[文摘] 德意志哲學會被這群新世代的「網紅哲學家」搞死嗎?

 

終有時間品讀這篇《外交政策》7月24日刊的文章後(瀏覽器 tab 消滅不完的苦),它一躍成為 2017 下半年以來我最愛的一篇文章,是可以跟這篇文章的思想談戀愛這樣。

*
它從「當代德國哲學圈的第一網紅」普雷希特(Richard David Precht)談起。被譽為「非小說界的米克‧賈格(Mick Jagger)」,他的賣座書籍《我是誰?》已在全球翻譯成32種語言、熱銷百萬冊 。

Richard David Precht
Richard David Precht

還有他在德國ZDF頻道的同名哲普節目〈Precht〉收視人口也有近百萬。他的台風、口才、魅力,也是偶像級的德國文青師奶殺手(50+)。

 

德國哲學今天並不是馬丁•海德格爾在黑森林小屋裡實踐的一種思想紀律,而是一個要成功爭取客戶買單的服務行業。

就像在港台,也有01哲學哲學新媒體 Philosophy Medium這樣的哲普媒體一般,德國2011年時就有一個亮面的雙月刊《哲學誌》(Philosophie Magazin;德國嚴肅雜誌通常不用流行雜誌的亮面設計)上架書報通路。總編輯說這本雜誌宗旨是「把問題意識帶到大眾市場,讓公眾一起體會它們/賦予它們血肉」。

值得注意的是,在紙本退潮的當代《哲學誌》的發行量卻堂堂來到10萬本。因為它也打開了年輕族群的市場、讓人們渴求哲學思想的養分。過去3年間,德國連大學哲學系都變得熱門,學生招收人數比之前多了3分之1。

當你看到他們的標竿人物在辦了熱銷的雜誌、在TED侃侃而談、寫出賣座書籍、做出高收視節目,還有每年6月在科隆有上萬遊客人次的「科隆哲學祭」;你再也不能說,他們只是等著餓死的窮書生或空想家。

**
但以前的德國哲學不是這樣子的。或說,德意志哲學的正宗精神並非如此。70多年前,法蘭克福學派(批判理論學派)的阿多諾(Theodor Adorno)和霍克海默(Max Horkheimer)是極為不留情地批判所謂的「(影視傳媒)文化產業」為「一群愚蠢和腦腐名人的群魔亂舞派對」、是用來控制和愚民的。

他們指出,消費這些文化產業,會讓人思想愚鈍、失去深度的長考能力、想像力與自主性退化。

我們要知道,從康德、黑格爾、尼采、海德格以來,德意志的哲學
一直與德意志民族認同與建國大業存在一體兩面(我們甚至可以在這標準裡回推鞏固現代德文、新教理性的路德)。

不僅德意志哲學代表了德國驕傲,黑格爾更在法國拿破崙席捲歐陸失敗後,以它的哲學為普魯士的「大國崛起」定下基調;在它的「正反和」辯證中新世界的大和平要由一個前衛的新國度來帶領;而當時軍事上凱歌突進的普魯士,是唯一能夠符應這個哲學理想的現實參照物。

***
古今中外,恐怕沒有一地的哲學是像德國這樣,如此地在自己國族身上添加如此的重責大任和使命。

壞就壞在這裡。

它終於結出第三帝國─納粹這樣的惡果。奧斯威辛之後,以海德格為首的這套德意志觀念論哲學是要崩盤的。但父親是改信新教的猶太人、母親為義大利天主教徒的阿多諾,透過發展馬克思理論,以及將「德國哲學」擴張為「德語哲學」,在戰後為傳統延續了新的批判生機。

在阿多諾看來,是「德文」而非「德意志民族」賦予了這套哲學傳統優越性。他說:「要達到哲學的核心,只有德語能夠穿透現象背後的本質、實證性、既受性。」或換句話說,如果你想做正確的哲學,忘了英文、法文、阿拉伯和希臘文吧!(按:這全部都是我有學的語言。)

作為戰後在西德的國族良心(畢竟共產的東德是他們法蘭克福的新馬克斯主義為異端),阿多諾特別強調:奧斯威辛不能重演,這是新的無上律令(categorical imperative)!

(也是因著背負這個原罪和需要自我設限,打擊了現代德國哲學的創造力。)

****
直到在68學運的隔一年,發生了一件足以讓阿多諾遭受羞辱且憂鬱而終的憾事。

1969年4月22日正準備去上課的阿多諾,突然遭到法蘭克福歌德大學學生的的快閃襲擊。有學生在黑板上寫下:「如果讓阿多諾善終,資本主義將不會終結。」同時另有三名女學生突然「解放乳頭」對著阿多諾,如撒冥紙般在他身上灑一堆玫瑰和鬱金香花瓣。

阿多諾落荒而逃出教室、講課取消;而且之後陷入了不可自拔的憂鬱,幾個月後過世。得年66歲。

「乳房行動」殺死了阿多諾是很諷刺的。之所以在那個年代阿多諾會成為學生針對的對象,是因為做為一個馬克思主義學者,他居然如此「思巨行儒」(思想的巨人、行動的侏儒)、反對年輕人起義。言行不一就像是寫了《自由民主的理路》的台灣前閣揆江宜樺教授一般。

「如果哲學在關鍵的時刻不能提供行動的養分,那它就是失敗的哲學。」特別是當你說它是馬克思哲學時。

****
阿多諾的死是一個德國哲學時代的結束,也是法蘭克福學派的一個終結── 因為在它的接班人哈伯瑪斯(Jurgen Habermas)手上,法蘭克福學派完全變了樣。

現年88歲的哈伯瑪斯年少時曾加入納粹青年團、後成為阿多諾的助理。1970年代阿多諾死後,他執掌了法蘭克福學派。從此在他的知識分子生涯中嘗試建立一套跨越歐陸及英美哲學、政治理論、社會學和法律理論的知識體系,他充滿了樂觀的希望,相信人類可以在市場資本主義下興旺、自主 ──完全背離了法蘭克福學派的馬克思精神。

原來的批判哲學,是極為瞧不起那些權充技術資本主義打手的英美哲學的。但哈伯瑪斯視資本主義下的民生經濟發展,為避免納粹/法西斯/奧斯威辛重演的最關鍵元素。

阿多諾對普羅常民的主體性的悲觀態度彷如〈耶利米哀歌〉,但哈伯瑪斯卻認為這是德意志哲學傳統中一種菁英的傲慢。

哈伯瑪斯在一次1979年的採訪中說道,法蘭克福批判理論的前設是「工具理性的掌控是勞不可破的」,也就是他們認為資本邏輯如《駭客任務》的母體般把人們箝制在糜糜虛妄中,只有孤絕的哲學心靈能夠洞察與突破它。「但我不信這套。」哈伯瑪斯認為這一種左翼思想過於菁英主義和悲觀。

所以他在代表著作1981年的《溝通行動理論》,就架設了一種通過不斷地開放協商審議、互為主體的理性辯證的民主溝通社群,達成人性自由自主的「第二現代」理念。

這,就是為什麼我們接下來有了公眾哲學家,即「網紅哲學家」們。

哲學必須從象牙塔下來,與群眾溝通。1990年代時還是科隆大學哲學系學生的普雷希特,就想著要翻轉哲學家在世人眼中的形象:不是一群穿著卡其或海軍藍西裝的無聊中年紳士,

「而是過著有魅力又不妥協人生的一群超棒的人類。」

*****
哈伯瑪斯自1980年代就是 Historikerstreit(「歷史學家衝突」)中反方陣營的一架黏人戰鬥機。他不斷佔領德國報紙的評論頁面,重炮抨擊修正主義的德國歷史學家(他們為納粹的大屠殺開脫)。

哈伯瑪斯呼召全國男女對納粹過往進行公共反省。在現任總理的安潔拉•梅克爾(Angela Merkel)的道德領導下,可以看出這一轉變的反映,也就是他們為難民大開門戶的「歡迎文化」。

但如果哈伯瑪斯締造的「德國憲政愛國主義」新品牌和「理性大同運動」是成功的,當前的網紅哲學浪潮如何能夠比照;而不庸俗?

從2002年到2012年間,普雷希特在ZDF上的冠名節目本來為斯勞特戴克(Peter Sloterdijk)主持,名為《哲學四重奏》。當時以4人對談的方式,做了10年智性養分完全超英趕美的優質節目。

但2012年,電視台或喜新厭舊或顧及收視率,把主持人換成了普雷希特,風格也丕變。

如今在圈中,像普雷希特和加百列(Markus Gabriel)這樣才貌兼備又暢銷的新生代網紅哲學家,不時會遭到斯勞特戴克酸溜溜地批為「譁眾取寵」、敗壞哲學門風。但他倆這樣的哲學家,可不只是滿足原生的需求而已。他們還以極高的新媒體商數與消費者吸睛術,將德國哲學打造全球市場影響力。

當然德國哲學不可能有寶馬、德意志銀行、愛迪達這種國際品牌等級利潤可言,但相較德國獲得廣泛認可的工業和金融實力,軟實力是德國在國際間缺乏耕耘的一大殘缺;想想你能舉得出多少部21世紀德國叫好叫座的經典電影和文學?相比之下,德國哲學要多虧了這些年輕網紅,沖積了一塊出口沃土。

Markus Gabriel
Markus Gabriel

在1934年,法-德裔神學家史懷哲(Albert Schweitzer)告訴他的哲學家朋友卡西爾(Ernst Cassirer)說,神哲這行的人士必須處理和關心每個人的日常生命問題,而且必須發展出受高等教育的菁英口味之外的風格。這就是普雷希特和加百列這一輩現正在做的。

你說80 後的加百列2015年那本暢銷書《為什麼世界不存在》(Warum es die Welt nicht gibt)沒有深度吧?這位波恩大學的天才年輕教授可是把神哲學「實在論的轉向」打進普羅認知的旗手之一呢。他的2017新書《我不是大腦:21世紀的心智哲學》還要繼續挑戰大眾不能、或不該讀哲學的老派想像。

能表演、能思考、能當網紅,這將是當代哲學家的新品種。


寫到最後一段才發現此文過去至少已有兩個版本的全文中譯(大家都喜歡的文章啊)。還好我是以順順的意譯加偶爾超譯為主。1.  2.

Publicités

[文摘] DIE ZEIT’s Zeitgeist series with modern philosophers

Source Link: http://blog.zeit.de/schueler/2013/11/07/einfuhrung-in-philosophie-moderne/

Einführung in die Philosophie der Moderne

現代哲學的濫觴

Written by ; Translated and Edited by Mu-tien Chiou

nothanks1

Let’s mentally immerse ourselves in the Germany of the early 19th Century. The Holy Roman Empire was falling apart; the authority of the Church had already lost in the years of modern education; Darwin’s insights have had disproved the creation story of the church; Bayern imported the steam engine from England; then the 1848 revolution marked a new private sector revolution.

Never before had a mine-shaft been able to go so deep to pump water up; never had you been able to transport goods via land as fast and cheaply. The massification and mechanization of goods and production methods were advancing everyday .

Everywhere, factories produced and consumed more and more goods. More manpower was required but they were degraded as those who used to be farmers were now part of a workers’ army, languishing between chimneys and sooty tenements. The living conditions of the common man were changing for the worse.

This raises new ethical questions to which the philosophers of the modern age are looking for new answers. In the Far Eastern philosophy, as is the case with Arthur Schopenhauer. In nature and its relentless preferential preservation of the more powerful, as it prescribes Nietzsche. In the inevitability of a proletarian revolution, as Marx and Engels predicted.

Finally, two World Wars and the mass destruction of human lives in the concentration camps have concluded the achievements of the industrial age in a sad way. The survivors were appalled to ask: Which « universal soul » and which « Absolute Spirit » that Hegel proclaimed, could still stand behind these facts? Or, phrased more specifically: the corollary of the Enlightenment, is it ultimately disastrous ?

Modern thinkers in the 20th century fault the western system for the downward moral developments that created the colonizing behaviors and propose that we must now consider the worldviews from other cultural blocks as [at least] equally valid as the great Western one. The common sense and the scientific method behind the western developments is no longer THE way to guide us forward.

But as we come to terms with this intellectual milestone called post-modernism, a new problem ensues: if we are to predicate our Zeitgeist upon so many truths at the same time, we should find ourselves in dilemmas and doubts all the time.

With exemplary thinkers of the past 200 years, let’s encourage more philosophizing.

Dossier: Philosophie der Moderne

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik
2. Karl Marx und die Industrialisierung
3. Friedrich Nietzsche: Es denkt
4. Charles Darwin: Die Entstehung der Arten
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein und die Sprachspiele
6. Jean F. Lyotard: Das postmoderne Wissen
7. Paul Boghossian: Angst vor der Wahrheit

[書摘] Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Freedom

Statue of Immanuel Kant in Kaliningrad, Russia
Kant

Source: View the Review Online

Chad Wellmon, Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Freedom, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010, 326pp., $84.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780271037349.

The 19th century German Romanticism‘s reception of Kantian Anthropology includes an important response (by positively viewing Kant‘s inherent tensions and paradoxes as bases for « different forms of knowledge ») to the empirically informed Kant that is gaining prominence today.
They include Schleiermacher, Novalis, Goethe, Fülleborn, Platner, Wezel, Pölitz, and Schmid.

The continental tradition must resist empiricists‘ predisposition to read Kant’s Affective Ethics » as purely formal. They hold the tenet that « freedom is not a metaphysical discovery but a practical disposition that needs anthropological insights to guide and cultivate individuals » (10).

[書摘] The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century

The Resurrection from Grünewald's Isenheim Alt...
Resurrection

Source:

Gerrit Neven, ‘The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century’ in Theology as Conversation: The Significance Of Dialogue In Historical And Contemporary Theology: A Festschrift For Daniel L. Migliore, Bruce McCormack and Kimlym J. Bender eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009, pp. 67-81

My Summary:

Whereas initially Nietzsche and Marx only proclaim the death of God, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze proclaim with equal force the death of a man (cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 1994, esp. the last chapter, and Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 1993).

Following Barth, Geyer gives the Parousia the determinative role concerning various theological aspects of reconciliation. The Messiah’s having drawn near is the precondition of a future-oriented and therefore a dialogical mode of thinking. The Parousia points to a nearness of salvation that does not supernaturally demolish time and history, but rather breaks open time and history from within [messianically] by turning to the risky expectation of the Messiah, for whom each moment in time is an open entrance.

This expectation leads to intensive forms of discussion and debate with not just  theologians but also with [critical and phenomenological] thinkers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger , Horkheimer, Bloch, Sartre, and so on. The focus is the humanity of Christ.

(Hans-Georg Geyer [1929-1999]  studied in Frankfurt during 1950-1954 with Hans-Georg Gadamer, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Wolfgang Kramer before he turned to the study of systematic theology (at Gottingen, Berlin, Wuppertal, and Bonn.)

As early as 1962, Geyer declared his agreement with Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment. According to Benjamin, only the Messiah himself will consummate all that is happening historically, in the sense that only he himself will redeem and consummate the creation in its relation to the messianic.[1] Therefore, nothing historical can relate itself to something messianic on its own account. With this, he distanced himself from the idea that historical convictions, scientific achievements, or political opinions have in themselves the potential to make “the jump-ahead” to a time which is qualitatively new and different. Our knowledge is determined by economic and political factors. The desire to know is driven by a force consisting only of what can be [pragmatically or in a utilitarian manner] calculated. This [social/structural] force and the history of freedom contradict each other (analogous to the tension between poststructuralism and structuralism/rationalism).

Geyer here introduces the topic of faith in the post-liberal sense. He says, “faith, getting involved with and trusting upon the message concerning Christ, is at the same time radically renouncing the desire to discover the truth of the proclamation and past history”.

This criticism of metaphysics (of absolute certainly) is also part of the thinking projects of Moltmann and Pannenberg, for whom the future became the paradigm of transcendence. But both of them have felt that they have to leave Barth behind for they deem Barth’s system closed and ahistorical. Geyer does not share this view.

Geyer inherits early Barth’s dialectical theology. He is convinced that our time is an implication of the Parousia of Jesus Christ. His intensive debate with Moltmann and Pannenberg  is concerning the epistemology of hope. That is to say, if God’s new coming in the Parousia is an implication of the concrete identity of Jesus Christ, then how do we find his identity? He doubts whether for Moltmann and Pannenberg “the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ” are constitutive–and as opposed to merely illustrative— of the exegesis of biblical texts and of the practices of the Christian community. For according to Geyer, Moltmann and Pannenberg’s definition of history and Parousia did not clearly distinguish “the future as an end that we should strive for” (the anthropocentric) from “the future as the goal of God’s exclusive act” (the theocentric). His ultimate criticism is that the theology of Moltmann and Pannenberg is enclosed by a metaphysical correlation between God and the world. Transcendence is devoured by immanence.

To solve this problem, Geyer here uses Husserl’s concepts of protention (the succession of the historical accordance and its end) and retention. The protention in Jesus denotes the continuity between the character of Jesus’ conduct and his fate—death. According to Geyer, this historical fate can undergo an intensification or an ontological deepeningonly by the event of the meta-historical resurrection in Easter” [out of theological necessity].

By retention, it means when we look back, the attempts to ignore this fact or to place this death within an unduly higher framework can only lead to an idealization of his death or a degradation of it to an empirical fact (which is an unduly anthropologized theology full of liberal residues). Namely, the declaration that this historical death implies a [whether phenomenological, hermeneutic, or ontological] jump-ahead should be fiducially rooted only in the meta-historical domain, in [the post-Easter] remembrance, which runs backwards. This solution does not have to leave behind the aporia of this [historical] death. For at any rate, doctrinal or impersonal statements are not possible in the face of this death. Anamnesis and commemoration of this death can only give us non-metaphysical and personal truth. The redemptive history is inherently incomplete if all we have is this death of Jesus.

On the other hand, knowledge concerning the identity of this Jesus can only be acquired by participation in the process of the actuality of this meaning question in the medium of human language. That is why the question concerning the meaning of the cross is characterized by an infinite openness— as opposed to the enclosure of totalitarian metaphysics. For Geyer, the hope is the qualitative feature of faith, which is a prerequisite for new non-metaphysical mode of thinking.

In accorance with the nature of hope, Parousia concerns the future of which no one has sure knowledge of the time and the hour— it is beyond human calculation: Although we are vitalized by images of the future (e.g., Luke 21:7-33), these do not lead us into the future itself.

rhızomıng ındεxatıon dıs-choıcεs . .
Badiou

There is a remarkable parallelism in the thinking of Geyer and Badiou about metaphysics. Badiou establishes that « the death of God » and « the death of man » go hand-in-hand in the ethos of 20th century philosophy and theology. He calls them “the joint disappearances of Man and God”.

On one hand there is in the 20th century philosophy the movement that radicalizes Kant’s approach by enslaving man in his own emancipation (i.e., German idealism: our [finite] subjectivity creates our world). This line runs from Kant via Fichte and Sartre (man is condemned to freedom; man is programmed to be a man and cannot be freed from this program). On the other hand, there is the way of the radical anti-humanism of Nietzsche and Foucault: the absence of God is one of the names for the absence of man.

As Foucault (he criticizes Levinas and Derrida’s anthropology as religion or theology), Badiou does not think this either or situation leaves room for postmodern thinkers like Levinas or Derrida. For Levinas’ appeal to God’s radical otherness in order to safeguard the otherness of the human other falls short to attest to a radical alterity. (This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the other should be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. cf. Badiou, Ethics [2001], 22). As for Derrida’s deferral of presence (différance), a sort of religion of messianic delay, Badiou sees something too artificial in its ramification upon the relation between philosophy and religion (cf. P. Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth [2003], 157). Postmodernity has become boring.

Badiou searches for what is empty and open in a time when the [human and divine] subject has disappeared. There is no other possibility than to accept this aporia, this emptiness, and to retain a prospect to point beyond death. For Geyer, this means the resurrection and the coming of the Messiah— within the perspective of time. Biblically speaking this is the time that remains, a time of intense expectation (cf. Isa 21:11). [2]

Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin’s disciple, in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans declares “what remains is what separates us from the Messiah”. More than the Messiah’s coming close is the Messiah himself.

Giorgio Agamben descubre el limbo
Agamben

[1] The polemical context which Geyer (and possibly Benjamin) set out to argue against includes the following features (i.e., wrong assumptions):

1)       non-realism,

2)       post-structuralism,

3)       the totalitarian features of modernity in the 1960s (for which Geyer thinks Horkheimer’s treatment in the 1930s is exemplary. He lost faith but has not abandoned the project of human transformation of the society into a utopia).

4)       reciprocal freedom: the promises that somebody gives to someone else are ruled by a relationship of absolutely free reciprocity and by a reciprocal freedom.

[2] Here one may become somewhat apologetical over against Badiou. Badiou teaches with Nietzsche that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is dead. According to Nietzsche, faith in God as a supernatural power in general will no longer have any real influence, since God is not ascribed any power anyway. There is no such metaphysical God. However, it is precisely this faith that would be necessary to determine the convictions and the actions of man. This may be the case, Geyer answers Nietzsche. But even if God has lost his power over man and that super-sensual heaven has no meaning for the sensual earth, it does not necessarily follow the death of Christian theology.

Through Barth, Geyer has found a way forward: Christian theology has the task to lead faith out of its dogmatic identification with the concept of religion that is still metaphysically determined. Geyer rejects Nietzsche’s analysis that lumps together the God of metaphysics and the God of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike the metaphysical God, the God of the Bible can die.

On the basis of this God’s death, people in faith received the power to be really earthly finite and to be able to die. In the Christian faith, God’s identity can only be thought of appropriately when we take as point of departure the view that the death of Jesus Christ on the cross is God’s act on behalf of all.

The occurrence of cross in history demands remembrance and mimesis: the imitation of God in the praxis of love for one’s neighbor. God is a name that has to be continued in a passionate plea to practice love, as opposed to a concept that asks for ideological representation. Remembrance implies mimesis, through which we anticipate the coming of God in the Parousia.

[省思] 你還在害怕自己教會的講壇變成聖經與世俗學問、笑話、時事評論的競技場嗎?

Cover of "Hermeneutics of Doctrine"
Cover of Hermeneutics of Doctrine

我聽過很多教導叫傳道人不要講哲學、心理學、社會學、歷史,因為那些「在教會外也聽得到」,「台下的人比你更懂、更能講」、「不要耍花招,乖乖講聖經」。這部分也算是前華神院長林道亮的贈言。

然而這難免引發一種避世的態度,導致很多保守教會神學的學術只好鑽到希臘文希伯來文裡面裝高深,覺得好好搞原文就是嚴謹解經了。聖經原文學習的課程表和師資,紛紛成為嚴謹保守的神學院引進的對象,成為道學碩士學習的重頭戲。

但是仔細想想,使用(一般)語言學所建立的古希臘文、希伯來文系統,在本體論的什麼地方上比「哲學、心理學、社會學、歷史」更聖潔、更忠於福音、更貼近上帝心意了呢?

當十八世紀以降聖經鑑別文獻學研究清楚說明了所謂原文說穿了也只是在「世俗」(一般)語言學的基礎上所建構起來的浮動人為系統時,它比起其他的人文科學,在講台上能樹立所謂神話語權威的客觀優勢,會不會只是因為「台下的平信徒中你大概不會碰到比你更懂的人」?

我相信這不是林道亮前院長的本意。可是因為「台下有人比你更懂、更能講」所以就不能在解經講壇使用人文科學和自然科學的邏輯,卻無法為我們為何鑽入原文提供一個更高尚和有說服力的理由。

講到花招,Charles Finney 這個近代福音派和敬虔派的祖師爺之一,就是發明了一堆「花招」的講台魔術師:講台呼召(alter call)、音樂炒氣氛、當代復興運動的諸多佈道與敬拜方式都要歸功給他的創見。

這些「花招」,我們現在的佈道會,還有一些牧者平時主日講台還都在用。真要這樣定義且一視同仁地追究下去,現在教會哪有什麼東西是自己能夠獨佔的傳統,而不是在教會外面也找到的?

這個意識型態化的哲學問題,勢必會將我們帶回到三、四個世紀前清教徒和聖公會的敬拜之爭(Adiaphora vs. Latitudinarianism Controversy)。一直以來,前者(清教徒)持的是Regulative principle of worship,也就是聖經沒明制訂的東西,教會崇拜裡都不能出現(最好是吉他跟鋼琴也都別用了),而後者持normative principle of worship,意思是聖經裡沒禁止的東西,都可以考慮在教會崇拜中採納,這些次要的敬拜元件,個別地方教區有自己的決議空間。

但是在近代許多人看來,這個把聖經當「百科全書」和「律法書」來貼聖俗標籤的做法是過時的。更正確地說,道成肉身的耶穌基督,既聖也俗。被人類作者用人類文字系統和人類文明記載方式留下來的「聖經」,既聖也俗。如果按照John Milbank的看法,根本就沒有什麼「講道中不能講哲學、心理學、社會學、歷史這些『人學』」,也不會說「John R. Stott 味如嚼蠟、完全排斥後現代解構理論、不偏不倚的宣講才是百分百按照正義分解上帝的道這種說法」。他甚至更大膽地說,只有在教會中才能做出真正的政治學、社會學、經濟學等等。重點是靠神的智慧與聖靈,叫一些的知識—考古學、生物學、數學—都能被用來闡明聖經,引人歸向聖經中所指示的那位耶穌基督。

「一切的真理都是神的真理。」如果不是這樣的話,使徒約翰在那邊大談希臘人的邏格司、耶穌還敢在那班門弄斧跟一堆農民講撒種、無花果樹、尋羊理論等農經畜產學,我看來到今天林道亮前院長的的華神通通畢不了業。(參見上個月First Things 的一篇文章「St. Paul Would Have Failed My Hermeneutics Course 」。)

確實,今日的傳道人在聖經上所下的功夫必不可少。我們從前的華人教會界資源不足、篳路藍縷。前段所提的林道亮前院長也是忠心主僕,告誡我們不可在無法清楚透析上帝旨意之下貪圖人間學問的捷徑,在講壇上引證失敗又類比錯誤,導致上帝的話語受虧損、福音的信息被稀釋、甚至扭曲。甚至,對普世基督教有相當關懷的今日基督教雜誌(Christianity Today)資深主任編輯Mark Galli,也在近日一篇文章中提及:當前天主教講壇的「缺少福音靈魂的泛道德化信息」是他所難以接受的(“moralistic, lift-yourself-up-by-your-willpower motivational speech, combined with a fair bit of guilt”)。

然而,我輩中人現在應該思想,被神交付了三千兩、五千兩的華人教會還應當用避世藏財/才的方式當上帝話語的「好管家」嗎?一個律師退休的牧者,他的法律知識和從業經驗難道不能成為他在台上得著靈魂的工具,而非要希臘文才能ποιεῖ/θέλει πάντας ἀνθρώπους σωθῆναι καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας 嗎?

我們的講壇難道還迴避當代遺傳學、基因工程學、臨床心理學對人的自然狀態(State of Nature)所展開的普遍啟示嗎?

近年許多神學詮釋學的作品紛紛在西方學界面世,如John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (1990), Anthony Thiselton, The Two Horizons (1980), Hermeneutics of Doctrine (2007), Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text (1998), The Drama of Doctrine (2005) 等等,坊間也陸續翻譯引進。還有更多已經貫徹神學性詮釋的建構神學著作,進入國關、經濟、農業、醫學、社關、心理學等領域。我們還在因為自己舞不動哲學這把關刀,就說思想工具本身是無用、甚至邪惡、敵擋神的「世俗小學」(worldly principle)嗎?

我相信如果使徒行傳十三章的彼得能夠透過神讓一切俗物成為潔淨的異象,明白這個普世的神、超越的神所要教導他的功課,21世紀的我們沒有道理還活得像個「隨夥裝假」(加二:13)的一世紀猶太基督徒。

我們的講道學勢必要更注意不是假借「實踐神學」的保護大傘傳授溝通傳播理論或修辭學的話術,因為要小心,這些進到神學院的東西也很「俗」,也非常像是「講台花招」,所以要告訴學子們「為什麼這樣做符合聖經?」及「為什麼使用這些方式傳講能榮耀神?」

我個人非常熱愛聖經原文,但是教授聖經原文的老師應該讓學生明白,不是這些句法理論或詞法學重建古文字義的「假說」有什麼神力,而是因為在我們的歷史中,有一位超越宇宙萬物的神願意在這最平凡的文字、最平凡的事物、最平凡的歷史上,做那神蹟奇事和顯現祂那不平凡的心意。

我們的釋經學更勢必要變得堅固嚴謹,不囿於亞歷山大學派(The Alexandrian approach to exegesis)或安提阿學派(Antiochene methods of interpretation)的極端。慢慢我們就會發現「字面與寓意」、「一般與特殊」、「字義和句法」、「信仰的基督—歷史的耶穌」這幾組概念之間,更多時候不是二元辯證的對立關係,而是存在著詮釋螺旋(hermeneutical spiral)這樣交叉解釋的向心性關係,甚至是不可分割的附隨關係(supervenience)。

我們的系統神學必須成為一種建構神學,幫助我們建設性地看待一切知識、以基督中心的方式批判及超越一切文化。我們的講台,要講聖經,因為聖經裡有大福音

Colossians 1:28  ὃν ἡμεῖς καταγγέλλομεν νουθετοῦντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον καὶ διδάσκοντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ, ἵνα παραστήσωμεν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ἐν Χριστῷ· (我們傳揚祂, 是用諸般的智慧, 勸戒各人, 教導各人, 要把各人在基督裡完完全全的引到神面前 [CUV]/為了要使各人在基督裡得到完全 [CNV]。)