[Book Review] The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth

 

 

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The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth Paperback
published by Cambridge University Press (2000)

0521585600 • 9780521585606
Paperback, 332 pages
Published October 5th 2000 by Cambridge University Press

To me, this book is quite an achievement and enjoyable to read.

But beginners (and non-professionals) may need some professional guidance to grapple with its advanced content.

For, on the one hand, it assumes basic acquaintanceship with Barth’s work per se and some formal training in the field of systematic theology.
And on the other, the contributors, though all sympathetic to Barth, hold some different perspectives in their approaches.

Painting with a broad stroke, there are four major voices in this book: postliberal, radical orthodox, neo-reformed, and the German tradition.

Personally, I am happy to see that Webster (the most influential Barth scholar in UK) drawing together these Barth interpreters from diverging school of thoughts. But you probably won’t be able to tell and slide through their differences and synthesize their views.)

I recommend ch.1, 10, 14, 15, 18 of this book for beginners that have not completed any single volume of CD themselves. They are accessible and written in good styles.

As for ch.2-9, 11-3, which each takes an aspect of Barth doctrine of theological prolegomena, revelation, Scripture, Trinity, Election, Creation, Christology, Soteriology, Pneumatology, liturgy, and ethics, you will need to be able to contrast Barth against the backdrop of the traditional (evangelical) and liberal understanding of these topics in order to appreciate what Barth is doing. The contributors here do not necessarily help you do this. This is not a problem to me, and some chapters really helped me to set Barth’s CD in order.
But it should be said that the section in this companion is not for any novice who wants to read Barth as their first and primary tutor about how to talk about God systematically.

Apparently, the most seminal and controversial piece in this companion is ch.6 ‘Grace and Being’ by Bruce McCormack, which sparkled a fierce debate over a decade since its publication (on the theological ontology of God’s immanence, aseity, and election).
His chapter is not only important but also very inspirational to read, especially for what is now known as ‘actualistic ontology’ in not just theological but philosophical circles as well.

Personally, I found ch.17 ‘Barth, modernity, postmodernity’ by Graham Ward a very wise inclusion in this companion. For up until now, the solution and inspiration Barth offers for overcoming the epistemological and ethical plight in the secular world are underappreciated by theologians unfamiliar with the larger picture of contemporary critical thinking.
And this is one of the reasons why conservative theology has lost its mic to speak publicly while liberal theology has lost its vowels to speak loudly.

Graham Ward is one among those (along with Stanley Hauerwas, Joseph Magina, Paul Dafydd Jones, Steven Long, Nicholas Adams) who are insightful and capable of bringing out the bearings of Barth’s theology unto this world which has never thought they want or need to think about theology.

In my opinion, these two chapters are for the more ‘advanced’, and they are also the most rewarding chapters to read.
All in all, this book is highly recommended.

[書摘] Karl Barth on the Atonement as penal substitution

Although Barth insists (against Albrecht Ritschl and his followers) that God shows anger against sin and that God’s wrath is something very real and must be reckoned with, Barth denies that this wrath of God is turned away by the reconciliation of Christ . You must wonder why. The reason is that this binds God into an abstract law of necessity and reduces the act of God into a drama between the divine Persons.

Even though Jesus Christ is our Substitute who stands in our place and bears the full penalty of our sin, Barth is hesitant to call this a real punishment (with reference to Isa 53). He states:

But we must not make this [the concept of punishment] a main concept as in some of the older presentations of the doctrine of the atonement (especially those which follow Anselm of Canterbury), either in the sense that by His [Christ’s] suffering our punishment we are spared from suffering it ourselves, or that in so doing He “satisfied” or offered satisfaction to the wrath of God. The latter thought is quite foreign to the New Testament.(CD IV/1:253)

For Barth the concept of satisfaction is « quite foreign” to the New Testament. Though the concept needs not be completely rejected, for him « satisfaction » can only mean that

which suffices for the reconciliation of the world with God has been made (satis fecit) and can be grasped only as something which has in fact happened, and not as something which had to happen by reason of some upper half of the event; not, then, in any theory of satisfaction, but only as we see and grasp the satis-facere which has, in fact, been achieved. (CD IV/1:276)

Barth is adamant that we cannot force what has divinely taken place into a preconceived abstract concept (whether it means ‘legal justice’, ’emotional satisfaction’, or whatever); rather, we can only begin to understand the meaning of God’s act by grappling with the Christ event itself.

For Barth « substitution » has already taken place in the man Jesus Christ before the creation of humanity (supralapsarianism). In his view God’s wrath never precedes man’s confrontation with the gospel, and Christ’s death has not been made necessary by historical sin.

Then if this concept of punishment was to be retained (as it should), it must be bestowed an ‘idealistic sense’ according to which the God-man Jesus took humanity’s place from eternity as an “eternal reprobate from God”.

However, to avoid the feminist’s charge against substitutionary atonement as a ‘monstrous child abuse’, our theological construction must be deep down Trinitarian lest we ‘individualize’ the Father and the Son as if the superior one was abusing the inferior person’s will.

In response to this, Bruce McCormack has Barth’s Trinitarian view on the atonement excellently put:

The problem is that death, however it is conceived, is a human experience. How then could the death of Jesus Christ be an event between God and God, between, that is, an eternal father and an eternal Son who is understood along the lines of a Logos simpliciter [that is, the Divine Logos apart from his identity as the human-incarnated Jesus]? So the logic of penal substitution is not that the Father does something to his « eternal Son » (as the charge of « cosmic » child abuse would suggest). An action of the eternal Father upon the eternal Son (seen in abstraction from the assumed humanity) would require a degree of individuation between the two such that the « separation » needed for an action of the one upon the other becomes unthinkable.


This is a human experience of the Logos. Therefore, it is an event between the eternal Father and the Logos as human. The « object » of the action is, therefore, the Logos as human. What happens in the outpouring of the wrath of God by the Father upon Jesus Christ is that the human experience of the « penalty of death » that humans have merited through their sinfulness is taken into the very life of God himself.

But then we still have to consider the logic of the « subject. » The subject who delivers Jesus Christ up to death is not the Father alone. For the Trinitarian axiom opera trinitas ad extra sunt indivisa means that if one does it [economically], they all do it. So it is the triune God (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) who gives himself over to this experience. And that also means, then, that the Father is not doing something to someone other than himself. The triune God pours his wrath out upon himself in and through the human nature that he has made his own in his second mode of his being — that is the ontological significance of penal substitution. The triune God takes this human experience into his own life; he « drinks it to the dregs. » And in doing so, he vanquishes its power over us. That, I would submit, is the meaning of penal substitution when seen against the background of a well-ordered Christology and a well-ordered doctrine of the Trinity. [all emphasis mine]

—Bruce L. McCormack, ‘The Ontological Presuppositions of Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement’ in The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Theological & Practical Perspectives, Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III eds. (Intervarsity: MI, 2004), 366

[書摘] Divine Impassability or Simply Divine Constancy?

Source:  Bruce McCormack, ‘Divine Impassability or Simply Divine Constancy? Karl Barth’s Later Christology for Debates over Impassability’ in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering,  James Keating & Thomas Joseph White eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009, pp. 150-186

Summary:

In this article, Bruce McCormack argues that we should dispense with the apostolic doctrine of divine impassibility, not just because of Adolf von Harnack’s Hellenization thesis (that the apostolic fathers’ exegesis has been contaminated by platonic thoughts), but more so because of Christology.

It is more justifiable to speak of God‘s fidelity and constancy. God’s affectivity is demonstrated in His own free power and His innermost essence, open and ready to co-suffering with alien suffering. Barth criticizes Schleiermacher’s conception of absolute dependence because the source of this absolute dependence has no heart and no soul (KD II/1, p.416; CD II/1, p.370).

For Barth, the human Jesus that suffers and dies is truly and fully God, and this creates two problems concerning the immutability and the impassability of God.

We have only two options. The first is to mystify the relationship between the ontic Trinity and the economic Trinity—that the transcendent God is also the immanent God with us is a paradox, a paradox culminated in Mk 15:34: « My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? » In the incarnation God not only becomes the creature, but gives himself over to the human’s contradiction of him, placing himself under the judgment that rests on that contradiction.

But according to Barth this solution is intolerable in that it sets God in self-contradiction. How can God reconcile the world with Himself if there is any fundamental self-contradiction in His [immanent and economic] nature?

Communication of attributes between Christ‘s two natures is an area of debate between reformed orthodoxy and Lutheran theology. But no one here who holds to the traditional paradox can give a satisfactory single-subject Christological account of the communication of attributes without either drifting into Nestorianism or winding up with greater paradox.

The only remaining option is to affirm that God has completely faithful to Himself. God must be fully committed in being in Christ and must not flirt with other possibilities. We can successfully hold this claim only by beginning with what God does in Jesus Christ, such a God that can be emptied, humiliated, suffer, and die. God’s immutability is preserved by if we speak of the ontology of God first and foremost in light of the Christocentric historical revelation. The Majesty of the father and the obedience of the son are manifestations of a single divine subject in different modes of being, a purposive /willed “self-repetition”. We might say it is precisely the father’s majestic command which posits Himself over against himself in the person of the son that is capable of responding in obedience.

Tweaking Barth’s theology in this actualistic way, there will be no room left for divine impassability.

The homecoming of the son of man” in CD IV/2

Barth and Cyril of Alexander both hold to the conviction that “what the man Jesus does, God does.” Cyril’s solution is to instrumentalize the human nature of Jesus to make it a tool/performative agent of the Logos as the single subject in Jesus Christ.

But to prevent it from collapsing into a Hegelian reduction, the abstractness of the Chalcedonian formula needs some reworking. Classically there is a static center between the great divine acts of virginal conception and resurrection that bypasses the history of Jesus. Barth thinks that we have to ‘actualize’ the doctrine of the incarnation that the traditional concepts of unio, communion, and communication will be all “terms which speak of actions, operationes, events.” (CD IV/2 p.46)

Christ exists in a modality of being in perfect receptivity in a kind of relation of his humanity that is more than merely economic, it constitutes God second mode of being in eternity. That the command and the obedience are the dual aspects of the divine election into eternal processions means the second person of the Trinity is always the “Logos asarkos in anticipation of the Logos ensarkos”. The hypostatic union is not a static state but can only be spoken as hypostatic uniting from a timeless aspect. Barth has set aside the essentialism of the ancient church and rejected that there is a Logos acting in and through and upon the human nature. He exchanged what was essentialist for an understanding that is historicized and actualistic.

Barth is not Arian, but also not a modalist according to the following reasons:

1)      Though Modalists (Noetus and Praxeas) and Barth both attributed suffering to the Father in certain ways, Barth has an adequate distinction between the person of the Father and that of the Son. The threes persons for Barth are distinguished not according to temporal or economic phases, but in the decision that takes place in eternity. The modalist thinking has been continued in 19th century Lutheran kenoticism (Wolfgang Gess). (Notice also that Swiss reformed concept of “the genus tapeinoticum” [literally: the “genus of humility”] is the logical contrary of the Lutheran genus majestaticum.)

2)      Barth also distinguishes himself from Sabellius. The three persons for Barth exist in their different modes of being, and for Sabellius different modes of appearance.

3)      Barth identifies the misguided doctrinal commitment to divine impassibility as the root problem of both modalism and subordinationism. That is to say, God could have remained impassible only if He did not elect Himself to be for us. But since He did and He is completely faithful to whom He is, then there is no place for impassibility.

McCormack’s final suggestion is that Karl Barth has completely moved away and beyond early church fathers, including Cappadocian fathers, in terms of metaphysical framework.

The Scholastic effort to tie them back together is wrong and useless.  We have to accept Karl Barth  and reject church fathers because their worldviews were conditioned by their Hellenistic world rather than the biblical one.  This is inevitable because the Bible simply did not give us a firm and consistent teaching in metaphysics. That is not the concern of the biblical writers. This means today we have to develop a different set of Scriptural ontology according to our best understanding of the conditions of our time- the postmodern, and even the postliberal condition.

神的想法就是神的行動就是神的本質=自由?

20111016 -IMGP9381 24 mm

在三一神學院 Kantzer Lectures in Revealed Theology 的最後一場,Bruce McCormack 提到Karl Barth 教義學革命的核心觀念:上帝的自由。

他認為,上帝的自由不在於「從各種可行方案中做出決定」的權力,而在於「祂的選擇就是祂自己、祂自己就是祂的選擇」。從這個觀念推演下去的下一個重要拼圖是基督論。

亦即,如果基督是具有神、人二性的上帝之子,又是與聖父、聖子同質的三位一體聖神,那麼透過認識這位被差遣到世上的中保,我們將會發現上帝的意志和本相,是在雙極辯證中完全合一的(Heb 1:3; Col 1:15-16):一個向人類開放、捨己、受苦、與人類同在,卻又榮耀無比的三一上帝。

這樣,如果上帝的選擇如此、上帝自由之中所彰顯的意志是如此,我們將面對一個問題:上帝有沒有別的選擇-不論是創造或救贖這世界的方式?

客西馬尼的禱告中,當耶穌這樣問時(「可以不用喝這苦杯嗎?」),從上而來的聲音是一陣靜默。

不像提出神義論(Theodicy)的 Leibniz 過去說:上帝已經在所有可能世界中選擇執行了一個最佳化的世界, McCormack 認為上帝根本沒有別的選擇。「祂的選擇就是祂自己、祂自己就是祂的選擇!」重申一遍。若有任何其他的選擇可以做,上帝都將不再是 [這個] 上帝。

這就是實行的本體論(actualistic ontology)的威力:它把上帝的選擇/行動與祂自己的本體綁死。又藉著基督論把上帝的選擇和整個時間維度中的宇宙歷史綁死。

這裡也必須強調,實行的本體論中,上帝和時間維度創造的認同,必須緊隨基督化的歷史觀:在客西馬尼的禱告中,耶穌明確知道自己的十架之路必須回到三位一體的內在協商;世俗政權和猶太人的審判並沒有能力和上帝「合寫」救贖歷史。這就徹底排除了和 Hegel 唯心史觀的可能混淆。

接下來的邏輯是,如果宇宙就是上帝永恆抉擇的彰顯,那麼就等於說上帝預定了一切。這點連通到 John Calvin 的預定論(predestination)以及傳統的墮前救贖論(supralapsarianism)。

由於我不十分同意 Calvin 的預定論,這裡我出現第一個疑惑。(但我支持墮前救贖論。這點聖經中說得太清楚了。)

 

我的考量在於「預知」在「上帝自由選擇」之中所能扮演的地位。McCormack 認為上帝所想(will)的事,就是上帝所知道(know)的事,兩者沒有差別、也不能分開。換句話說,所有上帝知道的事,都是祂想要的、選擇的、以及將會被執行的。上帝完全不會去思考、也不知道、不用知道那些祂所不想、不會做、以及不會在人類歷史中發生的事。

這裡我產生第二個問題。

我在談 上帝的預定、可能世界(possible worlds)與中介知識(middle knowledge) 的段落中表明,我相信中介知識和可能世界的存在。這是建立在上帝如同一部精密大腦的圖像上。中介知識是由約莫改教時期的天主教神學家 Luis de Molina 所提出,他認為上帝的全知除了 Thomas Aquinas 所提出的「自然知識」(亦即,不涉及意志的邏輯知識,例如: « 5 » 比 « 4 »大、牛角是尖的)和「自由知識」(即上帝既知道、又去執行的知識。如:哪些人會得救、明天會不會下雨等等)之外 ,還有一種「中介知識」,就是那些「只存在於可能世界中」、而上帝「既沒有動念去積極執行」(所以獨立於上帝的自由知識),又「在現實生活中與事實相反」的事。

撒上廿三:11-13提到,身在基伊拉城的大衛求問神,若掃羅以滅城來逼基伊拉人交大衛出來,基伊拉人會否交大衛出來,神藉著祂的中介知識說「必交出來」。這種對虛構處境的肯定性知識,是神於受造物自由意志將如何運行、及將產生如何相映結局的預知。(另一處的例證是耶穌論及當今的世代邪惡背逆,不聽福音。而若早有這福音傳給所多瑪、蛾摩拉的話連他們都會悔改。)

中介知識的神學預設,能夠發散出對「恩典」與「自由」更積極的理解。也就是說,人類每一步的選擇和行動,都像地圖捲軸被打開一般。整份地圖的製圖師上帝,雖然已經知道所有路徑以及人類會去選擇的方式(中介知識/弱預定),但人還是有完全的參與性。

再者,聖經除了在中介知識之外,更肯定了人的選擇權(如保羅勸勉人不要濫用在基督裡的真自由、如耶穌的生命成為我們的表率是因為他的甘心順服彰顯人神意志的連結,而非僅是三一神自我決議後位格間的融洽交流而已)。

反觀 McCormack ,他把「可能性」刪除盡淨,比起傳統的改革宗還要激進。如此操作方式產生的神義論問題顯而易見:這讓「納粹屠殺」、「南亞海嘯」、「變態虐嬰殺嬰」等所有的一切爛事,都不可避免將被歸算為上帝在完全自由底下所決定開敞的積極行動。這樣的想法簡單說,叫人難以下嚥;技術點地說,我們的智慧和神學也欠缺對從上帝眼光深描這些殘酷和苦難事件的能力。如果我們能肯定一事是神的積極作為,卻無法同時明白道出神藉此作為所顯明的積極意志為何,這是不平衡及不負責的神學。

「祂願意萬人得救,並且充分認識真理。」(提摩太前書1 Timothy 2:4)這段經文更告訴我們,神的意願並不是直接地強加在歷史的軌跡中,而是要分別透過信心與盼望,回到基督終末這兩組與永恆的連接點去支取完整圖像。畢竟「萬人得救」一事在今世的人類,以及在歷史神學的現況來說都是不可能的。

換句話說,「表面違反神良善慈愛公義本性的天災人禍」、「人類失落了救恩遭受永刑」只能被適當地理解為神的消極作為,亦即「神允許」或「神未曾插手」,以及「神有當下我們所不能明白的計畫」。中介知識將三種可能性都保留了。

除了中介知識外,Hans Urs von Balthasar 的天主教巴特詮釋路線,是成熟的後自由神學必須取道經過的。Von Balthasar 肯定「類比」(analogy)在論述上帝各種存有模態(mode of being)時的作用。全本聖經都是用位格、關係、擬人的語言來描述這位上帝,這些都是人類存有的模態,在某些層面對應到上帝的本像。那麼關於自由這部分,我們可以同意「上帝的選擇就是祂自己、祂自己就是祂的選擇」的確是一個比「在存在主義困局中、只擁有有限選擇的人類」還要更完美的自由;但我不太能看到我們 得把上帝的意願和上帝的全知綁在一起的必要。因為人類並不這麼做:我們知道的事,不一定是我們想做的事。我們也有推知和抽象建構與現實相反的境況的能力 (例如:「若昨天下雪,我室友就不會出門了」)。

我們的神論要是能肯定上帝是在永恆中從無限可能中彰顯其意志並執行選擇,成為這樣一位上帝。

第一個問題的解決方向:知識(knowledge)、想法(Will)、喻旨(Decree)、行動(Act)四者有別

第二個問題的解決方向:「與事實相反的知識」進一步地肯定了真正的自由選擇權

這樣相容的預定論(compatiblist predestination)仍在成立,也讓「隱而未現、屬於上帝自己的事」被保留在地圖捲軸中「那些上帝和人類的共同歷史中沒有選擇去涉足實行的象限座標」中(如「一個二戰不曾發生的世界」、「一個物體可以自由在二、三、四度空間中變異穿梭的世界」),讓科幻小說家繼續幻想,揣度那迷人的上帝意志和這製圖師精妙的製圖工程。是的,上帝不但是那位「以馬內利」的旅者,還是那位製圖師。

雖然後自由神學的關鍵是基督論與教會論、口號之一是「禁止無斷猜想」。但在 McCormack 從基督身上的神人位格交流來逐步建構「自由」與「上帝自存」等觀念時,仍然是依靠了猜想而非更仔細的經文詮釋。事實上,聖經直接回答這個問題的地方幾乎沒有。也可以說,我們在福音書的耶穌身上,並沒有看到一個在根本屬性上與人類不同的自由意志。耶穌他這個人之所是神的地方,在於他身份上是神差愛子、實行上又是一個被聖靈充滿、全然遵行天父意志的人。

從這裡開始,我們將進入下一個戰場: 對 Phi 2:6-11 的虛己基督論(kenoticism)的詮釋。

[書摘] A Mirror for God and for Us: Christology and Exegesis in Calvin’s Doctrine of Election

fresco at the Karlskirche in vienna (by Johann...
Electing

Source:  DAVID GIBSON, « A Mirror for God and for Us: Christology and Exegesis in Calvin’s Doctrine of Election », International Journal of Systematic Theology Volume 11 Number 4 October 2009, pp.448-465

Excerpt and Summary

Calvin’s exegesis yields a view of Christ’s role in election which may be traced across a spectrum: reaching back into eternity there is the pre-existent Son who is the author of election, the active subject who participates in the decree of election, and there is also Christ the object of the decree, the Elect One, both as the pre-existent Mediator and as the Mediator in time. In his role as the pre-existent Mediator, Christ is the ‘Head’ of the elect, the one in whom certain humans are elected.

Christ the subject of election: The electing God

Concerning the election of Judas, in Jn 6:70 he is one of the chosen; in Jn 13:18 he is not (‘I am not speaking of all of you; I know whom I have chosen’). For Calvin the sense in which Judas is both chosen and not chosen is because two very different kinds of choosing are on display:

  1. First a temporal election is meant by which God appoints us to any particular work – just like Saul who was elected king.
  2. Then Christ speaks of the eternal election by which we are made God’s children, and by which God predestined us to life before the creation of the world.

For Calvin, the eternally reprobate can actually be adorned with God’s gifts which enable them to carry out their office (like Saul or Judas), but this is entirely different from the sanctification of the Spirit. Christ/God in history plays an active role not just in the temporal choosing of the twelve to the apostolic office (and Israel to be His law-keeper and so on), but also according to his divine nature in the eternal choosing of individuals in a salvific sense.

When it comes to Jn 15:16, 19 (‘You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit’), however, Calvin equivocates between assigning a temporal or an eternal referent to it. He first admits that this passage does not ‘treat of the common election of believers’, by which they are adopted to be God’s children, but of that special election by which he appointed his disciples to the office of preaching the gospel’. But he still wants to affirm the clear parallel between this temporal election and eternal election: both the beginning of salvation (eternal election), and all the parts which flow from it (in this case appointment to the office of preaching), issue from Christ’s free mercy. Christ is the author of both forms of election.

Christ the object of election:

The mediating God-man and preexistent Son; Christ is the object of election in an eternal sense by being the one in whom the elect from the human race are chosen (John 15, 17). Calvin’s description of this love is sharply focused on the economy – it is a love of the Son, but it is a love that must be referred to us. The title of beloved belongs to Christ alone. God loves none but in Christ. For Calvin, it is not that we are chosen by God and, on the basis of that choice, engrafted into Christ’s body; we are too lowly, even in an unfallen state, to merit God’s favor. Rather, God looked upon our head, and predestined the chosen to life only as they were members of Christ. Christ is a mirror in which God looks to see us.

It is vital to note that eternal election is not an end in itself for Calvin, but is merely the structural ground of the temporal work of salvation. For Calvin the title ‘the beloved Son’, at least in election contexts, appears to work not at the level of describing immanent Trinitarian relations, but rather the economic relations of the Father, the Son, and the people who belong to the Son. Christ confirm what the Father has decreed on our salvation by actually effecting it.

Christ the object of our faith, the elected Man and the head/ representative of the Elect.

  • Calvin is most interested in describing Christ as the object of faith. Depictions such as “author of the great blessing” (Jn 6:26) and “author of life (Jn 6:33) are less claims about Christ’s divine essence than they are claims about his office of Mediator in time (Notice in Jn 6:32 . Jesus says that ‘his Father, rather than he himself, is the author of this gift.). 創始成終 is understood as a historical category.
  • There is the closest possible correlation between the work of the Father and the work of the Son. The Father wills salvation in the Son, and this is what the Son has come to achieve. By entering the world to execute the Father’s eternal decree, Christ stands as faith’s object in salvation. Our faith is a response to this Father-Son relation.
  • Faith is the neotic basis for a sufficient knowledge of election. The election of God in itself is hidden and secret. The Lord manifests it by the calling in time.
  • Whoever is not satisfied with Christ but inquires/speculate elsewhere about eternal predestination desires to be saved contrary to God’s purpose. The nuance is that their election is not the only thing that God has decreed for them; he has also decreed their faith [in Christ]. Christ mediates the salvation that flows from eternal election by being the object of the elect person’s faith.
  • To be sure, Christ’s eternal mediation is vitally important, but it is so less because of the knowledge it gives about the trinitarian ground of election and more because of the knowledge it gives of free and certain salvation.

Here Calvin speaks of his second distinction of Eternal and Temporal election: The former may be described as election itself; the latter as the salvation that flows from election.

  • Temporal election: for redemptive purpose in time and sanctification. Election is known in Christ.
  • Eternal election: timeless; sealed by the Holy Spirit and inscribed in the Book of Life. Election is in Christ.

As one inseparable (where time connects with eternity) reality, election and faith are executed separately –election in eternity, calling to faith in time.*

Calvin’s logical timeline of election:

In sum, Calvin begins in eternity with election in Christ. While election is properly described as decreed by the Father, Calvin is clear that Christ also participates in the choosing [of specific individuals that will belong to Him]. As we move along the line and enter the world of created reality, we encounter a universal calling of the gospel which is made effective in the hearts of the elect. Here they come to faith in Christ, and experience regeneration and adoption into God’s family.

【Further Reflection and Critique】

(1)

First, the problem in Calvin’s « faith in time » is that it is a depiction of the cognitive aspects of faith only and falls short of a concrete ecclesial narrative form. Too much weight is given to propositional and forensic account of salvation and too little room is left for collective imagination and praxis.

(2)

The dynamic relationship between the « temporal election for divine office » (e.g., King: Saul; Apostle: Judas; Covenant People: Israel; Judge: Samson) and the « temporal election into salvific faith » is underdeveloped.

Calvin only gives us a positive example where the « apostleship as a divine office » corresponds with the temporal coming to faith, which must be correctly understood as the actualization of the eternal decree. But he does not spell out how temporal election for divine office can aslo correspond to the eternal decree in a non-salvific sense: the forever damnation of Judas and forever loss of Saul.

(3)

Paul Helm thinks that Calvin understands the incarnate Christ as a ‘fit, consistent, or appropriate expression’ of the character of the Logos asarkos (eternal Son in Calvin’s conception) not merely of his omnipotence but also of his moral character. This move is to maintain the continuity between the incarnate Son and the eternal Son. But in this way Eutychism looms in (i.e., the incarnated Jesus only has one nature and it’s all about His divinity). How we maintain the distinction between Jesus two nature while keeping the ontological continuity the incarnated and the eternal One  is the challenge!

On the other hand, Karl Barth and Bruce McCormack’s concern that Calvin’s eternal Son has an ‘identity shrouded in darkness’, though seems to be not completely on target (given Calvin’s commentary on Jn 13:18),  must nonetheless be registered as legitimate. For Calvin’s immanent Trinity gives us a weak Son in terms of dramatic personality. He is the electing God, but beyond this affirmation we could only speculate other things about Him.This is because for Calvin the incarnated Son is a mere temporal expression of who He eternally is and not the other way around.

While the economic Son’s role as object of faith is underscored, how this Logos ensarkos would illumine us about the Logos asarkos is not theologically undergirded in Calvinism.

The doctrine that is traditionally called extra Calvinisticum (Lat. « The Calvinistic beyond/outside ») exposes further issue. It claims that Logos was also outside or beyond the physical body of Christ. This was meant to protect the immanent Trinity from being reduced to immanent “Duality” when the economic Trinity is at work with the creation during Jesus’ 33 years earthly sojourn.

To explain the function of the extra Calvinisticum in Calvin, E.D. Willis puts it in this way: While Logos asarkos mediated the divine ordering of the universe from its beginning, Logos ensarkos performed the reconciling work without the cessation or diminution of his mediation of this divine ordering.

‘[T]he Son of God left heaven only in such a way that he continued to exercise his dominion over it; the Incarnation was the extension of his empire, not the momentary abdication of it’.

But for Willis, Calvin jeopardizes his own stance on Christocentric revelation by prioritizing election as God’s eternal will, which is discoverable by us outside the Christ event itself. If this is true, then incarnation is relegated as extension that is only complementary (rather than integral or comprehensive) to a bigger revelation. Then this “bigger revelation”, while still will commit in prioritizing the Bible over human reason, really could not defend itself from degenerating into Biblicism, dominion theology, and/or natural theology.

Thus, it is on the one hand vital to see Barth’s criticism [though ill-informed] against Calvin’s failure to assign the active subjective role to Christ in election in good terms—both Calvin and Barth want to affirm Christ as the electing God who mediates salvation in His free grace and unconditional love. On the other hand it is also crucial to understand the excruciating problem with Logos asarkos and extra Calvinisticum posited in old metaphysical framework. Nowhere in the Bible do the apostles claim to have knowledge about the preexistent (asarkos or extra) Logos apart from what we may know in Jesus’s own being and revealed words.

By consequence, it makes much better sense to speak of the Logos incarnandus (the Logos ‘to be incarnate) regarding to the passages on the preexistent Son, and this requires us to adopt an actualistic ontology that grounds our Christology in history: the historical Jesus Christ.