[文摘] 3:AM Magazine Interviews Brian Leiter


Source Link: http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/leiter-reports/


Brian Leiter (AB, 1984, Princeton University; JD, 1987, PhD in philosophy, 1995, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) is the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values in University of Chicago Law School.


3:AM: I want to ask you about the Wall Street Occupation and Plutocracy but I want to start by giving our readers a sense of where your arguments are coming from. You’re an expert in the philosophy of law, a leading authority on the philosophy of Nietzsche and have taken on the role of a public intellectual of the left. So were you always an iconoclastic type and was it political ideals that brought you to philosophy originally?


Brian Leiter: Yes and no! Yes, I guess my mix of intellectual interests and normative positions are iconoclastic, but, no, it wasn’t politics that brought me to philosophy. What brought me to philosophy most immediately was the study of Sartre, especially Huis Clos, in high school, which crystallized my propensity towards existential angst, which follows naturally for any sentient being upon atheism and a vivid sense of mortality. There followed upon this interest in Sartre a kind of fateful mistake: Sartre was a philosopher, so I was told, and he dealt with matters of existential moment, and, on top of all that, my father had studied philosophy in college and thought it a worthy topic, so I thought I should study philosophy! So I went to the college that, at the time, was reputed to have the best philosophy program in America, not knowing that most of its faculty did not think Sartre was really a philosopher! Things worked out happily, though, as I took to the other parts of philosophy, learned about Nietzsche and Marx and Freud with Richard Rorty and Raymond Geuss, but also discovered the useful “intellectual cleanliness” (as Nietzsche would say) that is characteristic of so-called “analytic” philosophy, which was then dominant.


The parochialism of analytic philosophers didn’t much matter for me, as I had my own sense of what really mattered, what really had value, and that probably explains my iconoclastic mix of interests: as a sympathetic student of Marx who loves Nietzsche; as a Nietzschean who values the dialectical rigor of so much boring “analytic” moral philosophy; as a defender of H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism, who thinks the American Legal Realists that Hart did so much to discredit had far more insight than he gave them credit for. I’ve been helped by being largely immune to, indeed often offended by, amour-propre (to use Rousseau’s term): I don’t really care what “respectable” academics think, though sometimes they get it right. My political sympathies did play a role, however, in my decision to also study law, as I’ve discussed elsewhere. This was before the “revolution from the Right” that Reagan orchestrated, and so it was possible, back in the 1970s, to think of lawyering as a force for social and economic progress.


3:AM: You use a striking phrase in one of your essays, “the hermeneutics of suspicion”, to discuss three of your intellectual heroes, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Could you say a little about what you were getting at in that phrase and how it is really relevant for the intellectual left today?


BL: The phrase itself derives from the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, though I take strong issue with how he understands what such a “hermeneutics” – or method of interpretation – involves. But what Ricoeur correctly notices is that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud represent ways of thinking about and analyzing human societies and human behavior that share certain structural similarities. First, they typically suspect that people’s own self-understanding and self-presentation are misleading as to what really explains why they say what they say and do what they do. Second, these thinkers try to show that the real explanation is one that would undermine the credibility of the beliefs and values people affirm.


Take a wonderful Freudian example, that has since been confirmed by experimental work in psychology. A “reaction formation” is a psychological process in which one forms moral views in reaction to desires that one really has – so, e.g., one becomes a vociferous critic of the immorality of homosexuality and gay marriage precisely because one has strong homosexual urges and desires that one finds threatening. A reaction formation is a “defense mechanism,” a way of trying to protect oneself from desires one doesn’t want to act upon. The typical religious or moralistic homophobe will conceive of himself as “defending family values” and “traditional marriage,” when, in reality, he only mouths these moralistic platitudes单调, 陈腐, 平凡because deep down he’d like nothing better than to have anal or oral sex with another man. If, in fact, it’s the reaction formation that really explains his moral beliefs, then those beliefs can’t possibly be justified, since they arise from a mechanism, reaction formation, that’s inherently unreliable (that is, it’s not a reliable way to figure out what’s morally right or wrong). This bears emphasizing: if what really explains your moral attitudes is that they are a desperate psychological attempt to restrain your own desire for what those attitudes condemn, then why should anyone else take them seriously?


  • My comment: It is analogous and illustrative of my hate against liberalism (because deep in my desire I love money, and I don’t like the money-loving self in me.)


This kind of critical suspicion is very offensive to the dominant political culture, especially in the United States: it is considered rude and disrespectful. And so it is, but, again, that has no bearing on its epistemic relevance, that is, its relevance to figuring out what’s really going on. Take Barack Obama, in whom many on the anemic American left invested their hopes. As President of the United States, his domestic policies, like those of Bill Clinton, have been largely to the right of Richard Nixon, and his primary economic advisors were the various economic soothsayers who orchestrated the deregulation of the financial sector in the 1990s that brought about the collapse of the global capitalist system under George W. Bush. His most ambitious “progressive” legislation was a healthcare plan originally developed by the Republican Governor of Massachussetts. At every moment where Obama, if he had any moral or intellectual core, might have led, he pivoted to the right. How could the great “liberal” hope have turned out to be such a shallow apologist for and tinkerer with the status quo?


  • My comment:  This is not illustrative. The reasons Obama has to lean toward the center (a right shift) are various pragmatic and prudential concerns. It is a political maneuver and concession to maintain equilibrium, rather than his love or inherent ties with plutocrats.


If we put aside the romance surrounding the advertising product “Barack Obama,” and even put aside the more genuine emotional resonance of electing a Black President given the history of vicious racism in America, the answer seems quite obvious. In the United States, no one can compete meaningfully for the Presidency without tens of millions of dollars, and no one can raise such money without backing from the richest sliver of American society, i.e., the plutocrats. Since enough of the public can be manipulated at any time to believe just about anything – the entire history of the world is massive confirmation of that fact – it follows that only a candidate who meets the needs of the plutocracy has any chance, since only that candidate can get plutocrat money. The plutocracy has largely become more liberal on so-called “social” issues (e.g., anti-gay bigotry), and so any Democrat who basically respects the prerogatives of the rich is a viable candidate for them. Obama is not a fool, and nor are the plutocrats: they understand each other, and the result is that Obama has had and will have more money than any of his Republican opponents, and Obama will pivot to the right on any economic issue that affects the interests of the plutocratic class. That’s the hermeneutics of suspicion, and we need more of it every day.



  • My comment:  The trend seems quite obvious. In Taiwan, no one can compete meaningfully for the Presidency without tens of millions of dollars, and no one can raise such money without backing from the richest sliver of the society, i.e., the plutocrats. Since enough of the public can be manipulated at any time to believe just about anything (the entire history of the world is massive confirmation of that fact) it follows that only a candidate who meets the needs of the plutocracy has any chance, since only that candidate can get plutocrat money. The plutocracy has largely become more liberal on so-called “social” issues (e.g., anti-gay bigotry), and so any KMT candidate who basically respects the prerogatives of the rich is a viable candidate for them. KMT is not a fool, and nor are the plutocrats: they understand each other, and the result is that Ma has had and will have more money than any of his DPP opponents, and Ma will pivot to the right on any economic issue that affects the interests of the plutocratic class. That’s the hermeneutics of suspicion, and we need more of it every day.


3:AM: Linked with that last question is what makes your views distinctive about Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. You’ve expressed disagreement with readings of these three thinkers that undermine the naturalism you take to be embedded in them. So post-modernist readings get short shrift from you, for example. Could you explain this? The editor of The Wire once wrote that it was post-modernism that saved Marxism’s sorry ass; in other words, it’s the view in certain quarters that the left’s best hopes are found in theories of post modernism, the Heideggerian, Foucaultian, Derridean, Badiouian, Zizekean approach. Now I put it like that because I know that it’s part of your distinctive approach that you don’t bracket these thinkers together at all. You in fact are vehement about this and this feeds into the discussion about the alleged two traditions of philosophy – the Analytic and the Continental – a distinction you think is bogus. Can you tell us about how you navigate these waters?


BL: There are real dividing lines in the history of philosophy, but the one between the “analytic” and the “Continental” isn’t one of them, though it’s interesting today from a sociological point of view, since it allows graduate programs in philosophy to define spheres of permissible ignorance for their students. A real dividing line, by contrast, one that matters for substantive philosophical questions, is between “naturalists” and “anti-naturalists.” The naturalists, very roughly, are those who think human beings are just certain kinds of animals, that one understands these animals through the same empirical methods one uses to understand other animals, and that philosophy has no proprietary methods for figuring out what there is, what we know, and, in particular, what humans are like. The anti-naturalists, by contrast, are (again, roughly) those who think human beings are different not just in degree but in kind from the other animals, and that this difference demands certain proprietary philosophical methods – perhaps a priori knowledge or philosophical ways of exploring the distinctively “normative” realm in which humans live.


  • My comment:  Naturalists are like poststructuralists, Freud, Marxists, and philosophers/sociologists of religion.


So on the naturalist side you get, more or less, David Hume, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Ludwig Büchner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Rudolf Carnap, W.V.O. Quine, Jerry Fodor, Stephen Stich, and Alex Rosenberg and on the anti-naturalist side you get, more or less, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Gottlob Frege, Jean-Paul Sartre, G.E.M. Anscombe, Wilfrid Sellars (at least for part of his career), the older Hilary Putnam, Alvin Plantinga, and John McDowell, among many others. This disagreement – a disagreement, very roughly, about the relationship of philosophy to the sciences – isn’t one that tracks the alleged analytic/Continental distinction. Indeed, the founders of the 20th-century traditions of “analytic” and “Continental” philosophy (Frege and Husserl, respectively) are both on the anti-naturalist side, and both are reacting against hardcore naturalist positions in philosophy that had become dominant on the European Continent in the late 19th-century. And the first explosion of what anti-naturalists would derisively call “scientism” came in Germany in the 1840s and 1850s, as a reaction to Hegel’s obscurantist反启蒙主义者 (deliberately vague and difficult to understand, so that it prevents people from finding out the truth about it) idealism. Naturalism and anti-naturalism mark a profound dividing line in modern philosophy, but it has nothing to do with “analytic” vs. “Continental’ philosophy.


The other distinction that I think is increasingly important is that between what I call “realists” and “moralists,” between those who think the aim of philosophy should be to get as clear as possible about the way things really are (naturalist), that is, about the actual causal structure of the natural and human world, how societies and economies work, what motivates politicians and ordinary people to do what they do, and, on the other hand, those who think the aim of philosophy is to set up moral ideals, to give moralistic lectures about what society ought to do and how people ought to act. On the realist side, you find Thucydides, Marx, and Nietzsche, but also Max Weber, Michel Foucault, Richard Posner, and Raymond Geuss. On the moralist side, you find Plato and Kant, but also John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Martha Nussbaum, among many others. Many, but not all, naturalists are realists, since it’s reasonable to think that if you want to understand the way things really are, you ought to rely on the methods of the sciences, which have been the most successful ones over the past several centuries.


  • My comment:  In front of this « What things really are » vs. « what things ought to be » dichotomy, my question are 1) where does liberalism fit? 2) Why can’t people be both? Your realists are all sociologists, and inevitably descriptive work is part of their duty. But it does not mean that description is all what philosophy should and can do. On the other hand, those who do prescriptive work are ethicists and political philosophers. This is more of a disciplinary division rather than an epistemological division.


On this way of thinking about the serious disagreements in the history of philosophy, postmodernism is just an embarrassing blip, largely anti-naturalist in its sympathies, but infatuated入迷的with sophomoric二年级的; 一知半解的versions of skepticism about truth and knowledge, that both the naturalist and anti-naturalist, and realist and moralist, traditions largely repudiate. Foucault is the hard case in this story, though it always pains me to see a thinker and scholar of his seriousness lumped with poseurs like Derrida and some of the others you mention. It’s important, though, to avoid the kind of cult of personality that Heidegger and a lot of post-Heideggerian (that is, postmodern) philosophy depends upon. Foucault was human and fallible, so perhaps we need to recognize that he sometimes had bad intellectual judgment and picked up certain bad intellectual habits in Paris as well. But when he was at his best, Foucault diagnosed how individuals in the modern era become agents of their own oppression in virtue of certain moral and epistemic norms they endorse and thus impose upon themselves. That is Foucault’s uniquely disturbing contribution to the literature whose diagnostic aim is, with Max Weber, to understand the oppressive character of modernity, and whose moral aim is, with the Frankfurt School, human liberation and human flourishing.


  • My comment:  Foucault is properly understood as a realist in his ways of revealing the falsehood of artificial norms.


Now Marx certainly didn’t need to be saved by sophomoric post-modernists; indeed, Marx didn’t need to be saved at all. On two central issues, Marx was far more right than any of his critics: first, that the long-term tendency of capitalist societies is towards immiseration (economic impoverishment 貧富不均) of the majority (the post-WWII illusion of upward mobility for the “middle classes” will soon be revealed for the anomaly it was); and second, that capitalist societies produce moral and political ideologies that serve to justify the dominance of the capitalist class. Marx had three faults, to be sure: one was that he took Hegel seriously; another was that he wasn’t a very good fortune teller, so wildly over-estimated the pace of capitalist development; and a third is that he had no account of individual psychology, of the kind Nietzsche and Freud provide.


  • My comment:  Psychology about individual tendency to corrupt is in wanted in classical Marxism. Also, communism does no better in saving the economy. I don’t know on what basis can the bourgeois bubble be poked as an anomaly, especially without the help of post-Marxists?

Within academic philosophy, however, far more harm, in my view, has been done to Marx by moralists like G.A. Cohen than by any of the post-modernists. Cohen – a truly smart man and delightful human being to boot – did two unfortunate things to academic Anglophone Marxism: first, by offering a philosophical reconstruction of historical materialism in its least interesting form (namely, as functional explanation, rather than in terms of class conflict); and second, in his later work, by calling for a moralistic change in the consciousness of individuals, regardless of historical circumstances. This latter, Christian turn in Cohen’s thought represents as profound a betrayal of Marxism as Habermas‘ attempt to supply it [Marxism] a Kantian foundation – in this respect, both Anglophone and “Continental” Marxism betray Marx’s original realism.


To be sure, Cohen on historical materialism is preferable to Althusser, but that hardly matters, except for academic debates. What does matter is that class conflict is both the actual causal mechanism of historical change and intelligible to the people who are the agents of that change. Functional explanations are, by contrast, an interesting but irrelevant theoretical overlay. And the idea that Marxism should be reduced to moralistic sermons is, well, depressing, an admission of intellectual defeat.


  • However, I like Cohen and Habermas’ approach much better. You treat them as leftists rather than Marxists, and then you will be free.


3:AM: I guess the last question was raised because certainly here in the UK there’s a sense that the political left have rather struggled to find a distinctive voice to discuss issues of inequality and injustice. In fact I think it’s fair to characterize the last Labor government as being as unconcerned about plutocratic pressures as the right, and this was disappointing and shocking to many supporters of Labour. And now we have a lib-Dem party in bed with Tories – it’s kind of ridiculous. You do have a distinctive line on all this though and would it be fair to say that the philosophical naturalism you argue for is the starting point for your ethical and political stance? Could you tell us about Naturalism and how Naturalism and politics and ethics go together in your thinking?


BL: The line of political development in the UK over the past generation that you describe has certainly been similar to that in the US, though perhaps not as extreme. Just as Clinton in the U.S. delivered the Democratic Party wholesale to the plutocracy (so that the only issues on which it could take a real stand concerned the mistreatment of social minorities like gay men and women), so too Blair delivered the Labour Party to the slightly less rapacious ruling class in the UK. I consider this kind of analysis to follow from my realism, which I view as a subset of naturalism. As naturalists, we want to understand human beings as they actually are, and that ends up requiring realism about those human beings who are political actors. Marx is the key realist in this regard, since he understands politicians as representatives of a dominant economic class. But naturalism and realism go no further, and this is where Nietzsche is important. For I accept Nietzsche’s view (from The Gay Science) that, “Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature – nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a present – and it was we who gave and bestowed it.” I think, with Nietzsche, that the idea that “nature is always value-less” is one upshot of a serious naturalism about the world. And as Nietzsche notes at the end of the first essay of his on the Genealogy of Morality, “the well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite evaluative points of view.” This is why, to my mind, the dispute between Marx and Nietzsche is as stark as any dispute can be: they are both naturalists and realists, but Marx adopts the point of view of the majority, while Nietzsche adopts the point of view of the genius elite – not the capitalist elite I hasten to add, since he regarded them as contemptible herd-animals, like the mass of humanity. The choice between those two evaluative viewpoints isn’t one that can be made on rational grounds. What worries me, as someone who mostly sides with Marx, is Nietzsche’s challenge that a culture defined by egalitarian values is one in which genius will no longer be possible. I still don’t know what to think about that challenge, but it’s the most serious one to Marxism and to liberalism on offer.


  • Marx adopts the point of view of the majority, while Nietzsche adopts the point of view of the genius elite – the sober-minded princes…The choice between those two evaluative viewpoints isn’t one that can be made on rational grounds… it is a moral stance you have to pick up as your presuppositioal framework. I don’t think there is a way to transcend this stance.


3:AM: So when you look at the Wall Street Occupation, and others elsewhere both in the USA and in London, for example, you bring a distinctive approach to thinking about what’s going on. You’ve also brought to our attention serious police brutality being endorsed by university leaders even, which again is shocking. But you’ve also described the USA as the most powerful and dangerous state on earth and it has been a depressing reality that there seems to be a perpetual Orwellian war (George Orwell’s satirical novel 1984 depicts a futuristic totalitarian state) going on as a backdrop to our lives. Can you give us your take on the current economic and political situation and what you find most valuable and interesting about the Occupation phenomena. I’m particularly interested in your views about the use of state violence and the endorsement of plutocratic policing to clear the protests.


BL: I think Robert Paul Wolff, the distinguished philosopher who has written on Kant and Marx, is quite right to note that the Occupy movement succeeded, in the space of a couple of months, in changing the national dialogue in the U.S. from the need for austerity and cuts to programs that benefit the elderly and the poor, to the actual reality of massive economic inequality. If 75% of the wealth of the richest 0.1% of American society were immediately expropriated征用, 没收, there would be no need to discuss cuts to spending that affects the well-being of the vast majority. This is a democracy, why isn’t this a major topic of public debate? Why aren’t the national media full of debates between defenders of the right of the Koch brothers to keep their billions and advocates for seizing the majority of their fortune to meet human needs? One only needs to read Marx to know the answer.


  • My comment: I am not convinced. You want to tell us that plutocrats are (but should not be) protected. But I tell you this 0.1% plutocrats’ right to their own property has to be protected and not expropriated for the ‘public good’ of the 75% unless they are willing to share their wealth without compulsion. Otherwise, a populist form of communism will create an extremely harmful ripple effect upon the society that is not ‘daring’ to get rich.


An important strategic question for the Occupy movement concerns the police. The police are, themselves, members of the 99%, indeed the 99.9%. Police labor unions remain strong, despite a three-decade long campaign against labor unions in the United States. As unionized workers, the interests of police lie with the Occupy Movement, not the plutocrats. On the day the police refuse to clear “Occupy” protesters from their sites, that will be the day the game is up for the plutocracy in America. It would behoove the Occupy activists, indeed any opponents of the plutocracy, to remember this.


3:AM: Which brings us to your work in legal studies and the philosophy of law. You’re known for again developing a distinctive legal theory that you oppose the likes of Ronald Dworkin and you think that law is much closer to what Richard Posner describes in his How Judges Think book. This itself is refreshingly pugnacious好鬥的. Can you say what your views are and what it opposes? And why you think it is justified?


BL: This harkens back to the dispute between moralists and realists noted earlier, and in legal philosophy, I am an unapologetic realist (like Judge Posner, who has a first-person vantage point on what it is judges really do!). The core question is how do we understand what courts are doing: do we take at face value the opinions they write, and see if we can reconstruct, as Dworkinians try to do, the principled grounds of their decisions, to understand them as trying to discover the answer the law always required? Or do we, instead, understand judges as political actors, who exploit the many points of indeterminacy and uncertainty in the law, to reach the outcomes they deem morally and politically desirable? In the United States, it seems to me utterly incredible that anyone could look at most of the work of the appellate courts, and adopt the Dworkinian view. Cases that reach the courts, especially those that reach the appellate上诉的courts, are precisely the ones in which the law’s indeterminacies are most apparent, and judges are called upon to make moral and political judgments, not legal ones. Given that reality, decisions to confirm, say, judges on the U.S. Supreme Court should be decisions based on their moral and political views, and little else. The U.S. Supreme Court is a super-legislature, though one with a decidedly limited jurisdiction (that is, only the litigated cases that come before it). A bit of realism about courts would lead the public to realize what is at stake in every single confirmation hearing for a position on the Supreme Court – to be sure, all politicians since Reagan onwards realize it, but the public is sadly in the dark.


  • My comment: BL is against ruling by [moral] tastes. Maybe BL loves techno-bureaucracy.


A harder question is how far this realism about courts generalizes, though in talking to my legal realist friends in countries like Italy and Spain, my suspicion is that the narrow, but nonetheless legislative, role of courts is true most places. The English are in denial on this score, and perhaps their civil service judiciary is sufficiently disciplined that the legislative analogy is inapt. But I’m skeptical, but agnostic!



3:AM: Now one of the interesting things happening at the moment in philosophy is x phil. You wrote a paper with Josh Knobe on Nietzsche and morality and in that essay, and in your seminal book on Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, you make the case for arguing that Nietzsche had three basic beliefs about humans that make this position distinctive and important (and a better description of moral agency than those of its chief rivals, Aristotle and Kant). The challenge of this is that it seems to offer a very different view of what it is to be human than is usually presented. Do you believe that a change of the human self-image is indeed what follows from this approach, and can you say what the opportunities and risks attached to this are?


BL: You are quite right that the Nietzschean conception of the person involves a very different view of what it is to be human. In the Nietzschean view, our conscious life is largely superficial, largely epiphenomenal – we are, as on the Freudian picture, largely creatures of our drives, many of which are unknown to us, except obliquely. But Nietzsche, unlike Freud, is not especially optimistic about the capacity for “ego” to exercise much rational influence on these drives – though it can exercise some, but only when it acquires the motivational energy of opposing drives behind it. To make matters worse, Nietzsche thinks our particular constellation of drives is a kind of biological legacy, so we are, in a kind of naturalized Calvinist fashion, set on a particular course in life long before we become aware of it – that’s why Nietzsche says, famously, that “one becomes what one is without knowing what one is.” So one’s life, on this picture, is largely a matter of figuring out what one already is – basically the opposite of the existential picture we associate with Sartre, who was, alas, a superficial reader of Nietzsche.


I think one reason Nietzsche thinks that “illusion” and “falsehood” are essential to human life is that he recognizes no one can actually live – in the sense of get up in the morning and try to make decisions about what to do – with this picture [of falsehood] in mind. So Nietzsche should change what philosophers call our third-person perspective on human beings, and how to understand them, but Nietzsche realized that from the “first-person” perspective (the perspective of you or me thinking about what to do), the illusion of freedom and choice is essential. But it is, to repeat, an illusion, which means we ought to rethink every normative realm dependent on those concepts.


3:AM: Now, from within the naturalism approach, I wonder if there isn’t a tension between 1)your Nietzschean idea that there are human types and 2) empirical evidence that there isn’t enough stability in any human behaviour to justify saying that we can conform to type. I’m thinking of experiments that seem to show that ethically irrelevant factors can alter moral choices people make. So, for example, you have a person finding a dime, they are kinder straight away after than if they didn’t find the dime. Or the idea that if tired we’ll make different decisions from when we’re not. Or that if the moral questions are asked in different orders different answers are given. Or Josh Greene’s work on the famous trolley puzzles, where it seems that our moral decisions are strongly altered by how they are presented to us etc, etc. Don’t these undermine any idea that there is a type? And doesn’t this erode even projects like those of Freud and Nietzsche who wanted to offer a way of stitching us into something more unified than this crazy creature the experiments seems to be finding? And, at risk of sounding Kantian, how do we navigate if we lose reason?


  • My comment:  Trolly puzzles are those used by Sandel: you don’t put a fat guy down to stop the train in front of five workers, but you would tend to be less guilty in steering the train to the track that has one worker on it to prevent the killing of five.
  • The ‘human’ type of anthropological dilemma is that you either side with Nietzsche that we have an intrinsic character, determined biologically, or Foucault that individuality is made up by situations.



BL: You’re quite correct that there is a tension between Nietzschean moral psychology, which depends on a notion of a psychological “type” or “character,” and the situationist themes in a lot of social psychology which call attention to the influence of particular situational cues on behavior. I think there’s two key points to make about this apparent conflict. First, the actual empirical results make perfect sense from a Nietzschean point of view: for in all the famous case studies – including the Millgram experiments about obedience to authority – there is always some minority of subjects who are not influenced at all by the situational cues. So, in the case of the Millgram studies, there are some who simply refuse to turn up the voltage, despite being ordered to do so by the experimenter “in charge.” It’s quite natural to think that these were precisely the folks with character, while those who complied with even outrageous directives betrayed precisely their lack of character. Nietzsche certainly wouldn’t be surprised that most “herd animals” will do what they’re told! Millgram himself didn’t think his experiments showed that character was explanatorily otiose没有用的in understanding behavior. Second, and this is a point I owe to Joshua Knobe and that we make in our jointly authored paper to which you allude, it may well turn out that situational cues are important to understanding behavior on particular occasions, and still be true that character type gives you the best explanation of behavior over the long haul, as it were. In the end, I suspect the situationist challenge to character-based explanations has been much over-played, both with respect to what the actual results show and with respect to their import for a plausible moral psychology.


  • My comment: The Millgram experiment can be seen on TED (how a good person becomes bad). Basically, it is what Nazi regime uses to dehumanize their subordinates. When people are asked to obey and do not have to take the responsibility in torturing their prisoners, people tend to boost up the voltage to ‘accomplish’ the goal, having remove their ‘conscientious valve’.
  • The section clearly manifest BL as a Nietzschean. But I lean more to Foucault: ‘See, we’re 10% our genes, but 90% of the products of the environment’.




What happens to “reason” depends on what is meant by reason. Kant will not be happy on either the situationist or Nietzschean view. But that’s because Kantians think reason can dictate our ultimate ends, not simply the means to deploy in service of ends that have no rational standing. That marks another important dividing line in the history of philosophy – about the deliverances of practical reason – and, unsurprisingly, I’m on the anti-Kantian, thoroughly naturalist and realist side of that debate.


  • The Kantian reason’s role in establishing ethical ends is most famously in its undergirding of the categorical imperative: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. The sentence contains three aspects:


  1. The universal law – All moral statements should be general laws, which apply to everyone under any circumstances. There should be no occasion under which an exception is made.
  2.  Treat humans as ends in themselves – Kant argues that you should never treat people as a means to some end. People should always be treated as ends in themselves. This promotes equality.
  3. Act as if you live in a kingdom of ends – Kant assumed that all rational agents were able to deduce whether an argument was moral or not through reason alone and so, all rational humans should be able to conclude the same moral laws.


3:AM: You have taken a distinctive approach to the place of religious beliefs in society. We’re very familiar to the approach to the debate presented in terms of the science – so figures like Dawkins and Dennett and Hitchens tend to fix on the truth of religious claims to oppose religions. Your approach is different in that it’s about claims constitutional, legal and just and these don’t justify treating religious beliefs separately from any other. Is that right? Can you say something about your ideas about religious tolerance?


BL: This is the subject of the book I’ve just finished, Why Tolerate Religion? which Princeton University Press will publish next year. I share one thing with so-called “New Atheists” like Dawkins et al., namely, the assumption that religions involve significant amounts of false belief. It’s a bit too late in the day for that to be a serious topic of debate, since the evidence is all on only one side of that question. But I’m Nietzschean enough to realize that the fact that religion involves a lot of false belief goes no distance to deciding its value, its contributions to human well-being, its centrality to human life. If we only were allowed to believe what was true, after all, we’d give up on life pretty quickly since, as Nietzsche likes to say, “the truth is terrible”! So I come at this from a very different angle. My initial question was whether if you think “liberty” or “freedom” of conscience is valuable, something that ought to be protected, whether there was some reason to think that only religious claims of conscience should enjoy its benefits. And the strange reality, even in Europe – which is largely an atheistic Continent now (the spectacle of the Pope notwithstanding) – is that the only times the courts will exempt someone from a generally applicable law is when they assert that their religion requires them, as a matter of conscience, not to comply. We understand well enough how, as an historical matter, this came to pass: the bloody wars of religion that tortured Europe in the early modern period led to the idea that religious toleration would be a better alternative. But that’s history, and the question is whether, today, there is some reason to think religious conscience is more important than any other claim of conscience. I argue that there isn’t.


3:AM: Now 3:AM is about books, music, film and the kind of thing typically exciting to English graduates among others. But you don’t seem to like English departments, in the US at least. Is this right? Is it because they seem to be in thrall to obscurantist philosophers, as you characterize them, such as Derrida? Or are you like Alex Rosenberg in his new book where he largely dismisses the study of literature per se?


BL: I love literature, and love the study of literature – indeed, I was almost an “English” major in college. One problem with a lot of American English Departments in the 1980s was that they stopped teaching literature, and became the repositories for bad philosophy, bad history, bad social science! Rosenberg’s position is a bracing令人鼓舞的 one, and a useful challenge to lazy anti-naturalist tendencies in a lot of Anglophone philosophy, but it does seem to me to be based ultimately on armchair philosophy of the kind naturalists are supposed to decry. Physicalism is not a scientific result – Carnap thought it would be, but we know it isn’t the case that everything that is causally explicable is explicable in terms of causal relata that are physical. So my view on this issue is certainly not Rosenberg’s, as much as I admire his work. In any case, it seems to me that American literature departments have recovered quite a bit from the intellectual disaster of the 1980s, a happy development. And if I may paraphrase Nietzsche, life without literature would be a mistake!


3:AM: And finally, you have written harsh things about the state of the press in the USA but of course it’s not just the USA that has the deficit. Given the state of the world at the moment, the erosion of a strong 4th estate seems to be worrying. Are you optimistic about the future not just in terms of press freedoms and ownership but generally?


BL: This is one of the few areas where the Internet has made a positive difference to human freedom and well-being. The U.S. is obviously at one extreme in terms of the supine posture懒散的; 仰卧的 of its media, as well as its low intellectual level – and I’m not even talking here about the more-or-less openly fascist media like Fox News! But the Internet now makes available the media in multiple jurisdictions, at least to anyone who looks. I often read Al Jazeera’s English site, not because they are paragons模范, 完美之物, 优秀之人 of journalistic objectivity and intellectual depth, but because their biases and blinders are not those of the New York Times. So I think one reason to be optimistic is that as the United States fades as a hegemonic power, other countries, with very different agendas, will support media that make very different judgments about what is newsworthy, what sources are credible, whose suffering counts, and so on. Fascists like Rupert Murdoch may destroy the major media in some countries, but it’s a big world out there, and the Internet makes it available. That’s a reason for hope.


3:AM: And really finally, can you recommend your top 5 books for general readers that we all should be reading over the xmas break?


BL: Only five books, that’s hard! But here’s five, of relatively recent vintage, that are provocative and interesting, that relate to some of themes we’ve discussed, and that I think would be accessible to any educated reader: Richard Posner’s How Judges Think, Alex Rosenberg’s The Atheist’s Guide to Reality, David Livingstone Smith’s Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others, Jonathan Wolff’s Why Read Marx Today? and, a bit older but still psychologically fascinating, Li Zhisui’s The Private Life of Chairman Mao. All books for any good naturalist or realist to read!


The Laird Bell Quadrangle at night
Image via Wikipedia



[靈修筆記] 以賽亞書32章 Reflection on Isaiah 32

CNV5  Isaiah 32:1 看哪!必有一王憑公義執政,必有眾領袖按公平治理。

 2 必有一人像避風所,和避暴雨的隱密處,像乾旱之地的溪水,又像疲乏之地的大磐石的陰影。

 3 那時,能看見事物者的眼睛,必不再昏暗;能聽到事物者的耳朵,必然傾聽。

 4 性急者的心必明白知識,口吃者的舌頭必說話清楚。

 5 愚頑人不再被稱為高尚,惡棍也不再被稱為大方。

 6 因為愚頑人說的是愚頑話,他心裡所想的是罪孽,慣行褻瀆 神的事,說錯謬的話攻擊耶和華,使飢餓的人仍空著肚子,使口渴的人仍無水可喝。

 7 至於惡棍,他的手段是邪惡的,他圖謀惡計,用虛假的言語毀滅困苦的人,即使在窮乏人講公理的時候(even when their cause is just),他也是這樣。

 8 高尚的人卻籌謀高尚的事,他也必堅持這些高尚的事。

 9 安逸的婦女啊!你們要起來,聽我的聲音;無憂無慮的女子啊!你們要側耳聽我的話。

 10 無憂無慮的女子啊!再過一年多,你們就必受困擾,因為沒有葡萄可摘,收禾稼的日子也沒有來。

 11 安逸的婦女啊!你們要受震驚。無憂無慮的女子啊!你們要受困擾了,脫去衣服,赤著身子,以麻布束腰吧。

 12 你們要為美好的田地和多結果子的葡萄樹搥胸哀哭。

 13 也為那些在我子民的土地上長起來的荊棘和蒺藜而哀哭,為那歡樂的城和所有快樂的房屋,也是這樣。

 14 因為宮殿必被丟棄,熱鬧的城市也被撇下,山岡和守望樓必永遠成為洞穴,作了野驢喜歡的地方和羊群的草場。

 15 等到聖靈從高處傾倒在我們身上,曠野變為肥田,肥田被看為樹林的時候,

 16 公平就必居在曠野中,公義必住在肥田裡。

 17 公義的果效必是平安,公義的效驗必是平靜與安穩,直到永遠。

 18 那時,我的子民必住在平安的居所,安穩的住處,不受騷擾的安息之處。

 19 但在敵人的國土中,必有冰雹降下,打倒他們的樹林,他們的城必被夷平。

 20 你們這些在各水邊撒種,又使牛驢隨意走動的,是多麼有福啊!

via Flickr »]2008-03-16 False prophet (by H&M)

以賽亞書32章佳句連連,意象優美。開頭幾節提到那彌賽亞君王變革下的國度榮景:「能看見事物者的眼睛,必不再昏暗;能聽到事物者的耳朵,必然傾聽。 4 性急者的心必明白知識,口吃者的舌頭必說話清楚。 5 愚頑人不再被稱為高尚,惡棍也不再被稱為大方。」重點不是軍事和經濟的強盛,而是公義的彰顯、智慧的遍傳,展現Jürgen Habermas 現代性理論中「溝通理性」、「公民理性」被復興的願景。

願景當中,卻描述一群原先處在利益集團中的人—惡棍、愚頑人,必須失勢而無法在彌賽亞國度中共融。vv.5-7 轉而著重在為這點做出補充說明和解釋:原因是愚頑人褻瀆神、又苦待困乏人。至於惡棍,甚至無法講理,自然在推崇「互為主體性」和「溝通理性」的彌賽亞國度中無法站立。

這裡有趣的是「即使」這個字,因為這似乎假定了窮乏人在大多數時候是不講理、甚或無法講理的。用左派的角度來講,當代所謂的「法制」和「公理」都是擁有教育資源、知識權力的人所定下,「法律只保護懂法律的人」就是這麼說的。這本身是一場不公平的遊戲,因此Karl Marx 主張階級鬥爭、Che Guevara 組織武裝游擊隊作為窮乏人聲援自身權益的手段。

但經文彷彿奇妙地在說,窮乏人是有辦法講公理的(דַבֵּ֥ר מִשְׁפָּֽט׃),也就是非暴力、理性和平、訴諸認知手段的抗爭一方面可行,然而一方面他遇上惡棍、獨裁者、政客卻是無益。解放神學在遇到這種情況下時,手段出現分歧。一種轉向一種同屬現代化進程(modern project)的馬克思主義,攫取更多的屬世權力以達成抗爭目的,無論是暴力、統攝力、傳播影響力;,另一種則投向後自由神學的耶穌政治(Jesus politics):「我的國不屬這世界」。


Vv. 9-14 似乎針對著那些在安定城市文明下才能孕育出的一個特殊群體發話:安逸的婦女們。雖然這裡形容使用葡萄樹和田地的意象,然而她們並不像是真正務農的人,而是負責收割與宴樂的一群人。「歡樂的城、快樂的房屋、宮殿、熱鬧的城市,山岡、守望樓」這些才是她們寄居以及或得物質和生存安全感的空間。這種城市文明在法國左派馬克斯學者Henri Lefebvre的觀念看來製造了許多「異化的空間」。這些舒適和能製造安全感的空間是刻意被建構的社會空間,從真正的自然生活中區隔出來使人遠離自然:日光燈、霓虹燈、人工色彩、空調與除濕、人工庭園造景或盆栽…等等,從視覺、觸覺、嗅覺、聽覺、甚或味覺,空間中已經沒有一項是自然原始的。而這樣的生活特徵特別涵蓋了中產城市文明下的我們看做「貴婦」、「公主」的時尚女性群體。她們或可能還是有自己的勞動習慣,如減肥鍛鍊、逛街購物、保持儀態、美容保養等等,也是要花許多心力。就像我們說「當女人真辛苦」時,常常指得是這些社會壓力賦予這些當代女性的「義務」而言的。

然而重點是都會女性與這個社會空間掛勾時,結構面的代價是人與自然的異化。我們以那些限制我們行動的衣服為美、開無法越野的車子、穿只能走在水泥或磁磚地面上的嬌貴鞋子、被馴化後的胃吃野果會拉肚子、被馴化後的身體不在柔軟床墊上會睡不著。不僅如此,這一個個項目,從設計過後的衣服、鞋子,到精緻過後的料理,居住舒適的公寓別墅及其沙發、床墊、浴室等等,都被資本主義的貨幣價值給標籤,內化成為我們的價值以及人生追求的標的。照Jacques Derrida 和 Jean-Luc Marion 「禮物的現象學」,這是將上帝的恩典變質為一種資本的交換。而缺少這些社會資本的窮人自然人,甚至連享受上帝自然恩典的渠道都被剝奪:土地被剝奪,享用乾淨飲水和新鮮空氣的權利被[工業污染]剝奪、狩獵打魚開採礦產的權利都被剝奪與受限。