跟立報記者說這件事,剛好被隔壁桌的董小姐聽到」,這樣整起事件才說得通。

網路事件的零和遊戲

這起「便當門」讓三位發文者始料未及的,可能是網路病毒式傳播的「量變帶來質變」。

本來第一人稱的「拒賣菲勞便當」敘事若屬實,那它應該是一起道德上的「零和遊戲」;事件中的英雄主角所收穫的道德聲望,其實是扮演惡人的便當店老闆和冷漠看客們的道德負分的總和。但正因為便當店老闆是虛構的而且不會被供出,在虛擬世界中編造這樣的故事變成「毋須成本」的善行。

無論是聽說或是杜撰,發文者起初也只是在自己所能掌控的社群圈子內,提醒大家多多關心菲勞在台灣的待遇。

但隨著公開設定的轉貼量呈指數性爆炸,英雄賺進了大把聲望,「零和遊戲」被破壞的本質勢必需要修復:人事時地物必須交代;只有「便當店老闆」出面賠出信譽,我們才能將英雄坐收不成比例的聲望兌現。

越演越烈

這樣的零和天平在文章被轉引到外國媒體,並對菲律賓台僑造成身心威脅後,更是被強迫加碼。在國際輿論的規格下,一旦沒有虛擬便當店老闆出來「坦」傷害,將是由全台灣人「代償」信譽和道德聲望值,給這三位超凡入聖的便當英雄賺盡。

潘傳道在這起事件所受的傷害反饋最小,因為他在大量無法掌控的美譽和質疑湧入以先,就選擇銷聲匿跡。而鄭姓記者雖在更早就隱藏了名為「海洋藍」臉書帳號,卻透過四方報總編輯張正的臉書平台繼續抵賴網友質疑。

同樣地,董小姐也是因為自己和友人Viola Kao等人不斷地以破綻愈來愈多的說詞圓謊,並在認錯之餘,還將部分罪責卸給「有心擷取」和「斷章取義」的轉貼民眾,使憤怒的網民對她的口誅筆伐至今仍不能停止。

便當門的意圖

在《傅柯說真話》有關「說真話」的理念中,提到了雅典與斯巴達的伯羅奔尼薩斯戰爭之後,古希臘的民主政治開始正視「說真話」的暴民政治危害,人民被法律所保障的言論自由也意味著參差不齊、道德意涵不一的「真話」。這些是民粹的顯影,也在這次台菲衝突的風波中非常引人憂心。

可是這波在網路上延燒的「便當門」反倒讓人們看見,縱使帶有正確道德寓意,夾帶著利己意圖的虛假道德敘事,絕對不是言論自由困境的解答。

一般相信,發便當文的三人肯定在撰述情節的時刻,在心理及良知上和故事情節是完全認知調和的;也就是說,他們若有足夠的「運氣」在現實中撞見「菲勞買便當被拒」的場景,必定可以踐行他們文中所成就的義行。

然而,不論是菲律賓對殺人的抵賴和矯飾,還是董小姐等人陷台灣形象於不義的厚顏辯駁,都提醒了這個社會我們所最欠缺的,乃是在時運不濟、甚至「風向」錯誤時,依然誠實坦蕩說真話的勇氣。
by www.sos-detresse.org
用生命說真話

原來在希臘先哲蘇格拉底的哲學中,「說真話」並不是一種向君王或公民百姓呼告的政治藝術,而是人際之間最單純的溝通關係。並且在它和真道與勇氣的對應關係之外,「說真話」原初的對應對象,乃是「生命」(bios)。

一個人是透過生命的見證(便當事件的經歷)來說話(便當文),而人們也是透過見證真話來認識一個「說真話的人」。換句話說,標識著一位「說真話的人」(parrhesiastes)的決定性標準,既不是他的出身,也不是他的公民身份、記者身份或傳道身份,而是其言與行之間的和諧一致。

在這個「單純說真話的人」已經失去了其社會功能的時代,也就是一個沒有「先知」的世代,「傳道」普遍也只是在真誠互動匱乏的現代生活中傳述其所「聽說」之道,「說真話」的倫理行動因此成了關鍵危急時刻人們所能仰賴的偶發神蹟,像是一道強烈的閃電乍現天際,劃破犬儒與玩世的黑暗、照亮專制與民粹的猙獰。

by Bro. Jeffrey Pioquinto, SJ @ Flickr

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[文摘] Eerdmans 100 Interview Series: Anthony Thiselton

Cover of "Hermeneutics of Doctrine"
Cover of Hermeneutics of Doctrine

Source Link: Eerdmans 100 Interview Series: Anthony Thiselton

Matthew: Hermeneutics is a complex discipline that cannot be performed with an overly reduced concept of the term. Indeed, it draws on many fields for its practice and coherence. Will you, briefly, outline what hermeneutics is and explain its relationship to other disciplines both scientific and artistic?

Thiselton: Although it entails, first, biblical hermeneutics, it is vital that Biblical Studies is not isolated from Systematic Theology. This occurs all too often, to the impoverishment of both. Hence the second discipline is Theology. Third, Linguistics has to be studied for a serious Hermeneutic. Fourth, because modern Hermeneutics since Schleiermacher is “the art of understanding”, it must involve epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. The fifth essential discipline is sociology of knowledge, since all interpretation is not purely “objective”, but depends on pre-understanding, or what Habermas calls “interest”. Preliminary understandings (English, rather than German!) can be negotiated like “horizons”; they are not fixed like “presuppositions. Nowadays, sixthly, Literary Studies are indispensible, both for an understanding of genre (as in Umberto Eco), but also on “intention” and Reader Response Theory.

We might add, seventh, Reception History or Reception Theory, which has now become a sub-discipline in Biblical Studies, Theology, and Literary Theory. I cannot think of any of these eight which we can easily omit. It is tragic that some relegate Hermeneutics only to a branch of Biblical Studies or oh Church History. I have explored more on the Hermeneutics of Doctrine in my book, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Eerdmans, 2007).

Matthew: Postmodern thought has been preoccupied with the task of hermeneutics and the relationship of readers to texts. Yet, many in Christian circles have had a difficult time recognizing the value it might add to our reading of texts generally or to the Bible specifically. What positive contributions (if any), in your view has postmodernism made to hermeneutics?

Thiselton: I must confess that I suspect all “-isms” as overgeneralizations.  I speak to my students only specifically about Lyotard, Derrida, Rorty, Foucault, and others.  For the most part, I am grieved that many Evangelicals retreat from robust, rational discussion because many postmodernists say that I can say only how it is with me, i.e. testify to what has worked for me. But there are some positive features: (1) an attack on the standardization of knowledge, especially making everything correspond to technology (especially Lyotard); this applies to what is said above about “science”. (2) I share their dislike of generalities; but we need caution about rejecting all “meta-narratives”, of which the Bible may be one. (3) Roland Barthesearly work “Mythologies” is fascinating, and assists Ricoeur’s “Hermeneutic of Suspicion”, although this may be too early to call it “Postmodern”. (4) Jean Baudrillard exposes fantasy and simulacra, together the idolization of utility and media-created, and media-centred “celebrities”. But specifically on Hermeneutics I have some sympathy with Vanhoozer’s exposure of Derrida as too near to atheism, and I would add Lyotard on incommensurability and the plurality of “paganism” as negativeIn the U.S.A., I find it difficult to find merits in Rorty and Fish.

The First Epistle to the Corinthians

[書摘] The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century

The Resurrection from Grünewald's Isenheim Alt...
Resurrection

Source:

Gerrit Neven, ‘The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century’ in Theology as Conversation: The Significance Of Dialogue In Historical And Contemporary Theology: A Festschrift For Daniel L. Migliore, Bruce McCormack and Kimlym J. Bender eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009, pp. 67-81

My Summary:

Whereas initially Nietzsche and Marx only proclaim the death of God, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze proclaim with equal force the death of a man (cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 1994, esp. the last chapter, and Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 1993).

Following Barth, Geyer gives the Parousia the determinative role concerning various theological aspects of reconciliation. The Messiah’s having drawn near is the precondition of a future-oriented and therefore a dialogical mode of thinking. The Parousia points to a nearness of salvation that does not supernaturally demolish time and history, but rather breaks open time and history from within [messianically] by turning to the risky expectation of the Messiah, for whom each moment in time is an open entrance.

This expectation leads to intensive forms of discussion and debate with not just  theologians but also with [critical and phenomenological] thinkers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger , Horkheimer, Bloch, Sartre, and so on. The focus is the humanity of Christ.

(Hans-Georg Geyer [1929-1999]  studied in Frankfurt during 1950-1954 with Hans-Georg Gadamer, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Wolfgang Kramer before he turned to the study of systematic theology (at Gottingen, Berlin, Wuppertal, and Bonn.)

As early as 1962, Geyer declared his agreement with Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment. According to Benjamin, only the Messiah himself will consummate all that is happening historically, in the sense that only he himself will redeem and consummate the creation in its relation to the messianic.[1] Therefore, nothing historical can relate itself to something messianic on its own account. With this, he distanced himself from the idea that historical convictions, scientific achievements, or political opinions have in themselves the potential to make “the jump-ahead” to a time which is qualitatively new and different. Our knowledge is determined by economic and political factors. The desire to know is driven by a force consisting only of what can be [pragmatically or in a utilitarian manner] calculated. This [social/structural] force and the history of freedom contradict each other (analogous to the tension between poststructuralism and structuralism/rationalism).

Geyer here introduces the topic of faith in the post-liberal sense. He says, “faith, getting involved with and trusting upon the message concerning Christ, is at the same time radically renouncing the desire to discover the truth of the proclamation and past history”.

This criticism of metaphysics (of absolute certainly) is also part of the thinking projects of Moltmann and Pannenberg, for whom the future became the paradigm of transcendence. But both of them have felt that they have to leave Barth behind for they deem Barth’s system closed and ahistorical. Geyer does not share this view.

Geyer inherits early Barth’s dialectical theology. He is convinced that our time is an implication of the Parousia of Jesus Christ. His intensive debate with Moltmann and Pannenberg  is concerning the epistemology of hope. That is to say, if God’s new coming in the Parousia is an implication of the concrete identity of Jesus Christ, then how do we find his identity? He doubts whether for Moltmann and Pannenberg “the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ” are constitutive–and as opposed to merely illustrative— of the exegesis of biblical texts and of the practices of the Christian community. For according to Geyer, Moltmann and Pannenberg’s definition of history and Parousia did not clearly distinguish “the future as an end that we should strive for” (the anthropocentric) from “the future as the goal of God’s exclusive act” (the theocentric). His ultimate criticism is that the theology of Moltmann and Pannenberg is enclosed by a metaphysical correlation between God and the world. Transcendence is devoured by immanence.

To solve this problem, Geyer here uses Husserl’s concepts of protention (the succession of the historical accordance and its end) and retention. The protention in Jesus denotes the continuity between the character of Jesus’ conduct and his fate—death. According to Geyer, this historical fate can undergo an intensification or an ontological deepeningonly by the event of the meta-historical resurrection in Easter” [out of theological necessity].

By retention, it means when we look back, the attempts to ignore this fact or to place this death within an unduly higher framework can only lead to an idealization of his death or a degradation of it to an empirical fact (which is an unduly anthropologized theology full of liberal residues). Namely, the declaration that this historical death implies a [whether phenomenological, hermeneutic, or ontological] jump-ahead should be fiducially rooted only in the meta-historical domain, in [the post-Easter] remembrance, which runs backwards. This solution does not have to leave behind the aporia of this [historical] death. For at any rate, doctrinal or impersonal statements are not possible in the face of this death. Anamnesis and commemoration of this death can only give us non-metaphysical and personal truth. The redemptive history is inherently incomplete if all we have is this death of Jesus.

On the other hand, knowledge concerning the identity of this Jesus can only be acquired by participation in the process of the actuality of this meaning question in the medium of human language. That is why the question concerning the meaning of the cross is characterized by an infinite openness— as opposed to the enclosure of totalitarian metaphysics. For Geyer, the hope is the qualitative feature of faith, which is a prerequisite for new non-metaphysical mode of thinking.

In accorance with the nature of hope, Parousia concerns the future of which no one has sure knowledge of the time and the hour— it is beyond human calculation: Although we are vitalized by images of the future (e.g., Luke 21:7-33), these do not lead us into the future itself.

rhızomıng ındεxatıon dıs-choıcεs . .
Badiou

There is a remarkable parallelism in the thinking of Geyer and Badiou about metaphysics. Badiou establishes that « the death of God » and « the death of man » go hand-in-hand in the ethos of 20th century philosophy and theology. He calls them “the joint disappearances of Man and God”.

On one hand there is in the 20th century philosophy the movement that radicalizes Kant’s approach by enslaving man in his own emancipation (i.e., German idealism: our [finite] subjectivity creates our world). This line runs from Kant via Fichte and Sartre (man is condemned to freedom; man is programmed to be a man and cannot be freed from this program). On the other hand, there is the way of the radical anti-humanism of Nietzsche and Foucault: the absence of God is one of the names for the absence of man.

As Foucault (he criticizes Levinas and Derrida’s anthropology as religion or theology), Badiou does not think this either or situation leaves room for postmodern thinkers like Levinas or Derrida. For Levinas’ appeal to God’s radical otherness in order to safeguard the otherness of the human other falls short to attest to a radical alterity. (This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the other should be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. cf. Badiou, Ethics [2001], 22). As for Derrida’s deferral of presence (différance), a sort of religion of messianic delay, Badiou sees something too artificial in its ramification upon the relation between philosophy and religion (cf. P. Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth [2003], 157). Postmodernity has become boring.

Badiou searches for what is empty and open in a time when the [human and divine] subject has disappeared. There is no other possibility than to accept this aporia, this emptiness, and to retain a prospect to point beyond death. For Geyer, this means the resurrection and the coming of the Messiah— within the perspective of time. Biblically speaking this is the time that remains, a time of intense expectation (cf. Isa 21:11). [2]

Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin’s disciple, in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans declares “what remains is what separates us from the Messiah”. More than the Messiah’s coming close is the Messiah himself.

Giorgio Agamben descubre el limbo
Agamben

[1] The polemical context which Geyer (and possibly Benjamin) set out to argue against includes the following features (i.e., wrong assumptions):

1)       non-realism,

2)       post-structuralism,

3)       the totalitarian features of modernity in the 1960s (for which Geyer thinks Horkheimer’s treatment in the 1930s is exemplary. He lost faith but has not abandoned the project of human transformation of the society into a utopia).

4)       reciprocal freedom: the promises that somebody gives to someone else are ruled by a relationship of absolutely free reciprocity and by a reciprocal freedom.

[2] Here one may become somewhat apologetical over against Badiou. Badiou teaches with Nietzsche that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is dead. According to Nietzsche, faith in God as a supernatural power in general will no longer have any real influence, since God is not ascribed any power anyway. There is no such metaphysical God. However, it is precisely this faith that would be necessary to determine the convictions and the actions of man. This may be the case, Geyer answers Nietzsche. But even if God has lost his power over man and that super-sensual heaven has no meaning for the sensual earth, it does not necessarily follow the death of Christian theology.

Through Barth, Geyer has found a way forward: Christian theology has the task to lead faith out of its dogmatic identification with the concept of religion that is still metaphysically determined. Geyer rejects Nietzsche’s analysis that lumps together the God of metaphysics and the God of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike the metaphysical God, the God of the Bible can die.

On the basis of this God’s death, people in faith received the power to be really earthly finite and to be able to die. In the Christian faith, God’s identity can only be thought of appropriately when we take as point of departure the view that the death of Jesus Christ on the cross is God’s act on behalf of all.

The occurrence of cross in history demands remembrance and mimesis: the imitation of God in the praxis of love for one’s neighbor. God is a name that has to be continued in a passionate plea to practice love, as opposed to a concept that asks for ideological representation. Remembrance implies mimesis, through which we anticipate the coming of God in the Parousia.

[靈修筆記] 以賽亞書35章 Reflection on Isaiah 35

Isaiah 35:1 曠野和乾旱之地必歡喜;沙漠要快樂,又像番紅花一般開花, 2 必茂盛地開花,大大快樂,並且歡呼。黎巴嫩的榮耀、迦密和沙崙的華美也賜給它;人們必看見耶和華的榮耀、我們 神的華美 3 你們要堅固無力的手,穩固搖動的膝。 4 又對那些憂心的人說:« 你們要剛強,不要懼怕。看哪!你們的 神,他要來報仇,來施行報應,他必來拯救你們。 » 5 那時,瞎子的眼必打開,聾子的耳必暢通。 6 那時,瘸子必像鹿一般跳躍,啞巴的舌頭必大聲歡呼;曠野必湧出大水,沙漠必流出江河。 7 灼熱的沙地必變為水池,乾旱之地必變成泉源;在野狗的住處,就是牠們躺臥之處,必成為青草、蘆葦和蒲草生長的地方。 8 那裡必有一條大路,要稱為« 聖路« ;不潔淨的人不能經過,那是為那些行走正路的人預備的;愚昧的人不會在路上留連。 9 那裡必沒有獅子,猛獸也不會上去,在那裡必遇不見牠們;只有蒙救贖的人在那裡行走。 10 蒙耶和華贖回的人必歸回,必歡呼地來到錫安;永遠的喜樂必臨到他們的頭上;他們必得著歡喜和快樂,憂愁和歎息都必逃跑了。

頭兩節的用詞呼應了雅歌,v.3得到新約希伯來書的引用。V.4像是神對約書亞的鼓舞:你當剛強壯膽。V.5-7 讓我們想到耶穌的事工和他對施洗約翰所說的話,也呼應著詩篇。V.8 用一條「直路」的意象與「正直」的道德特質相連結,v.9-10 則以「聖城」的意象來呈現「喜樂」的屬靈特質。

仔細注意這個順序,我們發現作者的注意力先是放在自然界本身的週期和規律迎來的復興,接著是人信心和靈命的堅定,再來人生理上的奇蹟就臨到。Foucault 的《瘋癲與文明》揭露了正常人使用自私的權力和成見,將異常者貶為社會上無法翻身的弱勢。但是我們將看到,神的拯救將會移除這些隔絕與偏見的生理基礎。

下一步,那些超出一般可預習自然規律的現象就要發生了:曠野必湧出大水,沙漠必流出江河。灼熱的沙地必變為水池,乾旱之地必變成泉源。這四個句子本質上談論的是同一個現象。但重點是這個沙漠綠洲中將出現的那條「聖路」。在這裡,基本上那些前一章所描述的那些活躍於不毛之地的野生動物,特別是具備攻擊性的都不會出現。於是,作者仍然隱隱是高舉了「社會文明」(聖路、聖城)的救贖強度,過於「自然創造」(有蘆葦蒲草生長的谿壑流水)的救贖強度。

正如聖經一貫所啟示的,創世紀的一開始人們的樂園是由自然物種所構築成的伊甸園,然而到了末世、歷史的終結,我們將迎來的是「上帝的國」,又叫做新天新地,它將是一個政治性、社會性、與科技化的文明實體。雖然不一定是透過人手所建造,但它所隱含的是一種制度性,以及基督教救贖軌跡是線性地朝向一個與原初開端不同的狀態。

對現在的我們來說,喜樂和正直純全,就是我們所要戮力追求的。

Hebrews 12:12 所以你們要把下垂的手、發酸的腿、挺起來.也要為自己的腳把道路修直了、使瘸子不至歪腳、反得痊癒。

[省思] 風險抉擇與形而上倫理學

Source Link: 風險抉擇與形而上倫理學  本文原載《當代》154 期(2000.6.1.):pp. 20-35。經小幅修改後將收入《第二現代-風險社會的出路?》(書名暫定;將由巨流公司於2001 年四月出版)。

前言:我將論文第一部份的原文濃縮,進行一些段落的重新編排和微幅調整字句,以​求重現文意重點。作者在第二部份有引用聖經,談神學人類學的觀念,未收錄在本篇文摘中。

作者:孫治本

1979年,漢斯.約拿斯(Hans Jonas)出版了西方思想史上的劃時代鉅著-《責任原則》(Das Prinzip Verantwortung),推翻了啟蒙時代以來西方人的樂觀主義,即法蘭西斯.培根(Francis Bacon)宣稱的「知識就是力量」。

人類知識與技術的發展,已使培根的主張成為一種「災難威脅」(Unheilsdrohung)。亦即,人類智識善意的企圖可能導致災難,科技不再只是追求幸福的工具,而也是毀滅世界的潛在力量其原因。這並非人類宰制自然的理想失敗了,反而是因為宰制自然的技術的巨大成功(成果)(Jonas 1984:251)。

面對隨科技發展而增強的不可預知性,約拿斯並未對人類智識做出否定,而是要求注意科技的「遠程效應」(Fernwirkung),並將遠程效應納入倫理學的思考中。約拿斯認為,傳統的倫理學,只考慮到「這裡與現在」(Jonas 1984: 23),亦即人只需為其行為的直接後果負責。然而,鑒於科技的遠程效應越來越強,約拿斯要求建立「未來倫理學」(Zukunftsethik)。未來倫理學與傳統倫理學的差別在於:根據未來倫理學,如果一個決定是負責任的,那麼,此一決定就不僅應考慮到行為的即時、直接後果,也應考慮行為的遠程效應、行為的後果的後果的後果…。未來倫理學因此要求人遵行兩項義務:首先是建立關於遠程效應的想像;其次是鼓動與被想像之情狀相應之情感(ibid.: 64-65)。

Risky Business (soundtrack)
Image via Wikipedia

在《風險社會學》(Soziologie des Risikos ,1991)一書中,魯曼(Niklas Luhmann)將風險(Risiko)與危險(Gefahr)做了區別:風險必然與人的決定有關,亦即當某個決定可能導致損害時,我們說這個決定是有風險的。如果(可能的)損害原因完全是外在的、不涉及人類決定,他說這是「危險」,而非風險(Luhmann 1991:30-31)。

建立了「風險」必然與「人的決定」有關,而「每一個決定都是有風險的」這兩個論點後,魯曼進一步從社會學的角度來研究風險:風險評估未必是一個理性過程,而是一個心理問題,甚至於是一個社會問題。有些風險會受到較多的注意和觀察,有些則否,這都有社會心理因素的影響在(ibid.: 11-12)。因此,研究風險問題有兩個取向,其一是探討如何針對客觀事實進行風險評估,其二則是探究人如何評估風險。

魯曼稱前者(如何評估風險)為「第一秩序的觀察」(Beobachtung erster Ordnung),後者(研究人本身如何詮釋風險)為第二秩序觀察(Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung),也稱作「對於觀察之觀察」(ibid.:23 & 235-247)。

魯曼進一步指出,對客觀事實的觀察永遠受到主觀立場和心智模式的影響。在風險評估的過程中,「有權做決定者」和「可能受到決定的負面後果波及的人」,兩種人對風險的評估會有很大的不同(ibid.: 34;111-134)。

由於約拿斯既早已指出「預知的力量」必然落後於「技術的力量」的現象,這個客觀事實加上魯曼所說的主觀心理因素,使約拿斯要求的「對於科技的遠程效應的想像」,成為一個複雜的社會心理過程。

正是因為這種不可確知性,約拿斯主張:當可能的損害涉及非常多的人時,「關於不幸的預言」(Unheilsprophezeiung)要優先於「關於幸福的預言」(Heilsprophezeiung)(Jonas 1984: 70-76)。這項見解實為一種涉及決定的風險評估原則,可以稱為「後果原則」。亦即,當某一決定牽涉到許多人的命運時,決定者是沒有權利「賭」的。約拿斯特別指出,科技「實驗」不能拿人類全體之生存作賭注(ibid.: 81),故只需要考慮可能的負面效應是否為人類所能承擔,而不考慮其發生的機率。至於「甚麼樣的後果是無法承擔的」的問題,約拿斯似乎著重於可能的有害後果牽涉的人數,亦即當可能的有害後果牽涉到許多人的命運甚至人類整體的生存時,此後果是無法承擔的。

(舉例來說,假如在台北市建造核電廠,將有百萬分之一的機率會爆炸導致台北市成為死城。那麼哪怕爆炸機率只是百萬分之一,我們也要因為「死城」的代價是臺灣付不起的,而放棄這個核電廠開發案。)

Risky Woods
Image via Wikipedia

顯然地,與「後果原則」相對應的風險評估原則是「機率原則」,也就是對風險的評估並非依據可能發生的最糟後果是否無法承擔,而是依據此種後果發生的機率。

魯曼說過,有些人評估風險的方法,是將可能的損失程度與損失機率相乘(Luhmann 1991: 22)。如果再考慮獲利,則完整的機率原則的風險評估模式是:若某決定(可能的獲利x獲利機率)>(可能的損失x損失機率),則該決定是值得做的,亦即其隱藏的風險是值得冒的。所以,機率原則雖然亦會考慮後果,

但當可能的損失發生的機率很低時,便認為不值一顧。在此,機率顯然比「對遠程效應的想像」重要。後果原則與機率原則,何者是較理性的風險評估原則呢?

後果原則是較謹慎的原則,因為關於某項風險的機率估算即使是正確的,亦只能說出多少次中會發生一次,但根本無法預見是在哪一次發生,那麼,如果在下一次就發生了無法承擔的損失,便全盤皆輸,沒有再下一次的機會,使人從可能獲得的利益中彌補損失。由於人類預知能力的有限性,即使專家往往也無法確切地說某事是否會發生,而只能估算其發生的機率。由於機率只能作為參考,而非保證,這使專家在風險評估上不俱有最終決定的合法性。也就是說,在風險評估的最終決定上,專家與非專家是平等的。

但是,後果原則完全不考慮可能的獲利嗎?不。人之所以會採納機率原則,如同魯曼所言,是因為完全不冒風險,是非理性的(Luhmann1991: 22)。亦即,完全不冒風險,就無法獲得可能獲得的利益,由是,拒絕冒一個風險,也成了風險(ibid.: 27),因為有喪失可能獲得的利益的風險。也因此,所有的行為都是有風險的,絕對的安全(亦即零風險)是不存在的(ibid.: 37)。

所以應當說,只有當可能的損失並非無法承擔時,才考慮可能的獲利。在這種情況,機率有其參考作用,亦即除了比較可能的損失與獲利,還可參考兩者發生的機率。然而,如果做某事可能產生的損失是無法承擔的,則不管其發生的機率有多低,更不論做該事可能產生的利益有多大,都不應做該事。

(反之,當可能的損失微不足道時,儘管其發生機率大,一般人亦不在乎。例如購買彩票,儘管中獎機率低,但只要彩票的價格低,亦即可能的損失低,便還是會吸引許多人購買。由此也可知,在許多決定上,一般人對後果的考量確實優先於對發生機率的考量。)

但是從魯曼的說法中還會衍生一個思考:放棄可能的獲利亦為一種(可能的)損失,尤有甚者,此一放棄可能在未來產生無法承擔的損失。那麼,如果做某事可能產生的損失是無法承擔的,但放棄做該事也可能在未來帶來無法承擔的損失,這該如何決定呢?事實上,許多新科技或重大建設,都以其未來可能產生的鉅大利益,以及放棄此種利益即為無法承擔的損失,作為其合法化的根據(例如:「假使不建核電廠或簽署EFCA,臺灣的十年後的經濟將永無翻身之日、民不聊生」)。對於此一問題,似應考慮時間因素。如果做某事可能於近期產生無法承擔的損失,不做該事則可能於不可知或較遠的未來產生無法承擔的損失,則還是不應做該事。

Nuclear power plant in Cattenom, France
Nuclear Powerplant in France

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分析並摘要至此,我認為我們可以透過兩個環節進一步思考:

第一,分析風險和決策是一個政治、心理、與社會工程。當中不但涉及傅柯(Michel Foucault)所說的「知識權力」,更有利益團體的私心作祟。這意味著在一個利己導向的人性社會中,我們必須透過公民監督、協商、對話、透明公開的方式來制度化地面對每一個涉及公眾利益的風險決策。如同貝克(Ulrich Beck)在《解藥》(Gegengifte)一書中所提倡的,我們應當

在風險社會中應當增加安全性的策略,提高對於可能的損害的敏感度,打破科技專家對於安全定義的壟斷,並提高安全標準;重新分配舉證責任,使決策者透明化,而且損害發生時要有人負責(主要根據Nassehi 1997: 53的整理;貝克原文見Beck 1988: 278f) -孫治本,風險抉擇與形而上倫理學。《當代》,154 期(2000.6.1.):p. 24。。

第二,「放棄可能利益的損失」,真的能與「執行風險決策可能的損失」能等量齊觀嗎?舉例來說,有一位無工作能力的老王,他僅在當下有一個投資一百萬的機會。而這一百萬的投資,有50%機率贏得一百萬,有另50%的機率賠光總資產一百萬」。在這個情況下,不去賺那一百萬並不是「無法承受的損失」,但「損失這一百萬以致傾家蕩產卻是無法承受的損失」。在考慮「時間因素」的情況下,或許十年之間,如果無工作能力的老王不進行任何投資,他將用罄這一百萬的生活費,以致於「傾家蕩產」。假設老王還有二十年能活,投資成功意味著他能怡養天年,不投資的話他十年後死路一條,而投資失敗則意味著他當下立刻死路一條。請問你會幫老王做出什麼決定?這是一個資本主義增長社會的盲點,但是從神學倫理的角度就能看得非常透明。