[文摘] Slavoj Žižek and Harum Scarum

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Slavoj Zizek in Liverpool, cropped version of ...
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In Gene Nelson‘s « Harum Scarum » (1965), featuring Elvis Presley as the Hollywood heartthrob Johnny Tyronne, we meet the action movie star travelling through the Orient while promoting his new film, « Sands of the Desert« . Upon arrival, however, Elvis Presley/Johnny Tyronne is kidnapped by a gang of assassins led by a temptress « Oriental » named Aishah, who wish to hire him to carry out an assassination. Emboldened by proper « Western virtues », Elvis will do no such thing and manages to sing and dance his way out of the way of the conniving « Orientals ».

In an interview with Al Jazeera, Slavoj Zizek, the Slovenian philosopher, made a rather abrupt staccato observation – a hit-and-run strike worthy of an action hero – very much reminiscent of the fate of Elvis Presley and his Oriental sojourn:

« I think today the world is asking for a real alternative. Would you like to live in a world where the only alternative is either anglo-saxon neoliberalism or Chinese-Singaporean capitalism with Asian values? I claim if we do nothing we will gradually approach a kind of a new type of authoritarian society. Here I see the world historical importance of what is happening today in China. Until now there was one good argument for capitalism: sooner or later it brought a demand for democracy … What I’m afraid of is, with this capitalism with Asian values, we get a capitalism much more efficient and dynamic than our western capitalism. But I don’t share the hope of my liberal friends – give them ten years [and there will be] another Tiananmen Square demonstration – no, the marriage between capitalism and democracy is over. »

(full article)

The author of this article, Hamid Dabashi, is Hagop Kevorkian Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia University in New York. Among his most recent books is Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror (2008). This quite helpfully explains his viewpoint before you delve into his  tortuous reasoning adorned with beautifully labyrinthine English vocabularies.

Don’t get me wrong. This article is very thought-provoking, and definitely worth reading. Before we Chinese and Asian bow down to repent and recognize our Asian values as despicable, Dabashi helps us to see that this western intellectual pride has a long legacy among the European philosophical elites.

He found Žižek’s pedigree first of all in Emanuel Levinas (1906-1995) – the distinguished Lithuanian phenomenologist of Jewish ancestry. Levinas’ baffling dismissal of the non-European as non-human is no less controversial than Žižek given his Oriental ethnicity/political identification  and Other ethics. Contrary to his phenomenological ethics that famously sought the sight of the (European) knowing subject in an encounter with « the face of the other », Levinas wrote:

« When I speak of Europe, I think about the gathering of humanity. Only in the European sense can the world be gathered together … in this sense Buddhism can be said just as well in Greek. »

« I often say, although it is a dangerous thing to say publicly, that humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be translated: all the rest – all the exotic – is dance. »

If Levinas is not enough « vintage West » to convince you of this racist strand of Western philosophy, then Edward Saïd ‘s Orientalism should help us to trace the roots of this intelligentsia virus back to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the father of the European Enlightenment.

Kant insists:

« Even their paintings [that is Chinese painting] are grotesque and portray strange and unnatural figures such as are encountered nowhere in the world. They also have the venerable grotesqueries because they are of very ancient custom, and no nation in the world has more of these than this one. »

Kant does not hate the Chinese in particular. Dabashi tries to convince us that he was quite ecumenical and cosmopolitan in this regard with this following Kantian citation:

« All these savages [Native Americans] have little feeling for the beautiful in moral understanding, and the generous forgiveness of an injury, which is at once noble and beautiful, is completely unknown as a virtue among the savages, but rather is disdained as a miserable cowardice. »

More than that. For Kant, people of the African continent deserve an exclusive claim on stupidity. Regarding an African who might have said something worthy of Kant’s regards, the father of the European Enlightenment states:

« And it might be that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid. »Immanuel Kant developed his own version of the...

Dabashi remarks on behalf of Kant:

The only way that some « Orientals » were to approximate humanity was if they were to become like Europeans – for which Kant volunteered Arabs as Spaniards, Persians as French, and Japanese as Englishmen.

Dabashi concludes that the Žižek faulty ideology that « capitalism in the West it begat democracy and went wayward with Asian values »  is predicated on the idea that « Orientals » (a la Kant and Levinas’ reading of them) are incapable of thinking on their own feet (for they are black and too busy dancing).

African American History
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The New York Times seems to champion this rude proposition with an recent article that relegates the cause of the exacerbated disturbance in the Arab Spring to its lack of leading thinkers or intellectuals – contrary to all other revolutions:

It has not yet yielded any clear political or economic project, or any intellectual standard-bearers of the kind who shaped almost every modern revolution from 1776 onward. In those revolts, thinkers or ideologues – from Thomas Paine to Lenin to Mao to Vaclav Hevel – helped provide a unifying vision or became symbols of a people’s aspirations.

Dabashi is apparently not happy with this analysis as he raises a a few objections.

He challenges that if Žižek and Michael Moore can be rightly called the intellectual hero of #Occupy Wall Street, then where were they during the years of recent uprising in Europe, from workers in Greece to the Indignados in Spain to students and looters in the UK – a succession of uprisings that in fact predates the Arab Spring? « Marx did not cause the revolutions of 1848, the revolutions of 1848 created Marx, as did the American Revolution Thomas Paine, the Russian revolution Lenin, etc » Dabashi is convinced that some Westerners need to deal with their myopia, for like all other revolutionary uprisings, « the Arab Spring is generating its own thinkers » (but we cannot name one yet).

He also questions how those thinkers and commentators can idealize the West as if the Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy and Spain, Totalitarianism in Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe (Zizek’s own backyard) were not European in their own roots?

He also rejects Max Weber’s thesis that capitalism has its very inception in the Protestant ethics and argues for capitalism’s inherent aterritorial disposition (but he does not provide an argument).

Reminiscent of what the french structuralist Claude Lévi-Strauss had attempted discretely in his anthropological classic « Tristes Tropiques (憂鬱的熱帶), in conclusion Dabashi calls for a cosmopolitan vista of intellectual equality and of anthentic liberating ideas, instead of continual mind-boggling ethnicisation of the global calamity called capitalism, for

[t]hat world… is coming to an end – and folks like Zizek have no blasted clue how to read the change. They write a piece for London Review of Books denouncing anything from the Arab Spring to European uprisings in Spain and Greece as pointless one day, and next day they pop up in the Zuccotti Park in Wall Street reading redundant and silly stories about a Walt Disney cat falling from the precipice and not noticing it – that cat is in fact Zizek himself and his brand of philosophy – all it has to do is just look down and it is no more.

As a philosopher Zizek is the very last whimper of that bang called « the West » that had frightened the world out of the necessary confidence to generate any idea they never dreamt in their philosophies – for to them whatever we say is « grotesquery, » whatever we do is « dancing », for we are (and in that emancipatory acclamation Zizek is welcome to join us) « quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what we say is stupid ».

As I said, this article has from head to foot the proclivity to be thought-provoking, and I think it’s now we Chinese people’s turn to do some reflective work- on what exactly these Asian values are  and how they have ruined the happy-ever-after marriage between capitalism and democracy [slash] Protestant ethics- with its forceful  espousal to autocracy and Procrustean ethics perhaps?

China Town
陳芳明:威權體制背後的三大支柱是儒家思想、中華民族主義、黨國體制,這三者都是非常父權、異性戀沙文主義的產物。 - Are they the cause for the totalitarianization of Eastern capitalism?

China Town

[書摘] The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century

The Resurrection from Grünewald's Isenheim Alt...
Resurrection

Source:

Gerrit Neven, ‘The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century’ in Theology as Conversation: The Significance Of Dialogue In Historical And Contemporary Theology: A Festschrift For Daniel L. Migliore, Bruce McCormack and Kimlym J. Bender eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009, pp. 67-81

My Summary:

Whereas initially Nietzsche and Marx only proclaim the death of God, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze proclaim with equal force the death of a man (cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 1994, esp. the last chapter, and Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 1993).

Following Barth, Geyer gives the Parousia the determinative role concerning various theological aspects of reconciliation. The Messiah’s having drawn near is the precondition of a future-oriented and therefore a dialogical mode of thinking. The Parousia points to a nearness of salvation that does not supernaturally demolish time and history, but rather breaks open time and history from within [messianically] by turning to the risky expectation of the Messiah, for whom each moment in time is an open entrance.

This expectation leads to intensive forms of discussion and debate with not just  theologians but also with [critical and phenomenological] thinkers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger , Horkheimer, Bloch, Sartre, and so on. The focus is the humanity of Christ.

(Hans-Georg Geyer [1929-1999]  studied in Frankfurt during 1950-1954 with Hans-Georg Gadamer, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Wolfgang Kramer before he turned to the study of systematic theology (at Gottingen, Berlin, Wuppertal, and Bonn.)

As early as 1962, Geyer declared his agreement with Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment. According to Benjamin, only the Messiah himself will consummate all that is happening historically, in the sense that only he himself will redeem and consummate the creation in its relation to the messianic.[1] Therefore, nothing historical can relate itself to something messianic on its own account. With this, he distanced himself from the idea that historical convictions, scientific achievements, or political opinions have in themselves the potential to make “the jump-ahead” to a time which is qualitatively new and different. Our knowledge is determined by economic and political factors. The desire to know is driven by a force consisting only of what can be [pragmatically or in a utilitarian manner] calculated. This [social/structural] force and the history of freedom contradict each other (analogous to the tension between poststructuralism and structuralism/rationalism).

Geyer here introduces the topic of faith in the post-liberal sense. He says, “faith, getting involved with and trusting upon the message concerning Christ, is at the same time radically renouncing the desire to discover the truth of the proclamation and past history”.

This criticism of metaphysics (of absolute certainly) is also part of the thinking projects of Moltmann and Pannenberg, for whom the future became the paradigm of transcendence. But both of them have felt that they have to leave Barth behind for they deem Barth’s system closed and ahistorical. Geyer does not share this view.

Geyer inherits early Barth’s dialectical theology. He is convinced that our time is an implication of the Parousia of Jesus Christ. His intensive debate with Moltmann and Pannenberg  is concerning the epistemology of hope. That is to say, if God’s new coming in the Parousia is an implication of the concrete identity of Jesus Christ, then how do we find his identity? He doubts whether for Moltmann and Pannenberg “the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ” are constitutive–and as opposed to merely illustrative— of the exegesis of biblical texts and of the practices of the Christian community. For according to Geyer, Moltmann and Pannenberg’s definition of history and Parousia did not clearly distinguish “the future as an end that we should strive for” (the anthropocentric) from “the future as the goal of God’s exclusive act” (the theocentric). His ultimate criticism is that the theology of Moltmann and Pannenberg is enclosed by a metaphysical correlation between God and the world. Transcendence is devoured by immanence.

To solve this problem, Geyer here uses Husserl’s concepts of protention (the succession of the historical accordance and its end) and retention. The protention in Jesus denotes the continuity between the character of Jesus’ conduct and his fate—death. According to Geyer, this historical fate can undergo an intensification or an ontological deepeningonly by the event of the meta-historical resurrection in Easter” [out of theological necessity].

By retention, it means when we look back, the attempts to ignore this fact or to place this death within an unduly higher framework can only lead to an idealization of his death or a degradation of it to an empirical fact (which is an unduly anthropologized theology full of liberal residues). Namely, the declaration that this historical death implies a [whether phenomenological, hermeneutic, or ontological] jump-ahead should be fiducially rooted only in the meta-historical domain, in [the post-Easter] remembrance, which runs backwards. This solution does not have to leave behind the aporia of this [historical] death. For at any rate, doctrinal or impersonal statements are not possible in the face of this death. Anamnesis and commemoration of this death can only give us non-metaphysical and personal truth. The redemptive history is inherently incomplete if all we have is this death of Jesus.

On the other hand, knowledge concerning the identity of this Jesus can only be acquired by participation in the process of the actuality of this meaning question in the medium of human language. That is why the question concerning the meaning of the cross is characterized by an infinite openness— as opposed to the enclosure of totalitarian metaphysics. For Geyer, the hope is the qualitative feature of faith, which is a prerequisite for new non-metaphysical mode of thinking.

In accorance with the nature of hope, Parousia concerns the future of which no one has sure knowledge of the time and the hour— it is beyond human calculation: Although we are vitalized by images of the future (e.g., Luke 21:7-33), these do not lead us into the future itself.

rhızomıng ındεxatıon dıs-choıcεs . .
Badiou

There is a remarkable parallelism in the thinking of Geyer and Badiou about metaphysics. Badiou establishes that « the death of God » and « the death of man » go hand-in-hand in the ethos of 20th century philosophy and theology. He calls them “the joint disappearances of Man and God”.

On one hand there is in the 20th century philosophy the movement that radicalizes Kant’s approach by enslaving man in his own emancipation (i.e., German idealism: our [finite] subjectivity creates our world). This line runs from Kant via Fichte and Sartre (man is condemned to freedom; man is programmed to be a man and cannot be freed from this program). On the other hand, there is the way of the radical anti-humanism of Nietzsche and Foucault: the absence of God is one of the names for the absence of man.

As Foucault (he criticizes Levinas and Derrida’s anthropology as religion or theology), Badiou does not think this either or situation leaves room for postmodern thinkers like Levinas or Derrida. For Levinas’ appeal to God’s radical otherness in order to safeguard the otherness of the human other falls short to attest to a radical alterity. (This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the other should be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. cf. Badiou, Ethics [2001], 22). As for Derrida’s deferral of presence (différance), a sort of religion of messianic delay, Badiou sees something too artificial in its ramification upon the relation between philosophy and religion (cf. P. Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth [2003], 157). Postmodernity has become boring.

Badiou searches for what is empty and open in a time when the [human and divine] subject has disappeared. There is no other possibility than to accept this aporia, this emptiness, and to retain a prospect to point beyond death. For Geyer, this means the resurrection and the coming of the Messiah— within the perspective of time. Biblically speaking this is the time that remains, a time of intense expectation (cf. Isa 21:11). [2]

Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin’s disciple, in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans declares “what remains is what separates us from the Messiah”. More than the Messiah’s coming close is the Messiah himself.

Giorgio Agamben descubre el limbo
Agamben

[1] The polemical context which Geyer (and possibly Benjamin) set out to argue against includes the following features (i.e., wrong assumptions):

1)       non-realism,

2)       post-structuralism,

3)       the totalitarian features of modernity in the 1960s (for which Geyer thinks Horkheimer’s treatment in the 1930s is exemplary. He lost faith but has not abandoned the project of human transformation of the society into a utopia).

4)       reciprocal freedom: the promises that somebody gives to someone else are ruled by a relationship of absolutely free reciprocity and by a reciprocal freedom.

[2] Here one may become somewhat apologetical over against Badiou. Badiou teaches with Nietzsche that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is dead. According to Nietzsche, faith in God as a supernatural power in general will no longer have any real influence, since God is not ascribed any power anyway. There is no such metaphysical God. However, it is precisely this faith that would be necessary to determine the convictions and the actions of man. This may be the case, Geyer answers Nietzsche. But even if God has lost his power over man and that super-sensual heaven has no meaning for the sensual earth, it does not necessarily follow the death of Christian theology.

Through Barth, Geyer has found a way forward: Christian theology has the task to lead faith out of its dogmatic identification with the concept of religion that is still metaphysically determined. Geyer rejects Nietzsche’s analysis that lumps together the God of metaphysics and the God of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike the metaphysical God, the God of the Bible can die.

On the basis of this God’s death, people in faith received the power to be really earthly finite and to be able to die. In the Christian faith, God’s identity can only be thought of appropriately when we take as point of departure the view that the death of Jesus Christ on the cross is God’s act on behalf of all.

The occurrence of cross in history demands remembrance and mimesis: the imitation of God in the praxis of love for one’s neighbor. God is a name that has to be continued in a passionate plea to practice love, as opposed to a concept that asks for ideological representation. Remembrance implies mimesis, through which we anticipate the coming of God in the Parousia.

回應:「身為基督徒對真愛聯盟的疑惑」-他者、多元、與啟示 vs. kockroach 1

Gilles Deleuze
Gilles Deleuze

kockroach @ PTT Christianity says,

1. 你在「分辨陳述性(descriptive)語言的現象描繪和作為規範性(prescriptive)語言的意識型態入侵」的這一段先主張應該把多元現象放入現象學的括號(bracketing)中,採取存而不論(epoqué )的態度,避免主觀的判斷。

2. 但是到了後面一段,卻又先驗的主張「我們認為是罪的…」。
似乎在你的立場中,已經存在著一個「我們」的主體,可以代表所有的基督教現象,而這個主體可以輕易、不需任何驗證地發言,說「這就是基督教的立場、聖經的立場」?

你是在尊重他者(多元性)的口號下,假裝有一個「他者」的存在,但你其實是在「我」與「他」之間劃下一道無法逾越的界線,讓他者在自己的門外喧嘩,把他們稱為「罪人」,而自己卻躲在 ghetto 之中相信自己才是倖存的先知。

所以你所謂的「先知」和「見證者」這兩種身份其實是大同小異的,(就所我知,與「先知」相對應的另一個身份應該是「神秘主義者」,但在這裡先不討論)這兩者都脫離不了在一個異己的環境中堅持、主張自己的立場,並試圖透過不同方式說服他人自己的立場是正確的。

而你所謂『也將自己納入「罪人」的範疇』從這點來看,其實是一種矯揉造作。他者其實不存在於你的論述之中,他們被客體化(objectified),然後被你當作異己、需要被「循循善誘」的對象,然後整個切除了。他者並沒有任何發聲的權利,他們作為一個「罪人」,一個需要被「尋尋善誘」的對象存在於你的論述裡面,維持你的主體作為正義的一方的權利。

但這和你最後面所說,其他人也「具備上帝形象(imago Dei)」的神學立場其實是完全相反而牴觸的。

3. 上帝形象的神學並不是告訴我們「要愛罪人」,而是告訴我們「那不是罪人,那是主所愛的,在他身上也有著上帝的形象」。基督徒的責任,是讓所有的人都能暢行無阻地、自願地到神面前,把自己的香膏打破,澆在耶穌頭上。

因為上帝的形象存在於「他者」身上,而且上帝本身就是最終極的他者(the Other),因此認識到他者也有自己的發話權,認識到自己的主體論述可以隨時被他者所中斷(interrupt),同時認識到「我」是一個開放而非封閉的主體,才有可能在這個面對「絕對他者」的信仰中,打破自己,被他感召、啟示和救贖。

只有認識到主體本身也是多元而複雜的(即使在基督教內部,對同性戀的態度也是多元的),認識到上帝有著「他者」的臉龐,才能在視域融合(fusion of horizon)的企圖中,接近它者害怕的面容,聽到他虛弱的聲音:「不要殺我」。

因此,我不能接受你所謂「基督徒應該尊重性別認同多元的客觀現實,但不接受多元性向的教育價值灌輸」的論點。多元現象不僅是一個「現實」,它還是一種打破主體偏執的契機。多元的價值並不絕對與基督教的信仰衝突,基督教的信仰可以是面對他者的信仰,可以是打破自己,容許自己的主體論述被他者中斷的信仰。基督徒在「多元性向的價值觀」面前,應該承認自己作為先知和見證者的身份,提出自己的質疑和批判,但同時也應承認,自己的論述可以被他者所中斷,自己的價值有可能被他者所影響,這不是信仰的失落,而是在離開自我的過程中,看到他者所看到的,聽到他者所聽到的,體會到他者所體會而我自己所不知道的。

說得形而下一點,基督教應該要認識到,即使是在他們自己的教會中,也有許多同性戀的人,生活在所謂「基督徒倫理觀」的壓迫之下(而且這個壓迫只會比外面社會的歧視更嚴重)。一個堅持基督教主體必須反對同性戀的神學,只能讓這些人以低人一等的「罪人」存在於社群裡面,而不是真正的讓這些人感受到神的愛。

相反地,多元性向教育能讓這些人發聲,讓其他人體認到他們的感受,讓他們在互為主體性的價值觀下被接納到社群之裡面,獲得同儕和信仰的支持。

—————————

我認為kockroach 的第一點和第二點是誤讀和誤解我的立場。第三點則才真正展現我們的神學立場衝突和差異。

1. 在現象學還原和屬靈爭戰辨別的這段,我談的是「現象」。

如同Zheng Fuyao在一段FB同志家庭長大的青年公開見證影片下的一段聲明:

基督徒若把民主社會裡必然出現的文化價值衝突理解成屬靈爭戰無疑是致命的失誤,錯把應該細心呵護關懷的對象當成 »敵人 »或 »有問題的人 »予以批判潔淨(要求先認罪才配得被愛),既忘了自己根本是在不配愛的情況下被上帝無條件地接納,也忘了那真正需戒慎面對的對手是看不見的靈性勢力,以及那迫使受壓迫者無法自由呼吸的社會文化結構。

再者,「存而不論」(epoqué)不是永久性的。純粹的懷疑論不是倫理學。Richard Hays, Miroslav Volf 等神學倫理學家都強調我們無法避免在僅擁有「局部知識」的不得以情況下採取道德立場。(例如,如果小鳴看似要跳樓,儘管我不知道發生什麼事,我需要第一時間上去拉他。結果可能是我判斷錯誤了,但這就是「無法避免在僅擁有局部知識的不得以情況下採取道德立場」的倫理折衷。)

2.「我們認為是罪的,他們不認為!」

這段談的是基督教罪的定義,「何為罪?」
就像「偷竊是罪」。而今天發生了「麥可用右手從他叔叔脫下的襯衫中拿出五百元」的這個還原後的現象。我要挑戰基督徒的是,「你怎麼知道麥可偷錢了?而不是他叔叔請他拿這五百塊去還他爸?」

這與「基督徒能否從閱讀出埃及記和約書亞記七章猶大支派亞干的故事而一致認定偷竊在上帝眼中為罪」是兩碼子事。存而不論的「論」並非現象學的關注,而是倫理學的。我要求基督教會在兩者的聯繫之間,先將「論」所使用的聖經標準給釐清。

此外,「我們」是在耶穌基督的救恩盟約維繫下的共同體宣稱:「一主一信一洗」(以弗所書四:5)
驗證機制有,但是存在於內部(本於大公會議框架、聖經)。「我們認為是罪的,他們不認為!」是要強調,即使通過內部機制(對罪的認定),也尚未通過外部「世俗社會」驗證機制。

並不是肯定「基督教反同性戀立場已經通過內部驗證機制」。從一個條件句型的條件從句(protasis)導出其肯定了一種實然現象,是分析哲學上的一種邏輯謬誤。
我覺得這篇文章一開始就是對基督徒的呼籲,你們要跳進來回其實我也歡迎,只是需要麻煩你們嘗試進入盟約架構中思考,以免容易一再誤解語境。

3.

是在尊重他者(多元性)的口號下,假裝有一個「他者」的存在, 但你其實是在「我」與「他」之間劃下一道無法逾越的界線,自己躲在 ghetto 之中相信自己才 是倖存的先知。

我只能說基督教就是這麼可悲。難道基督徒連根據聖經認罪悔改,幻想自己是在審判之日將是神義怒(indignation)之下倖存者的權利都沒有?大家都是都是發現自己有罪而且很可悲,才聚集在廢墟之中仰望神的憐憫(參約翰福音五章畢士大池邊病人群集的敘事)。我們看自己和別人都有罪。想拉別人進來,別人不來。那還有什麼辦法?界線誰劃的?想進來,就認罪。我們都是突破了心理障礙,相信自己是罪人才去畢士大池的。

界線從來就不是不可逾越的啊~


請你來,不來(因為你不願跨過「我是罪人」這個象徵性門檻);讓你在外面,就是尊重你自願留在外面的權利,卻又要說我們排擠你。
(我知道這個比喻如果精確地邏輯推敲還會有一些衍生觀點需要說明,我已經把後面幾步棋也想過了。)

您如果要進入完全的意識型態批判,和列維納斯(Emmauel Levinas)倫理系統的激進詮釋,我只能同意它也說得通,但您必須紮實的有神學根基去解構現下的基督教神學。Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 1996已經針對這點給了有力的回應(見第二章:排斥、第三章:擁抱、第五章:欺壓與正義)。他提出,「他者」在基督教救恩論中沒有被客體化,而是重建主體性。特別是在擁抱的隱喻中(如浪子回頭後與父親的擁抱),「先展開雙臂、等待對方回抱」(循循善誘)正是他者無法被切除的證據。
性別剛好也是他的一個重要舉證。(參第四章:性別身份)

上帝形象的神學並不是告訴我們「要愛罪人」,而是告訴我們「那不是罪人,那是: 主所愛的,在他身上也有著上帝的形象」。基督徒的責任,是讓所有的人都能暢行: 無阻地、自願地到神面前,把自己的香膏打破,澆在耶穌頭上。

暢行無阻的條件必須是經過神人之間唯一的中保耶穌,而不是說「他者」可以不必與耶穌建立關係、不必接受基督十架救贖寶血、維持其原本的樣貌和所作所為,而不必在基督裡面重建主體性。否則請您解經,告訴我有一種上帝形象的神學,不包含

「世人都犯了罪、虧缺了神的榮耀。 如今卻蒙神的恩典、因基督耶穌的救贖、就白白的稱義。」
「我們若認自己的罪、神是信實的、是公義的、必要赦免我們的罪、洗淨我們一切的不義。」

這些基要真理。

其實您整篇回覆,誠實地說,我覺得我回這段就夠了。您所提的,既是田立克(Paul Tillich)面對終極關懷的態度,又是列維納斯(Emmauel Levinas)的他者,還有德勒茲(Gilles Deleuze)非此、非彼之主體性游牧的況味。
我對這些人都是開放的。我是先接觸哲學和自由神學,才學習福音神學(evangelical theology)和大公神學(catholic theology),也一直以來的都企圖在正統神學框架下延展更多外來聲音衝撞的可能性。但是所有的神學都有個底線:上帝的啟示。

按照正統神學來說,上帝的啟示有沒固定的內容?有!

上帝透過虛弱的他者啟示。
上帝透過教會傳統的智慧和口傳福音啟示。
上帝透過經驗和良知啟示。
上帝透過自然律啟示。
上帝透過聖經啟示。
上帝道成肉身,在基督身上的啟示。

這些啟示之中,基督耶穌是啟示的高峰。

基督耶穌的啟示卻只有透過傳統和聖經保存,所以正統基督教神學無法像Deleuze那樣地完全「在其中」、「從自我出走」。它的穩定性是被聖經、傳統所鞏固的,而且還有「救恩之約、洗禮」這樣的會員制,其神學注定無法完全地向非信徒開放。
拉赫納(Karl Rahner)將天主教完全對外開放的努力值得敬佩,但我老師和我都覺得他失敗了:從左派角度不夠解構,從右派角度更不用說,完全守不住聖經啟示的救恩論(太多經文他根本解不過去)。

Tillich 處理啟示的方式是完全將它坍塌到文化、經驗中。他的存在主義神學,叫人不是透過讀經認識耶穌、瞭解上帝心意,而是像您說的,在「存在性邂逅」( existential encounter )遭遇「絕對他者」,打破自己,被他感召、啟示和救贖,發掘一種新生命的可能性。

從前我愛死 Tillich了(現在還是很愛,他的「嗣子」基督論是我不停反思和想要引渡的一塊),但他的系統所要付出的代價太大:十字架的死、復活、永生,全都變成一種道德寓言,可以不按照「歷史」、「猶太-基督文化傳統下」律法、啟示、恩典等神學概念的脈絡理解。

在這個意義下,基督可以不必是耶穌,祂可以是任何人。
連基督教都可以繞過聖經來承認多元性別認同和基督教本質有相容性的話,基督教也就不存在任何實質了,只是一種「大公精神」,美其名為「自由、平等、博愛」,實則成為個人和「被淘空既成啟示的根基的上帝」之間的個人協定,不但沒有弟兄姊妹平行的當責關係(accountability),也根本就不具備任何神聖盟約的忠誠度:

「 我是耶和華你們的 神、所以你們要成為聖潔、因為我是聖潔的」(利未記十一:44)
「你們要歸我為聖、因為我耶和華是聖的、並叫你們與萬民有分別、使你們作我的民。」(利未記二十:16)

全聖經有十次相同片段。

因此,我回頭承襲歷代以來正統神學所傳承的模型:所有外部聲音、人物想要進入到修改教義內容的程度,都必須要回到解經。現在有些同志神學,如哈佛(Harvard Divinity School)、范德堡(Vanderbilt Divinity School)、耶魯(Yale Divinity School)的,都做得不錯,原因在於能從解經立場上扭轉基督徒對創世紀、羅馬書、哥林多書信的定見。

否則,基督徒最多能做到傾聽之神學、溝通之神學、現象學之保留。但無法以聖經明文啟示之是為非。就算被溝通被打斷無數次,最後還是要說:「我相信同性戀性行為(非傾向)是神所不喜悅的,一如婚外情、婚前性行為是神所不喜悅的。」(Martin Luther « sola scriptura« : 請用聖經說服我。)

回應:「身為基督徒對真愛聯盟的疑惑」-權力、缺陷、與榮耀 vs. nidor

nidor @ PTT Christianity says,

你可以自己不接受 [同性戀婚姻],但是我想你要你的孩子也學你,就是威權的洗腦了。

[引用約翰福音九:3],所以「在某人身上彰顯神的作為」不是「造物主美好的心意」?楊恩典生來沒有手,因為「在某人身上彰顯神的作為」,所以學著用腳生活。 同性戀生來愛同性,因為「在某人身上彰顯神的作為」,卻應該被改變?怎麼不乾脆說為了「在某人身上彰顯神的作為」,應該叫楊恩典把手長出來?

想問恩典比較敏感的問題。妳天生沒有手,懷孕時擔不擔心孩子也是這樣?

————————-

以下,我的回覆:

你抓原文的邏輯依然是我看到比別人清楚的。兩點都是核心環節,而且無法絕對性地回答。我的補充說明如下:

1. 所有的孩子都需要教育,所有的教育都是一種規訓,也會涉及威權。過去讓我覺得無解的就是傅柯(Michel Foucault)對「權力」的激進理解:

知識是一種權力。那麼即使因宗教理由而不希望同性戀結合被社會常態化的人士努力提出科學證據,這些科學證據也可以透過意識型態分析而被指為一種包裝過後的歧視(如MathTurtle上文所質疑的)。對孩童實施教育包含了價值的啟蒙和灌輸,同樣也涉及知識權力、甚至其他強制性權力和威權的使用。但如果一路順著傅柯,就進入完全的解構。因為完全沒有超越的立場可以說明何種權力比他種權力具有更高的正當性是可能的。任何公眾框架下有意義的討論也會在此打住。

所以我說明兩點:
a.      在世俗框架下。孩童的監護權是父母的。教育孩子宗教倫理道德的價值觀是被宗教自由的公民社會憲法保障,我先前提過,這與中國大陸現行狀況不同。

b.      在基督信仰框架下,父母親有義務教導孩子認識上帝,聖經中甚至賦予在必要時體罰孩子的權力(我當然知道有不體罰的教法)。父母親愛孩子,儘管手段方法難免不盡完善。但如果因噎廢食(被解構論述卡住)而不教養,過犯更大。「養不教,父之過」。我承認解構和激進的權力論述都會造成很大的神學困難。這部份我期望從列維納斯(Emmanuel Levinas)的思想和與他對話作品中找到更寬廣和深入的反對表述。

但在實行面上,你的論述我可以無視。因為憲法和聖經都保障我可以也應該對孩子傳遞我認為最正確的信仰價值,包含「異性戀比同性戀更貼近造物主的心意」這套價值。

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  • kuopohung 在回應中補充:列維納斯談死亡是從反對海德格的「存有就是邁向死亡」而開始的吧。而認為 »死亡是對他者的責任 »,來談論死亡本身,並非從宗教來談。要談的話,到是可以從列維納斯談論他者的關係,但是權力和他者的關係,這個部分不是那麼容易處理的吧。

回應:正是要從Levinas 的他者現象學和他者倫理學加進來,也就是從70年代的解構現象學一路以來延續到90年代的脈絡。但「權力」這個主題比較是Foucault 那邊的系統,屬於70年代解構、後結構的那一支。當前的跨越確實是頗大,但雪城歐陸哲學學派這近十年來已經積極在做。

========================

2. 我不認為同性戀「傾向」都應該或可能被改變。

耶穌醫治了一些瞎眼的、瘸腿的,使其能行走。但也很多聾啞人、肢障者(如楊恩典、Nick Vujicic)、罕病患者,帶著他們的缺陷榮耀神。神選擇不醫治他們。

但如同罕病患者還是積極地尋求醫治,基督徒中的同性戀(目前在我所理解後天影響大於先天)也不應該放棄被導正性向。同時,先天為同性戀卻被強硬扭正為異性戀的作法,我也不認同。我認為同性戀基督徒應該、也可以帶著同性戀的身份過榮神益人的人生,一點都不輸楊恩典:就是接受神的安排,不再尋求生理醫治、同時對神的超自然醫治不放棄希望。同時保守己心,避免發生淫亂。這方面我的看法接近美國聖公會(Episcopal Church),多半意味著(並非絕對)同性戀者會維持獨身,如同教會中許多異性戀者也在神安排下接受自己將終身獨身或不孕的事實,但仍活得喜樂光彩。

只是這方面,大多數教會都還沒跟上。同性戀就不說了,單身和沒小孩的也在教會被歧視得要死,屢屢有類似「某姊妹單身是上帝的咒詛」或「這家生不出小孩是他先生過去縱欲過度」這類的耳語或論述。

因此,我真的覺得國際家庭日義走活動中上街喊「一夫一妻才是理想家庭」口號的基督徒存有一種思緒欠週的霸權意識。儘管他們可能不是故意的,但應該考慮到很多家庭是單親的、獨身的、父母雙亡的。他們的家庭不那麼符合聖經或社會人類學理想,但這何嘗都是他們的錯?我覺得這樣的口號呼喊來自那些出自理想家庭的基督徒衛道人士口中特別會像是一種社會意識型態壓迫。

這些人就是把稅吏撒該逼上樹的那些群眾。儘管我相信他們不是故意的-他們真的只是想看耶穌、想歡迎耶穌、想得到耶穌喜悅。但耶穌卻是穿過群眾來到這位稅吏撒該面前,告訴這位即使爬樹也要尋求聽見主的撒該:不論他過去在社會中受到多少歧視或訛詐過多少人,祂今天要去到他家中與他吃喝坐席、交朋友。)

矮冬瓜稅吏撒該的故事(路加福音十九章1-10節

以上的架構都是從聖經原則出發,也有充足實際牧養案例的。希望有解答到你的疑惑。

—————

關於第一點,nidor 繼續追問:

知識是實然,你的個人道德觀是應然。教育地球是圓的不是威權(歡迎挑戰,有本事就找出地球是方的的證據),教育「不准給我搞同性戀」是威權(林北說了算,再講打斷你的狗腿)。

—————-

我的想法是,這樣的觀點就根本不需要回覆。但是可以繼續跟讀到這裡的人說明:

如果真要按照權力解構論述,地球為圓的科學「實然」也是透過經驗建構的。此外,在這麼多的「實然現象」中,為什麼有些特定歷史經驗就一定要「強迫」學童記憶和認知呢?憑什麼小孩沒有天真地相信童話世界的幻想而活的權利,而一定要認同教育當局的思考才能通過考試、畢業升學?

這些強制的義務教育、官方羅列的的科學知識系統,一如進化論與創造論教育之爭一樣,難道按照解構觀點可以不涉及威權?況且教育還會教導孩童要守法愛國,難道這些也只是「實然知識」而非「應然」的國族價值觀?

因此nidor 既搬出「權力解構」的論述,要不就只能選擇性地挑戰看不順眼的威權,自相矛盾破壞自己提出的「權力」遊戲規則,要不就只能鑽牛角尖而陷入虛無主義、無政府主義的死胡同。

我們需要的是更有建設性地看待權力的性質和檢視價值觀論述的內容。

———————-

kuopohung 補充如下:

這是沒錯阿,基礎教育就是對學童社會化的這種理解。本來就是一種權威,一種規訓啊!

傅柯:

知識( 知識論)          ( 瘋狂史,詞與物,知識考堀)


理         權力( 倫理 )           ( 規訓與懲罰)

主體( 認識自我的真理)  ( 性史)

傅柯要問的是,為什麼這是權力? 為什麼這就是倫理。
要以一種實踐自我的主體來談,談的還是真理。(對於高達美而言,科學也是一種歷史效果意識。)傅柯在性史還拿柏拉圖幫他的倫理背書。他沒有說怎麼樣的實踐才是好的,而是實踐作為一種主體控制自我慾望的方式。他在規訓與懲罰也沒說怎麼樣的權力是不好,頂多也只是批判人道主義並不是真的人道。

PS: 還蠻多人理解錯誤,或根本沒看到這塊。