[書摘] The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century

The Resurrection from Grünewald's Isenheim Alt...


Gerrit Neven, ‘The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century’ in Theology as Conversation: The Significance Of Dialogue In Historical And Contemporary Theology: A Festschrift For Daniel L. Migliore, Bruce McCormack and Kimlym J. Bender eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009, pp. 67-81

My Summary:

Whereas initially Nietzsche and Marx only proclaim the death of God, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze proclaim with equal force the death of a man (cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 1994, esp. the last chapter, and Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 1993).

Following Barth, Geyer gives the Parousia the determinative role concerning various theological aspects of reconciliation. The Messiah’s having drawn near is the precondition of a future-oriented and therefore a dialogical mode of thinking. The Parousia points to a nearness of salvation that does not supernaturally demolish time and history, but rather breaks open time and history from within [messianically] by turning to the risky expectation of the Messiah, for whom each moment in time is an open entrance.

This expectation leads to intensive forms of discussion and debate with not just  theologians but also with [critical and phenomenological] thinkers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger , Horkheimer, Bloch, Sartre, and so on. The focus is the humanity of Christ.

(Hans-Georg Geyer [1929-1999]  studied in Frankfurt during 1950-1954 with Hans-Georg Gadamer, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Wolfgang Kramer before he turned to the study of systematic theology (at Gottingen, Berlin, Wuppertal, and Bonn.)

As early as 1962, Geyer declared his agreement with Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment. According to Benjamin, only the Messiah himself will consummate all that is happening historically, in the sense that only he himself will redeem and consummate the creation in its relation to the messianic.[1] Therefore, nothing historical can relate itself to something messianic on its own account. With this, he distanced himself from the idea that historical convictions, scientific achievements, or political opinions have in themselves the potential to make “the jump-ahead” to a time which is qualitatively new and different. Our knowledge is determined by economic and political factors. The desire to know is driven by a force consisting only of what can be [pragmatically or in a utilitarian manner] calculated. This [social/structural] force and the history of freedom contradict each other (analogous to the tension between poststructuralism and structuralism/rationalism).

Geyer here introduces the topic of faith in the post-liberal sense. He says, “faith, getting involved with and trusting upon the message concerning Christ, is at the same time radically renouncing the desire to discover the truth of the proclamation and past history”.

This criticism of metaphysics (of absolute certainly) is also part of the thinking projects of Moltmann and Pannenberg, for whom the future became the paradigm of transcendence. But both of them have felt that they have to leave Barth behind for they deem Barth’s system closed and ahistorical. Geyer does not share this view.

Geyer inherits early Barth’s dialectical theology. He is convinced that our time is an implication of the Parousia of Jesus Christ. His intensive debate with Moltmann and Pannenberg  is concerning the epistemology of hope. That is to say, if God’s new coming in the Parousia is an implication of the concrete identity of Jesus Christ, then how do we find his identity? He doubts whether for Moltmann and Pannenberg “the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ” are constitutive–and as opposed to merely illustrative— of the exegesis of biblical texts and of the practices of the Christian community. For according to Geyer, Moltmann and Pannenberg’s definition of history and Parousia did not clearly distinguish “the future as an end that we should strive for” (the anthropocentric) from “the future as the goal of God’s exclusive act” (the theocentric). His ultimate criticism is that the theology of Moltmann and Pannenberg is enclosed by a metaphysical correlation between God and the world. Transcendence is devoured by immanence.

To solve this problem, Geyer here uses Husserl’s concepts of protention (the succession of the historical accordance and its end) and retention. The protention in Jesus denotes the continuity between the character of Jesus’ conduct and his fate—death. According to Geyer, this historical fate can undergo an intensification or an ontological deepeningonly by the event of the meta-historical resurrection in Easter” [out of theological necessity].

By retention, it means when we look back, the attempts to ignore this fact or to place this death within an unduly higher framework can only lead to an idealization of his death or a degradation of it to an empirical fact (which is an unduly anthropologized theology full of liberal residues). Namely, the declaration that this historical death implies a [whether phenomenological, hermeneutic, or ontological] jump-ahead should be fiducially rooted only in the meta-historical domain, in [the post-Easter] remembrance, which runs backwards. This solution does not have to leave behind the aporia of this [historical] death. For at any rate, doctrinal or impersonal statements are not possible in the face of this death. Anamnesis and commemoration of this death can only give us non-metaphysical and personal truth. The redemptive history is inherently incomplete if all we have is this death of Jesus.

On the other hand, knowledge concerning the identity of this Jesus can only be acquired by participation in the process of the actuality of this meaning question in the medium of human language. That is why the question concerning the meaning of the cross is characterized by an infinite openness— as opposed to the enclosure of totalitarian metaphysics. For Geyer, the hope is the qualitative feature of faith, which is a prerequisite for new non-metaphysical mode of thinking.

In accorance with the nature of hope, Parousia concerns the future of which no one has sure knowledge of the time and the hour— it is beyond human calculation: Although we are vitalized by images of the future (e.g., Luke 21:7-33), these do not lead us into the future itself.

rhızomıng ındεxatıon dıs-choıcεs . .

There is a remarkable parallelism in the thinking of Geyer and Badiou about metaphysics. Badiou establishes that « the death of God » and « the death of man » go hand-in-hand in the ethos of 20th century philosophy and theology. He calls them “the joint disappearances of Man and God”.

On one hand there is in the 20th century philosophy the movement that radicalizes Kant’s approach by enslaving man in his own emancipation (i.e., German idealism: our [finite] subjectivity creates our world). This line runs from Kant via Fichte and Sartre (man is condemned to freedom; man is programmed to be a man and cannot be freed from this program). On the other hand, there is the way of the radical anti-humanism of Nietzsche and Foucault: the absence of God is one of the names for the absence of man.

As Foucault (he criticizes Levinas and Derrida’s anthropology as religion or theology), Badiou does not think this either or situation leaves room for postmodern thinkers like Levinas or Derrida. For Levinas’ appeal to God’s radical otherness in order to safeguard the otherness of the human other falls short to attest to a radical alterity. (This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the other should be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. cf. Badiou, Ethics [2001], 22). As for Derrida’s deferral of presence (différance), a sort of religion of messianic delay, Badiou sees something too artificial in its ramification upon the relation between philosophy and religion (cf. P. Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth [2003], 157). Postmodernity has become boring.

Badiou searches for what is empty and open in a time when the [human and divine] subject has disappeared. There is no other possibility than to accept this aporia, this emptiness, and to retain a prospect to point beyond death. For Geyer, this means the resurrection and the coming of the Messiah— within the perspective of time. Biblically speaking this is the time that remains, a time of intense expectation (cf. Isa 21:11). [2]

Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin’s disciple, in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans declares “what remains is what separates us from the Messiah”. More than the Messiah’s coming close is the Messiah himself.

Giorgio Agamben descubre el limbo

[1] The polemical context which Geyer (and possibly Benjamin) set out to argue against includes the following features (i.e., wrong assumptions):

1)       non-realism,

2)       post-structuralism,

3)       the totalitarian features of modernity in the 1960s (for which Geyer thinks Horkheimer’s treatment in the 1930s is exemplary. He lost faith but has not abandoned the project of human transformation of the society into a utopia).

4)       reciprocal freedom: the promises that somebody gives to someone else are ruled by a relationship of absolutely free reciprocity and by a reciprocal freedom.

[2] Here one may become somewhat apologetical over against Badiou. Badiou teaches with Nietzsche that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is dead. According to Nietzsche, faith in God as a supernatural power in general will no longer have any real influence, since God is not ascribed any power anyway. There is no such metaphysical God. However, it is precisely this faith that would be necessary to determine the convictions and the actions of man. This may be the case, Geyer answers Nietzsche. But even if God has lost his power over man and that super-sensual heaven has no meaning for the sensual earth, it does not necessarily follow the death of Christian theology.

Through Barth, Geyer has found a way forward: Christian theology has the task to lead faith out of its dogmatic identification with the concept of religion that is still metaphysically determined. Geyer rejects Nietzsche’s analysis that lumps together the God of metaphysics and the God of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike the metaphysical God, the God of the Bible can die.

On the basis of this God’s death, people in faith received the power to be really earthly finite and to be able to die. In the Christian faith, God’s identity can only be thought of appropriately when we take as point of departure the view that the death of Jesus Christ on the cross is God’s act on behalf of all.

The occurrence of cross in history demands remembrance and mimesis: the imitation of God in the praxis of love for one’s neighbor. God is a name that has to be continued in a passionate plea to practice love, as opposed to a concept that asks for ideological representation. Remembrance implies mimesis, through which we anticipate the coming of God in the Parousia.


Book Review: Exclusion and Embrace

Not [yet] a formalized review but some remarks:

Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1996, 192 pp., no price given pbk.)

Eventually I have reviewed Exclusion and Embrace in its totality. As I pressing toward the end, it’s a pain (for i have invested so much) to see how Volf, after failing dealing with Deleuze adequately (ch.7), got inscreasingly dogmatic (which I never thought he would be or would want to be): throwing cheap comments on [feminist] non-realist eschatology, leaving his « realist premillennialism » unfoundded, and a practical outline of Christian political theology wanted- let alone the lack of clarification about postliberal boundary awareness (characteristic of East and North European theologians) and the inconsistency in his perspective on ‘memory and forgetfulness’ vis-a-vis Gregory Jones’.

  1. ‎ In ch.4, he thinks Karl Barth‘s Trinitarian theology will perpetuate male dominance. His solution is that gender equality must be based on the difference of sexed bodies, which is good. but I’m not convinced that he has read Karl Barth too well, for the way he describes immanent Trinity and economic Trinity can raise many classical problems against which Barth has already warned us.
  2. In ch.5, he disagrees with the post-liberal Proposal that McIntyre offers in dealing with the oppression and violence that follows any promotion of any ‘brand-name justice’. McIntyre insists that Christians dwell in and enrich their own Christian traditions while engaging in [second order] inter-tradition dialogue on justice with others. Volf rejects this view and contends that no tradition is an inherent protective shield. Relegating postliberal solutions to sectarianism, Voif thinks it is enough that a Christian insists basic Christian responsibilities in a pluralistic world shaped by many traditions, just like the earliest Christians have thrived in the dye vat of pagan Roman world without the protection of a theological system/tradition. But I think it’s false, not least because N.T. Wright has already pointed out that the early Christians were not without systematic backup (Judaism), but also because succeeding McIntyre, Hauerwas has rightfully argues for the possibility and necessity of the « catholic » tradition for Christians to carry on their mission, without which the so-called « basic Christian responsibilities » can hardly hold on its own.

回應:「身為基督徒對真愛聯盟的疑惑」-他者、多元、與啟示 vs. kockroach 1

Gilles Deleuze
Gilles Deleuze

kockroach @ PTT Christianity says,

1. 你在「分辨陳述性(descriptive)語言的現象描繪和作為規範性(prescriptive)語言的意識型態入侵」的這一段先主張應該把多元現象放入現象學的括號(bracketing)中,採取存而不論(epoqué )的態度,避免主觀的判斷。

2. 但是到了後面一段,卻又先驗的主張「我們認為是罪的…」。

你是在尊重他者(多元性)的口號下,假裝有一個「他者」的存在,但你其實是在「我」與「他」之間劃下一道無法逾越的界線,讓他者在自己的門外喧嘩,把他們稱為「罪人」,而自己卻躲在 ghetto 之中相信自己才是倖存的先知。



但這和你最後面所說,其他人也「具備上帝形象(imago Dei)」的神學立場其實是完全相反而牴觸的。

3. 上帝形象的神學並不是告訴我們「要愛罪人」,而是告訴我們「那不是罪人,那是主所愛的,在他身上也有著上帝的形象」。基督徒的責任,是讓所有的人都能暢行無阻地、自願地到神面前,把自己的香膏打破,澆在耶穌頭上。

因為上帝的形象存在於「他者」身上,而且上帝本身就是最終極的他者(the Other),因此認識到他者也有自己的發話權,認識到自己的主體論述可以隨時被他者所中斷(interrupt),同時認識到「我」是一個開放而非封閉的主體,才有可能在這個面對「絕對他者」的信仰中,打破自己,被他感召、啟示和救贖。

只有認識到主體本身也是多元而複雜的(即使在基督教內部,對同性戀的態度也是多元的),認識到上帝有著「他者」的臉龐,才能在視域融合(fusion of horizon)的企圖中,接近它者害怕的面容,聽到他虛弱的聲音:「不要殺我」。





我認為kockroach 的第一點和第二點是誤讀和誤解我的立場。第三點則才真正展現我們的神學立場衝突和差異。

1. 在現象學還原和屬靈爭戰辨別的這段,我談的是「現象」。

如同Zheng Fuyao在一段FB同志家庭長大的青年公開見證影片下的一段聲明:

基督徒若把民主社會裡必然出現的文化價值衝突理解成屬靈爭戰無疑是致命的失誤,錯把應該細心呵護關懷的對象當成 »敵人 »或 »有問題的人 »予以批判潔淨(要求先認罪才配得被愛),既忘了自己根本是在不配愛的情況下被上帝無條件地接納,也忘了那真正需戒慎面對的對手是看不見的靈性勢力,以及那迫使受壓迫者無法自由呼吸的社會文化結構。

再者,「存而不論」(epoqué)不是永久性的。純粹的懷疑論不是倫理學。Richard Hays, Miroslav Volf 等神學倫理學家都強調我們無法避免在僅擁有「局部知識」的不得以情況下採取道德立場。(例如,如果小鳴看似要跳樓,儘管我不知道發生什麼事,我需要第一時間上去拉他。結果可能是我判斷錯誤了,但這就是「無法避免在僅擁有局部知識的不得以情況下採取道德立場」的倫理折衷。)







是在尊重他者(多元性)的口號下,假裝有一個「他者」的存在, 但你其實是在「我」與「他」之間劃下一道無法逾越的界線,自己躲在 ghetto 之中相信自己才 是倖存的先知。




您如果要進入完全的意識型態批判,和列維納斯(Emmauel Levinas)倫理系統的激進詮釋,我只能同意它也說得通,但您必須紮實的有神學根基去解構現下的基督教神學。Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 1996已經針對這點給了有力的回應(見第二章:排斥、第三章:擁抱、第五章:欺壓與正義)。他提出,「他者」在基督教救恩論中沒有被客體化,而是重建主體性。特別是在擁抱的隱喻中(如浪子回頭後與父親的擁抱),「先展開雙臂、等待對方回抱」(循循善誘)正是他者無法被切除的證據。

上帝形象的神學並不是告訴我們「要愛罪人」,而是告訴我們「那不是罪人,那是: 主所愛的,在他身上也有著上帝的形象」。基督徒的責任,是讓所有的人都能暢行: 無阻地、自願地到神面前,把自己的香膏打破,澆在耶穌頭上。


「世人都犯了罪、虧缺了神的榮耀。 如今卻蒙神的恩典、因基督耶穌的救贖、就白白的稱義。」


其實您整篇回覆,誠實地說,我覺得我回這段就夠了。您所提的,既是田立克(Paul Tillich)面對終極關懷的態度,又是列維納斯(Emmauel Levinas)的他者,還有德勒茲(Gilles Deleuze)非此、非彼之主體性游牧的況味。
我對這些人都是開放的。我是先接觸哲學和自由神學,才學習福音神學(evangelical theology)和大公神學(catholic theology),也一直以來的都企圖在正統神學框架下延展更多外來聲音衝撞的可能性。但是所有的神學都有個底線:上帝的啟示。




拉赫納(Karl Rahner)將天主教完全對外開放的努力值得敬佩,但我老師和我都覺得他失敗了:從左派角度不夠解構,從右派角度更不用說,完全守不住聖經啟示的救恩論(太多經文他根本解不過去)。

Tillich 處理啟示的方式是完全將它坍塌到文化、經驗中。他的存在主義神學,叫人不是透過讀經認識耶穌、瞭解上帝心意,而是像您說的,在「存在性邂逅」( existential encounter )遭遇「絕對他者」,打破自己,被他感召、啟示和救贖,發掘一種新生命的可能性。

從前我愛死 Tillich了(現在還是很愛,他的「嗣子」基督論是我不停反思和想要引渡的一塊),但他的系統所要付出的代價太大:十字架的死、復活、永生,全都變成一種道德寓言,可以不按照「歷史」、「猶太-基督文化傳統下」律法、啟示、恩典等神學概念的脈絡理解。


「 我是耶和華你們的 神、所以你們要成為聖潔、因為我是聖潔的」(利未記十一:44)


因此,我回頭承襲歷代以來正統神學所傳承的模型:所有外部聲音、人物想要進入到修改教義內容的程度,都必須要回到解經。現在有些同志神學,如哈佛(Harvard Divinity School)、范德堡(Vanderbilt Divinity School)、耶魯(Yale Divinity School)的,都做得不錯,原因在於能從解經立場上扭轉基督徒對創世紀、羅馬書、哥林多書信的定見。

否則,基督徒最多能做到傾聽之神學、溝通之神學、現象學之保留。但無法以聖經明文啟示之是為非。就算被溝通被打斷無數次,最後還是要說:「我相信同性戀性行為(非傾向)是神所不喜悅的,一如婚外情、婚前性行為是神所不喜悅的。」(Martin Luther « sola scriptura« : 請用聖經說服我。)

[文摘] Book Review:新新後現代神學──海曼的穿越情操


Source: occr.christiantimes.org.hk/pdf/art_0064.pdf


Hyman, Gavin The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist Textualism? Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press 2001, 176pp.

雖然書名是「後現代神學的困境」,但蓋文.海曼(Gavin Hyman)這本2001年問世的著作,並不是又一番對後現代思潮的鞭撻或嘲笑。相反,海曼是要比一眾後現代神學議程走得更遠,不是唐.庫比特(Don Cupitt)的非實在論(書中稱為「虛無文本主義」(nihilist textualism),不是馬可.泰勒(Mark Taylor)的反/神學(A/theology),也不是近年在英國劍橋冒起,以約翰.米爾班克(John Milbank)為代表的激進正統主義(Radical Orthodoxy,簡稱RO),而是借用法國理論家米歇.迪雪圖(Michel de Certeau)的觀念,不斷的穿過(move through),不斷的遠行。
雖然作者對RO和虛無文本主義皆作出批評,但明顯他與前者更為親和,至少他跟前者搭通頻道,多處對RO的診斷表示認同。相反,作者批評庫比特還是活在現代主義的框框裡,以為RO也是「活躍非實在論」(active non-realism)(頁62),沒有注意到,其實RO根本否定了現代的「實在論/非實在論」的框架

  • Radical Orthodoxy is a postmodern Christian theological movement founded by John Milbank that takes its name from the title of a collection of essays published by Routledge in 1999: Radical Orthodoxy, A New Theology, edited by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward. Radical Orthodoxy is a critique of modern secularism, and Kantian accounts of metaphysics. The name « Radical Orthodoxy » emphasizes the movement’s attempt to return to or revive traditional doctrine. « Radical » (lat. radix, « root »), « Orthodoxy » (gr. oρθός orthós « correct », and δόξα dóxa « teaching », [God-] »honoring », therefore, « correct faith »). The movement brings politics, ethics, culture, art, science, and philosophy in discussion with the sources of Christian theology. Its ontology has some similarities to the Neoplatonist account of participation.

    Henri de Lubac’s theological work on the distinction of nature and grace has been influential in the movement’s articulation of ontology. Hans Urs von Balthasar‘s
    theological aesthetics and literary criticism are also influential. The strong critique of liberalism found in much of Radical Orthodoxy has its origin in the work of
    Karl Barth
    . The Oxford movement and the Cambridge Platonists are also key influencers of Radical Orthodoxy.

    A form of Neoplatonism plays a significant role in Radical Orthodoxy. Syrian Iamblichus of Chalcis (ca. 245-325) and the Byzantine Proclus (412-485) are occasionally sourced, while the theology of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas of Cusa and Meister Eckhart is often drawn upon.

    One of the key tasks of Radical Orthodoxy is to revisit the philosophy of Duns Scotus. Scotus’ (1265-1308) rejection of analogy
    is often presented as the precursor of modernity (including his optimistic view of reason’s ability to attain truth about the divine).

    The Druze, a religious community found primarily in Lebanon, Israel, and Syria, incorporate neoplatonic concepts into their beliefs.

    Central tenets of Neoplatonism, such as the absence of good being the source of evil, and that this absence of good comes from human sin, served as a philosophical interim for Augustine of Hippo, but he eventually decided to abandon Neoplatonism altogether in favor of a Christianity based on his own reading of Scripture.[22]

    In the Middle Ages, Neoplatonist ideas influenced Jewish thinkers, such as the Kabbalist Isaac the Blind, and the Jewish Neoplatonic philosopher Solomon ibn Gabirol, who modified it in the light of their own monotheism. Neoplatonist ideas also influenced Islamic and Sufi thinkers such as al Farabi and Avicenna. Neoplatonism survived in the Eastern Christian Church as an independent tradition and was reintroduced to the west by Plethon

不過,作者同樣對RO的議程保持距離,因為他察覺到米爾班克同樣是「打稻草人」(頁6),並且在否定了現代神話之後,有掉落另一個神話的危險。米爾班克所攻伐的,是尼采的虛無主義,因為它背後的本體論,引伸出暴力的倫理(頁113)。可是,尼采真的以為自己在談論真相嗎?兩個閱讀方向-自信為真理自覺為虛構,作者分別稱為「形上虛無主義」(metaphysical nihilism)和「虛構虛無主義」(fictional nihilism)。海德格便取前者,以尼采為「最後一位形上學家」(頁100),可是,德勒茲、德里達、吉安里.瓦蒂莫(Gianni Vattimo)等,都不認同海德格的詮釋。瓦蒂莫便不認為尼采相信永劫回歸是一種對現實的描述(頁102)。米爾班克認為,虛無主義拒絕依附傳統,可是那只是前者的閱讀方向,虛構虛無主義剛剛相反,由於削弱了自身的本體論位置,開放了對傳統委身之路(頁114)。

  • 後現代神學因為放下了絕對的形上學和本體論等暴力作法,因而才能在真理的詮釋和認識上做出貢獻!這裡「虛無主義」一詞不好,有誤導混淆之嫌。


01 敘事回來了


  • 不是被壓抑就不在了!以本體論來說,它一直在那裡!


那麼所壓抑的是甚麼呢?李歐塔指出,後現代是現代性所壓抑的敘事模態的回歸(頁15)。他又提出「元敘事」(meta-narrative)的觀念,那是所有小敘事(petit récit)合法位置的仲裁者,實現了現代宰制現實的慾望。如今元敘事不再,只有小敘事。對於現代抬舉理性與科學模態,壓抑敘事模態,還是尼采攻擊得最深。他認為,真理只是虛構,它的虛構性已被忘記(頁19)。
面對元敘事,元敘事。這一點,李歐塔和跟隨他的庫比特也注意到(頁25)。作者認為,他們只是「沒有主體的笛卡兒主義」,思路跟笛卡兒沒有兩樣(頁23)。回應這種自相矛盾,米爾班克認為,與其宣告元敘事結束,不如宣告它的無可避免。這樣,所結束的不是所有的元敘事,而是「世俗理性」這一個元敘事,它的終結讓路給「基督教神學」這一個元敘事的回歸。(頁28)如此,庫比特和米爾班克都接受敘事性。前者是在一個實在論/非實在論的框架下,由標誌著實在論的自由主義,躍進非實在論並以「表現主義者」(expressionist)(頁 23)自居,否定宗教的獨一性和統一性。後者則以神學取代世俗理性,並認為所有知識皆敘事知識,這裡沒有一個現實要處理,沒有要解釋的(自然科學框架)也沒有要理解的(人文科學框架),這裡只有敘事(頁27)。對於RO來說,我們只能敘述一個社會現象,並且只能在更大的脈絡裡敘述它。這裡的敘事,更加接近後自由主義(post-liberalism)的傳統。作者如米爾班克般重視敘事的脈絡性,但他堅持要在沒有元敘事的情況下完成這項工作,這一點下文再述。

02 現代是神學異端?


  • 大正確!阿奎那的本體論自然神學本來就缺陷重重,現代性只是因應需要而生,並反應了經院哲學的失敗和不足。現在若要回應現代性,我們所需要的不是回歸,而是繼續前進。

巴爾塔撒指出,亞奎那認為存有(being, esse)只是「從神而出」,神對於存有具優先性,神與一切存有都不同屬,一切對神的言說都是類比的,即是說,不全對,但有點對。可是,一二五○年代阿威洛伊主義(Averroism)興起,之後司各脫(Duns Scotus)接受它,他把「存有」同樣地用來指涉創造者與被造。這樣做有兩個結果:一、「存有」比神更優先,神與人同樣是存有,只是程度不同罷了,神因此失去了本體論的超越性。二、同時,神人之間有一個形上學的無限距離,如此,一個本體論的超越,轉換成為一個認識論的超越。正是因為神與人在存有上失去了差異,類比反而成為不可能。因此,司各脫同時把神拉近了(本體上)和拉遠了(認知上)

  • 見注一。另外這點就可以理解田立克說 »god is not exist; god is the ground of being. » 是要回復上帝(Ultimate concern)之於存有的超越與先驗性。

如此,存有成了先驗的,神成為形上學的對象,禮儀敘事類比,讓位給指涉、科學和再現(頁37)。再現(representation) 成了絕對的東西,從而產生主體和客體的區別,客體需要主體去感知和再現。這樣,作者指出,原來司各脫才是現代的創建人。日後的康德和希克(John Hick),也是跟隨他的。神的不可知性,對希克來說是指存在上的,不再是本質上的。這樣,神的超越性,使祂越來越不真實。

  • 太精彩了這段…it pithily brings out what Hauerwasian post-liberal project is all about and at the same time allude to the fact that the agenda of ever-dominant RCC Thomism/natural theology and the Enlightenment humanistic optimism/modernism basically share the same ideology!!
  • 然後這樣的再現神話要直到後結構(Barthes’ Mythology)、後現代時才被破除(and then the constructive theology/post-liberal theology again makes constructive model in response to what deconstruction has torn apart.)
  • Hick 這段我頗為懷疑。從某種角度說「不可知性」應該既是本質上又是存在上的。因為在存在上意味著我們無法經歷、就更不可能對本質做出任何描述。而這還關係到我們是否依循存在主義「存在先於本質」的立場。以Hick來說,他是大量繼承了康德的認識論轉向,但他希望淡化其中的唯心論色彩。所以結果是他的新自由神學,其實已經從前現代走得很遠了。Hick認為禮儀、敘事、類比不過是無法反應上帝本質的「宗教現象學」的內容。他既不願授與它們本體論的地位,又不想否定宗教經驗的真實性,結果就是把它們安置於「存在」的位置(現象界)。但另一方面來說,指涉、科學和再現更不是Hick所信任的,這就當然地把他和康德區分了開來:康德認定純粹理性中的超驗統覺,但Hick(跟隨 Wittgenstein)指出理性也不過是大腦對事物經驗的一種詮釋過程。結論是,當他在「宗教之解釋」一書中說「絕對者」(The Real)是無法指涉(ineffable)的時候,說他「意指存在上的神不可知,而不再是本質上的神不可知」並不正確。Hick想要說的是:所有的宗教都是在嘗試敬拜一位不可知之神;敬拜本身是真的,但「有沒有敬拜到神」卻是不可知的。是神本質上的不可知,導致了他存有上的不可知。

為甚麼RO反對現代呢?因為米爾班克認為,現代就是司各脫的反神學走向,因而是「異端的、偶像的和世俗的」(頁49),RO要做的是制勝現代,而不是發展現代;而且,只有神學才是唯一可以制勝現代的後現代。米爾班克批評道,康德肯定界限以外的他者,但不知道這他者的內容;可是,他怎知道有限一定不能推及到界限以外之地呢?他的肯定是教條式的,他正正相信自己知道永恆是甚麼。(頁50)如果所知的僅限於有限,與無限隔斷,我們又怎知道這所知的不是主觀的,而無限不是一種投射呢(頁51)RO的立論是,在之所以在,在於其多於所是all there is only is because it is more than it is)(頁69)。他們的邏輯是:元敘事造就了本體性超越,本體性超越造就了參予,而參予造就了類比

  • Hick 跟 Kant做出了相同的推斷(這不能說一定錯誤):肯定界限以外的他者,但不知道這他者的內容。the question we must ask is: isn’t there any better working assumption?
  • 簡單來說,存有最大,其為無限,超越一切本體論實在界的總和。這說法在讀過von Balthasar之後我覺得是相當含混的。對他來說,神學是「上帝的本體性超越造就了參予,而參予造就了類比,而類比造就了元敘事」。但人類心智在能夠進行神學性思考之前,一切卻必須由類比開始:由類比開始,我們慢慢建立一個敘事框架,以此我們方覺察了上帝的本體性超越(例如由數字觀念的無限來類比上帝的無限)。

03 由虛假到虛構

第三點值得注意的,是作者的答辯,他為RO辯護,然後再為虛無主義辯護。首先,RO不是非實在論。維根斯坦曾說,觀念論(即非實在論)和實在論都相信自己可以為世界的本質說些甚麼(頁56)。非實在論相信,一切的再現只是再現的再現,這個「只」字,也是相信自己在談論真相。米爾班克曾說,「他的工作是要 『說服』別人出於『文學口味』而認定基督教所講的故事更動聽。」(頁165,註31)。RO的Rowan Williams則說,「語言是人用來跟環境打交道(negotiating)的東西,是找路走,而不是以再現的問題為中心。」(頁60)

  • Milbank’s approach is narrative theology that truths depend on the strength of hermeneutical weight, given there is nothing outside of text (Derrida) and the narratability of human existence (Ricoeur). R. William則指向敘事和詩學對於「符號本質」與再現理論的根本差異。詩的關注在於符號本身,觀念界理念的能指遊戲。


  • …以及logocentrism!
  • 必須重新記憶的是don Cupitt理解為「真」的,不過也就是經驗表現和再現上的真(例如:活出一副天國是真的存在的樣子,意義上遠大於天國是否實存)。以Descartes二元論來貶抑這套系統,完全是合理的批判。


  • Fictional nihilism如我說過,是個很誤導的名稱。它的消極形式是解構,就是Derrida的破壞,本身必須不停地游牧(沒錯,你忽略了Deleuze)和迂迴;但其也具備積極形式,就是RO、敘事神學的後自由神學。Metaphysical nihilism則按照Heidegger說法,以Nietzsche為最後一個代表(事實上我個人認為在他之後還有Sartre),其虛無的方式是暴力的,because the way he « represented » « le neant » is still logocentric!! 然而Deleuze本身承襲了Nietzsche,所以他否定Heidegger說法。必須注意的是,Deleuze之所以難搞,是因為(如我在別處說過的)他本身在進行的就是「本體論的後現代」。所以一方面來說Deleuze是Foucault- Derrida (Heidegger excluded- being himself the « Ground of postmodernism », he does not belong to it.) 那派同樣作為Fictional nihilism的重大代表—Foucault破壞了倫理學(and Levinas built a lame version on top of the ruin);Derrida破壞了認識論(and Rorty built a lame model on top of its ruin);Deleuze(嚴格歷史意義上說來是Heidegger & Wittgenstein)破壞了本體論(but he himself built an ill-defined model on top of the very ruin),但另一層面意義上,what Deleuze is doing is exactly the resumption of the Nietzschean project, i.e., A « Metaphysical nihilism »。在本體論這層面上Deleuze的工作是雙重的!Fictional nihilism和Metaphysical nihilism的分類標準變成完全不適用。


04 「不是這個……不是這個……不是這個……」


作者指出,RO雖然反對現代二元論,處處流露另一種二元對立,一種前現代的二元論:神學優先於哲學,神聖優先於世俗(頁72)。元敘事本身就是暴力的, 它要定位(position)別人,把被定位的話語扭曲和施暴,共冶一爐,沒有他者

  • Milbank的RO敘事真的很有辯證結構主義的況味,這其實已經違反了敘事的精神。This is the reason why I think it will not outrun postliberal theology.

他批評,米爾班克缺少後現代作者的遊戲性格,言語又溫馴又沉重,而且 充滿全知、理性和護教的色彩,這通通都是神話系統的特色


  • But I also part my company with Hyman at this point. 如果回到遊戲、游牧、穿梭、懸宕這些中庸狀態就是海曼神學的結論的話,那樣根本就不是有建設性的基督教神學。從學術上說來也不過就是用微波爐加熱回收De Certeau [in sociology]、Deleuze [in continental philosophy] 的哲學冷飯罷了。
  • 我對海曼失望了。你自己那套還不是De Certeau、Deleuze式的後現代?拿來說嘴更沒意義。事實上你還忽略了Milbank擁有Gadamer、Ricoeur這邊的力量。基督教內在有一種後現代性一語事實上已經夠大膽了。海德格等人所做的,不過是還原並定向人類能夠詮釋真理的確切框架(背景請播放胡塞爾現象學動畫謝謝)


  • 補充兩字也用得很妙。In fact it is only in the Derridian Différance that the messianic hope is given the ultimate substance and the exclusivity.



  • 這邊應該是還有觀念發展的空間,我不想急於否定。然而他還是有一種「存在與虛無」二元對立的味道,也類似中世紀和早期現代已經用過的否定神學:因為無從指涉,便用雙重否定的方式來間接肯定現象界線外的他者。但這套進路跟Hick的應用思維實在太像了。問題同樣是:沒有人希望自己的信仰是建立在虛無主義上的。


  • Lame.

由此可見,「後現代」作為模態,也不是單一的模態,它的內部存在著矛盾而競逐的敘事,評論它時根本不能一概而論。它可以是高呼一切皆相對,可以是打倒一切 傳統,也可以是破除偶像,或是對「他者」的執著。至於「所有知識皆敘事知識」或者「終極優先性被無限推延」是不是你那杯茶,海曼的敘事又是否動聽,那就留給讀者們去選擇了,畢竟後現代就是一個只有口味的世代。

  • 終極優先性是被無限推延,但也是無限地逼近。天國已近,現在就是了。同時復活的盼望已經賜下,初熟的果子已經可嚐。這是神結的果子,不是人選的口味。

Prolegomena on Theological Epistemology




Kevin Vanhoozer on Epistemology: Do Biblical Scholars REALLY Need to Know Philosophy?

I agree with the postmodern insight that human reasoning is situated. I also agree with Lesslie Newbigin that the postmodern critique of foundationalism has shown that human thinking always takes place within “fiduciary” frameworks. Even the Enlightenment project began with a “faith” in the omnicompetence of reason, with a faith in a certain way of mapping the world and our way in it. The question, then, is not whether we can avoid subscribing to some fiduciary framework or another, but rather, which one enables us to make cognitive contact with reality?

All human thinking takes place within fiduciary frameworks, but only the biblical frameworks enable us rightly to interpret the nature of ultimate reality. »

Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Six Views (Myron B. Penner, ed., 2005) pg. 86 (Emphasis mine)


至此後現代神學與後現代哲學出現分野。後者所抱持的是平等主義,與多元理性主義的「條條大路通羅馬」相對的是他的「阡陌縱橫皆死巷」。他的盡頭早在德希達(Jacques Derrida)、傅柯(Michel Foucault),和德勒茲(Gilles Deleuze)三頭法國後現代馬車之下呈現,也就是:解構、權力、和混沌。






又如我之前所說的,在「物自體不可知」(noumenon)的情況下,誰先將胡塞爾(Edmund Husserl)—海德格(Martin Heidegger)所設立的現象界結界打破誰就贏了。然而成功破壞的或然率卻隨著人們更多的嘗試而愈形渺茫。猶如被繩捆索綁的嬌羞夥伴,她的掙扎在那興致盎然的偉大挑逗者面前顯得可盼而逗趣。量子物理、黑洞和奇點理論把這個結界搞得愈來愈厚,且深不可測。唯物論和邏輯實證論已經完全走死。人們窮盡自己智慧而發狂的探索豈無啻一場徒勞的掙扎,是否就在那造物者的眼中成為一場娛興饗宴?

表面上未來十五年真是神學詮釋學得意的大好階段,至少呂格爾(Paul Ricoeur)和高達美(Hans-Georg Gadamer)是這麼想的。他們站在挑逗者的那一邊,脈衝律動十足地配合祂。




人從受造時,無論以墮落或是如何地不完整,是被離心力甩在螺旋的最外圍的。而以我來看,人的天生認知是以「自我中心」而非「宇宙中心」、「他者中心」、「基督中心」、「上帝中心」的。而這就是墮落的問題,也是伊甸園悲劇所指向的「原罪」咒詛。它需要透過一個救贖轉變的過程才能導正,而無論沙特(Jean-Paul Sartre)存在主義或基督教神學都認同這個轉變過程是由外力介入而肇始的。只有尼采版本的存在主義才認為只要透過「內力」就足夠。1890年尼采在馬背上發瘋,這伙計自詡以內在超人意志貫徹存在性救贖,就是內力太強足以攻心才走火入魔的。

nietzche 「尼采死了,上帝還在。」原來那些說「上帝以死」的人通通死了,齊克果(Søren Kierkegaard)、布特曼(Rudolf Bultmann)、田立克都感謝這個幫助確立神有神學(theism)論述的反面試驗。這個是相對於「老我」(ego)的救贖「外力」,基督教版本存在主義卻必須將它逆轉過來看。雖是「外力」,卻非真正「外來」,而是在本體上居於內。「外來」一詞在語言結構主義上相對應的是「內有」(inherit),它前設是「內在自我」(ego)被當成核心。但基督教哲學真正強大的核心在於以他者為中心,尤其是那位「絕對他者」(The Absolute Other)。真正的救贖是來自於螺旋中心的引力。引力就是上帝的愛和自我啟示。

歷史上很多基督徒在神學上錯誤地理解了這個上帝啟示的引力,以為是它的運作方式是像磁鐵吸附鐵沙般,而信徒在受洗後,就是一下被吸附到上帝本體之中。然而實際情況是,我們先藉著「信」,而感受到這個引力並認識其螺旋軌跡。此一「行星入軌」[5]的調整在神學上的定位為「因信稱義」(justification by faith)。接著藉由「愛」,信徒得到順著軌跡往中心運行的動力,也就是基督徒的成聖道路(toward Christlikeness; sanctification),此一動力並非行星自身獨具,乃是由核心發出引力轉介到行星自身,成為神學上信徒個體的自轉(個人靈修成聖)和公轉(教會聖徒相通)現象。最後是「望」,因著盼望我們定睛在中心點那位耶穌基督、掌管天地萬有且為我們信心創始成終的主、上帝最大最實質的啟示。盼望的重點在於我們雖然都是終其一生也無法真正得到那所看見仰望的應許,但有人會為我們接續,且一切的不足在末世都將由上帝補完(參希伯來書11-12)[6],將我們帶到軌跡的中心與祂合一(參約翰福音14-17)[7]




此處我們將先批判的是此一二元迷思。它既落入符號結構主義的巢臼,也是後現代(後結構—解構、後殖民)所要逆轉的典範,就不得不予以揚棄。但事實上,他們對立的只有基礎信念(foundational belief)的前設罷了。只要加上適當的扣環做成連環船,絕大多數被解構的論述都還有機會救活。


第二現代的認識論典範[9]將會說明, 符號的詮釋理解將較結構主義所陳述的遠為複雜且生機蓬勃。它的精密和連動性表現在「視域融合」(fusion of horizons)、「言說理論」(speech-act theory)和實踐理性(practical reason)之中。

一、社會科學可以作為靈命的一個視角,使基督徒史學家研究出與印度教導師(Bhagwan; maharishi; guru)或穆斯林阿訇(imam)的區域發展認同或語意學,即為多元視角的視域融合。這是上帝的一般啟示。血之所以被定義為紅色,是絕多數人的眼球構造和大腦認知系統使他們產生共同的經驗,經驗達成一種共識,而後再被經驗實證論者上綱為真理[10]。如果沒有色盲等「異常者」的「病理學」經驗加上傅柯的幫助,恐怕實證論者將永遠不會知道還有重新檢述自身前設立場的必要。Vanhoozer所說的「信託框架」(fiduciary frameworks)就是任何思想方法論都無法避免的「信心前設」(presupposition of faith ),而這導致了神學本體論的永恆性和超驗性,也是保羅神學的「一般啟示」。[11]

二、言說理論則與海森堡的測不準定理(Heinsberg’s Uncertainty Principle)[12]相呼應,顯現的是符號本身的可異性/可議性。符號並非單純地將「表述」事物,它將事物貼上標籤的同時,將改變的將不僅是事物的本體,還有是意識投射到它之後產生的現象觀感。如一件衣物若標價五百時,能引起人們搶購的慾望,若標價五千時則可成為人們心中所鄙夷的黑心貨。衣物本身在「理論上」仍是同一件,但標價行為並不如前現代結構主義者所假定地中性,只是單純反應該事物的特性與價值。它乃是帶有主觀能動性的詮釋行為,而其價值還會隨著他者反應而波動,故成為絕對的測不準[13]。同時他者的反應還有衣物本身更是隨著三維進程(temporal)的,衣物本身因擺放而累積灰塵、因多人試穿而漸鬆舊、因換季而必須面臨折扣、又因復古潮流興起而重新翻紅。時間與歷史以各種方式改變了真理的框架,言說的本身也沒有實證性可言。言說理論用「發語內容觀點」( locution)、「語內表現行為」(illocution,在特定語境中一講出話即完成的言語表達行為,如答應、允許、要求、謝罪等),和「言語表達效果」(perlocution,指使人信服、 激動等的說話效果),說明了符號能指(signifying)與所指(signified)絕非任意或可斷開的二元系統。可觀的所指造成能指,而所指回頭形塑能指。



實踐理性對傳統認識論和後現代的打擊非常顯而易見,因為實踐理性的存在使得「純粹理性」(pure reason)必須受到限制,同時還有「判斷力批判」(critiques on Judgment)也為理性認識的有效性預留了狡兔三窟。當純粹理性在後現代徹底覆亡之時,實踐理性還存在。第二現代只要抓住這一點就足以全面吹起反攻後現代的號角。

總結以上,神學真正要做的,應該是把科學吸納在自身的框架之下(sublation),承認它們作為表述世界及推動歷史的途徑是能夠螺旋行進上做出貢獻的系統。反之,專注在不可知其然的「特殊啟示」(special revelation)所做的系統性論述—即系統神學—說不定該緩緩了。

或是,重新定義Vanhoozer所說的「聖經框架」會變成非常重要的一件事。拉扯過後的框架並定會比後現代更大、更包容。有時候避免混淆、並要達至真正的包容我們必須在學界認知上給予這框架一個新詞彙,甚至要大膽的去掉「聖經」二字。近代自由神學樹立典範的代換做法有田立克的「終極關懷」(ultimate concern)之於救贖(salvation)、存有場域(ground of being)之於上帝。…然後他就會變得很不「基督教」,也會引起改革宗和基要派的揣揣不安。但其實除了「基督耶穌」和YHWH的字元是「絕對的啟示能指」(absolute signifying of revelation)之外,基督教神學根本沒有什麼是不能處境化(contextualize)的。然而憂心的是,人們永遠是背著文化處境包袱來到這場永恆的賽道前,一場迭無休止的意識型態大戰呈現給祂的不過是一場愚神禮讚(Encomium Moriae)[18]




但一如激進正統派(Radical Orthodoxy)所指出的,如果這奧秘的啟示真有如此巨大,基督教神學便斷無可能以忽略與它者(及其他學科)交會的方式支撐自身的宏大,唯恐這樣的冇斷吹噓又導致自貶為意識型態陣營的一支,最後只能以政治或軍事權力手段來解決疆域問題(如中古歐洲歷史上的基督王國Christendom和十字軍Crusade)。


在愚者看來,在沒有尚未與外邦人世界觀談得中間地帶(middle ground)前的一切「勉人入教舉動」,都是在破壞上帝審判的中立性。什麼叫中間地帶?它不是妥協或藉由批判他者攻城掠地的成果,而是理解與入情(empathy)對方的處境,領對方從她自身的處境看見基督。如此一來,一種更接近神學上的利他主義(theological altruism)、就是一種包含詮釋行為與實踐性言說符號的終極關懷,才有可能徹底破壞、及替換掉壓在福音派神學上頭的後現代系譜學解構框架。



[1] Baudrillard, Jean, and Sylvère Lotringer. Forget Foucault, Semiotext(E) Foreign Agents Series. New York, NY: Semiotext(e), 1987. Baudrillard, Jean, and Sylvère Lotringer. Forget Foucault. Los Angeles, CACambridge, Mass.: Semiotext(e) ;Distributed by MIT Press, 2007.

[2] Ockham, William of (c 1300-1349) British theologian influenced by Duns Scotus; against Aquinas; reason cannot give us knowledge of God only revelation and faith can; Occam’s Razor In its simplest form, Occam’s Razor states that one should make no more assumptions than needed. Put into everyday language, it says

Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate [Latin]


Given two equally predictive theories, choose the simpler.

For example, after a storm you notice that a tree has fallen. Based on the evidence of the storm and the fallen tree, a reasonable hypothesis would be that the storm blew down the tree — a hypothesis that requires you to suspend your disbelief very little, as there exist strong logical connections binding what you already know to this solution (seeing and hearing storms tends to indeed indicate the existence of storms; storms are more than capable of felling trees). A rival hypothesis claiming that the tree was knocked over by marauding 200-metre tall space aliens requires several additional assumptions, with various logical weaknesses resulting from inconsistencies with what is already known (concerning the very existence of aliens, their ability and desire to travel interstellar distances, their ability and desire to (non-)intentionally knock down trees and the alien biology that allows them to be 200 metres tall in terrestrial gravity), and is therefore less preferable.

[3] 參見Osborne, Grant R. The Hermeneutical Spiral : A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation. Rev. and expanded, 2nd ed. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2006. 中譯《基督教釋經學手冊:釋經學螺旋的原理與應用》,台北:校園,1999。

[4] Gaarder, Jostein. Svetot Na Sofija : Roman Za Istorijata Na Filozofijata. Skopje: TRI, 2002. 英譯Gaarder, Jostein, and Paulette Møller. Sophie’s World : A Novel About the History of Philosophy. Pbk. ed. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2007.

[5] 注意希臘文planaw(wander)一詞與planet的同字源關係(homogeneity)。

[6] 希伯來書 11:1-2 信就是所望之事的實底,是未見之事的確據。2古人在這信上得了美好的證據。…33 他們因著信,制伏了敵國,行了公義,得了應許,堵了獅子的口,34 滅了烈火的猛勢,脫了刀劍的鋒刃;軟弱變為剛強,爭戰顯出勇敢,打退外邦的全軍。35 有婦人得自己的死人復活。又有人忍受嚴刑,不肯苟且得釋放(原文作贖),為要得著更美的復活。36 又有人忍受戲弄、鞭打、捆鎖、監禁、各等的磨煉,37 被石頭打死,被鋸鋸死,受試探,被刀殺,披著綿羊山羊的皮各處奔跑,受窮乏、患難、苦害,38 在曠野、山嶺、山洞、地穴,飄流無定,本是世界不配有的人。39 這些人都是因信得了美好的證據,卻仍未得著所應許的;40 因為神給我們預備了更美的事,叫他們若不與我們同得,就不能完全。

[7]羅馬書 5:5 盼望不至於羞恥,因為所賜給我們的聖靈將神的愛澆灌在我們心裡。

約翰福音 17:20 -26我不但為這些人祈求,也為那些因他們的話信我的人祈求,21 使他們都合而為一。正如你父在我裡面,我在你裡面,使他們也在我們裡面,叫世人可以信你差了我來。22 你所賜給我的榮耀,我已賜給他們,使他們合而為一,像我們合而為一。23 我在他們裡面,你在我裡面,使他們完完全全的合而為一,叫世人知道你差了我來,也知道你愛他們如同愛我一樣。24 父啊,我在那裡,願你所賜給我的人也同我在那裡,叫他們看見你所賜給我的榮耀;因為創立世界以前,你已經愛我了。25 公義的父啊,世人未曾認識你,我卻認識你;這些人也知道你差了我來。26 我已將你的名指示他們,還要指示他們,使你所愛我的愛在他們裡面,我也在他們裡面。

[8] 來源要求增補

[9] 屬於筆者還在嘗試建構的一塊領域,大致方向都將類同於呂格爾和高達美的詮釋學,只是會從哲學層面再退化回認識論的科學層面,以求與認知科學、腦神經科學、宇宙科學達致互動。另框架本身則將是神學性的。

[10] 有趣的是,經驗實證論者的創啟人休模原先是極度懷疑任何這類型的經驗連結足以成為任何理性的依據的。

[11] 羅馬書 1:20 自從造天地以來,神的永能和神性是明明可知的,雖是眼不能見,但藉著所造之物就可以曉得,叫人無可推諉。

[12] 科學家原本相信這個宇宙自然律是可以完全被科學掌控的,如此可以精確預言宇宙的未來。例如只要引力定律,即可推知地球在太空中任何一刻之相對位置。然而測量粒子之位置,必須利用光頭投射粒子令它繞射而指出其位置。光的波長愈短得出的粒子定位愈加精確(如以兩個波峰夾粒子度其位置, 短波度得比較準確),然而波長愈短,粒子擾動愈加厲害(就像用衣夾拑波子),並以一種不可測的方式改變粒子之速度。粒子位置的不確定性(p)x粒子質量x速度的不確定性(q)不可小於普朗克常數。

若連粒子當下位置也不知,當然更不用說預言它未來之位置。要注意的是,現下的困難並不在於測量儀器之精密度與校準極限,而是粒子在任何一刻都沒有準確之速度及位置。誇大一點可說,如果電子確切知道自己之去向,就不知自己身在何方,反之亦然。同時因粒子之位置及運動速度不可是零,即保持一定能量起伏,叫做零點脹落(Zero Point Fluctuation),如此「絕對真空」或「絕對零度」就只是一個如數學般的幻想理論。測不準定理有補足性(complementarity)作為但書,即同時測不到的是兩樣東西的值,如動量+位置,時間+能量等等。

[13] 例如在這事件中,原本接受五千為合理預算範圍的潛在購買者,因畏懼周遭將他貼上「凱子」標籤而轉變對該衣物價值的看法。而後續還會有其他人因為這潛在購買者所表現的心理而轉變看法。該衣物的所見價值(perceived value)便產生了永恆波動性。

[14] “A type of logical reasoning that develops from a commonly accepted proposition until reasons are found to alter the acceptance or understanding of the original proposition.” –Oxford Talking Dictionary.

“Similar to induction, but predicated on a known or assumed relationary rule(s) and an observation(s) that contains at least one of the predicates(predictors) of the rule. Another predicate(s) of the relationary rule is then generalized to the observation due to the coincidence of the other predicate(s) in both the observation and the rule.” –Wikipedia

[15] “A reasoning procedure aimed at coming up with good hypotheses to explain observed cases.  The success of abduction is compromised if all rival hypotheses are equally compatible with the evidence (i.e., underdetermined .)  Abduction was an area of philosophy expanded upon by Peirce.” – A Dictionary of Postmodern Terms

abduction<logic> The process of inference to the best explanation. « Abduction » is sometimes used to mean just the generation of hypotheses to explain observations or conclusionsm, but the former definition is more common both in philosophy and computing. The semantics and the implementation of abduction cannot be reduced to those for deduction, as explanation cannot be reduced to implication. Applications include fault diagnosis, plan formation and default reasoning. Negation as failure in logic programming can both be given an abductive interpretation and also can be used to implement abduction. The abductive semantics of negation as failure leads naturally to an argumentation-theoretic interpretation of default reasoning in general.” –[« Abductive Inference », John R. Josephson jj@cis.ohio-state.edu].

“Raisonnement par lequel on restreint dès le départ le nombre des hypothèses susceptibles d’expliquer un phénomène donné. ”—Larousse Multidico

[16]“ [Bx] In the Preface to B, Kant speaks of theoretical reason as « determining » a given concept and of practical reason as « making it actual ». In addition to distinguishing the practical employment of reason from its speculative employment, Kant opposes practical and transcendental freedom. [Bxxv] He suggests that in practical reason we may pass beyond the limits of possible experience, and characterizes the Critique’s limitation of speculative reason as essential for clearing the way for practical reason, « the necessary practical employment of pure reason–the moral–in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Without the negative aspect of the Critique, the practical employment of reason is in jeopardy because reason is « brought into conflict with itself ».” –Kant Glossary

practical reason: Rational capacity by which (rational) agents guide their conduct.
In Immanuel Kant‘s moral philosophy, it is defined as the capacity of a rational being to act according to principles (i.e., according to the conception of laws). Unlike the ethical intuitionists (see intuitionism), Kant never held that practical reason intuits the rightness of particular actions or moral principles. For him, practical reason was basically formal rather than material, a framework of formative principles rather than a source of specific rules. This is why he put such stress on his first formulation of the categorical imperative. Lacking any insight into the moral realm, humans can only ask themselves if what they are proposing to do has the formal character of law, namely, the character of being the same for all persons similarly circumstanced. ” –Britannica Concise Encyclopedia (emphasis mine)

[17]創世紀 3:1-6 耶和華神所造的,惟有蛇比田野一切的活物更狡猾。蛇對女人說:「神豈是真說不許你們吃園中所有樹上的果子嗎?」2 女人對蛇說:「園中樹上的果子,我們可以吃,3 惟有園當中那棵樹上的果子,神曾說:『你們不可吃,也不可摸,免得你們死。』」4 蛇對女人說:「你們不一定死;5 因為神知道,你們吃的日子眼睛就明亮了,你們便如神能知道善惡。」6 於是女人見那棵樹的果子好作食物,也悅人的眼目,且是可喜愛的,能使人有智慧,就摘下果子來吃了,又給他丈夫,他丈夫也吃了。

[18] Encomium Moriae: The Praise of Folly (Greek title: Morias Enkomion (Mwriaj Egkw,mion), Latin: Stultitiae Laus, sometimes translated as In Praise of Folly, Dutch title: Lof der Zotheid). an essay written in 1509 by Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam and first printed in 1511, In Praise of Folly is considered one of the most influential works of literature in Western civilization and one of the catalysts of the Protestant Reformation.

[19] 700萬億億、7以後加22個零,這數字比全地球沙漠和沙灘的沙粒總和還大上N倍。垓為數詞單位,列於億、兆、京之後。

[20] 見Gadamer, Hans Georg, Joel Weinsheimer, and Donald G. Marshall. Truth and Method. 2nd, rev. ed, Continuum Impacts. London ; New York: Continuum, 2004.

[21]羅馬書 12:1-2 所以弟兄們,我以神的慈悲勸你們,將身體獻上,當作活祭,是聖潔的,是神所喜悅的;你們如此事奉乃是理所當然的。2 不要效法這個世界,只要心意更新而變化,叫你們察驗何為神的善良、純全、可喜悅的旨意。

[22]路加福音 10:27 他回答說:「你要盡心、盡性、盡力、盡意愛主你的神;又要愛鄰舍如同自己。」

[23]馬太福音 5:43 「你們聽見有話說:『當愛你的鄰舍,恨你的仇敵。』44 只是我告訴你們,要愛你們的仇敵,為那逼迫你們的禱告。

[24]馬太福音 19:18 他說:「什麼誡命?」耶穌說:「就是不可殺人;不可姦淫;不可偷盜;不可作假見證;

馬太福音 19:19 當孝敬父母,又當愛人如己。」

馬太福音 22:37-40 耶穌對他說:「你要盡心、盡性、盡意愛主你的神。38 這是誡命中的第一,且是最大的。39 其次也相仿,就是要愛人如己。40 這兩條誡命是律法和先知一切道理的總綱。」

馬可福音 12:28-34 有一個文士來,聽見他們辯論,曉得耶穌回答的好,就問他說:「誡命中那是第一要緊的呢?」29 耶穌回答說:「第一要緊的就是說:『以色列啊,你要聽,主我們神是獨一的主。30 你要盡心、盡性、盡意、盡力愛主你的神。』31 其次就是說:『要愛人如己。』再沒有比這兩條誡命更大的了。」32 那文士對耶穌說:「夫子說,神是一位,實在不錯;除了他以外,再沒有別的神;33 並且盡心、盡智、盡力愛他,又愛人如己,就比一切燔祭和各樣祭祀好的多。」34 耶穌見他回答的有智慧,就對他說:「你離神的國不遠了。」從此以後,沒有人敢再問他什麼。

羅馬書 13:8-10 凡事都不可虧欠人,惟有彼此相愛要常以為虧欠;因為愛人的,就完全了律法。9 像那不可姦淫,不可殺人,不可偷盜,不可貪婪,或有別的誡命,都包在愛人如己這一句話之內了。10 愛是不加害與人的,所以愛就完全了律法。

加拉太書 5:14 因為全律法都包在「愛人如己」這一句話之內了。

雅各書 2:8 經上記著說:「要愛人如己。」你們若全守這至尊的律法,才是好的。

利未記 19:18 不可報仇,也不可埋怨你本國的子民,卻要愛人如己。我是耶和華。

[26]另參http:// waytohome.blogspot.com/2006/11/faithchurch.htm