[書摘] The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century

The Resurrection from Grünewald's Isenheim Alt...
Resurrection

Source:

Gerrit Neven, ‘The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century’ in Theology as Conversation: The Significance Of Dialogue In Historical And Contemporary Theology: A Festschrift For Daniel L. Migliore, Bruce McCormack and Kimlym J. Bender eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009, pp. 67-81

My Summary:

Whereas initially Nietzsche and Marx only proclaim the death of God, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze proclaim with equal force the death of a man (cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 1994, esp. the last chapter, and Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 1993).

Following Barth, Geyer gives the Parousia the determinative role concerning various theological aspects of reconciliation. The Messiah’s having drawn near is the precondition of a future-oriented and therefore a dialogical mode of thinking. The Parousia points to a nearness of salvation that does not supernaturally demolish time and history, but rather breaks open time and history from within [messianically] by turning to the risky expectation of the Messiah, for whom each moment in time is an open entrance.

This expectation leads to intensive forms of discussion and debate with not just  theologians but also with [critical and phenomenological] thinkers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger , Horkheimer, Bloch, Sartre, and so on. The focus is the humanity of Christ.

(Hans-Georg Geyer [1929-1999]  studied in Frankfurt during 1950-1954 with Hans-Georg Gadamer, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Wolfgang Kramer before he turned to the study of systematic theology (at Gottingen, Berlin, Wuppertal, and Bonn.)

As early as 1962, Geyer declared his agreement with Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment. According to Benjamin, only the Messiah himself will consummate all that is happening historically, in the sense that only he himself will redeem and consummate the creation in its relation to the messianic.[1] Therefore, nothing historical can relate itself to something messianic on its own account. With this, he distanced himself from the idea that historical convictions, scientific achievements, or political opinions have in themselves the potential to make “the jump-ahead” to a time which is qualitatively new and different. Our knowledge is determined by economic and political factors. The desire to know is driven by a force consisting only of what can be [pragmatically or in a utilitarian manner] calculated. This [social/structural] force and the history of freedom contradict each other (analogous to the tension between poststructuralism and structuralism/rationalism).

Geyer here introduces the topic of faith in the post-liberal sense. He says, “faith, getting involved with and trusting upon the message concerning Christ, is at the same time radically renouncing the desire to discover the truth of the proclamation and past history”.

This criticism of metaphysics (of absolute certainly) is also part of the thinking projects of Moltmann and Pannenberg, for whom the future became the paradigm of transcendence. But both of them have felt that they have to leave Barth behind for they deem Barth’s system closed and ahistorical. Geyer does not share this view.

Geyer inherits early Barth’s dialectical theology. He is convinced that our time is an implication of the Parousia of Jesus Christ. His intensive debate with Moltmann and Pannenberg  is concerning the epistemology of hope. That is to say, if God’s new coming in the Parousia is an implication of the concrete identity of Jesus Christ, then how do we find his identity? He doubts whether for Moltmann and Pannenberg “the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ” are constitutive–and as opposed to merely illustrative— of the exegesis of biblical texts and of the practices of the Christian community. For according to Geyer, Moltmann and Pannenberg’s definition of history and Parousia did not clearly distinguish “the future as an end that we should strive for” (the anthropocentric) from “the future as the goal of God’s exclusive act” (the theocentric). His ultimate criticism is that the theology of Moltmann and Pannenberg is enclosed by a metaphysical correlation between God and the world. Transcendence is devoured by immanence.

To solve this problem, Geyer here uses Husserl’s concepts of protention (the succession of the historical accordance and its end) and retention. The protention in Jesus denotes the continuity between the character of Jesus’ conduct and his fate—death. According to Geyer, this historical fate can undergo an intensification or an ontological deepeningonly by the event of the meta-historical resurrection in Easter” [out of theological necessity].

By retention, it means when we look back, the attempts to ignore this fact or to place this death within an unduly higher framework can only lead to an idealization of his death or a degradation of it to an empirical fact (which is an unduly anthropologized theology full of liberal residues). Namely, the declaration that this historical death implies a [whether phenomenological, hermeneutic, or ontological] jump-ahead should be fiducially rooted only in the meta-historical domain, in [the post-Easter] remembrance, which runs backwards. This solution does not have to leave behind the aporia of this [historical] death. For at any rate, doctrinal or impersonal statements are not possible in the face of this death. Anamnesis and commemoration of this death can only give us non-metaphysical and personal truth. The redemptive history is inherently incomplete if all we have is this death of Jesus.

On the other hand, knowledge concerning the identity of this Jesus can only be acquired by participation in the process of the actuality of this meaning question in the medium of human language. That is why the question concerning the meaning of the cross is characterized by an infinite openness— as opposed to the enclosure of totalitarian metaphysics. For Geyer, the hope is the qualitative feature of faith, which is a prerequisite for new non-metaphysical mode of thinking.

In accorance with the nature of hope, Parousia concerns the future of which no one has sure knowledge of the time and the hour— it is beyond human calculation: Although we are vitalized by images of the future (e.g., Luke 21:7-33), these do not lead us into the future itself.

rhızomıng ındεxatıon dıs-choıcεs . .
Badiou

There is a remarkable parallelism in the thinking of Geyer and Badiou about metaphysics. Badiou establishes that « the death of God » and « the death of man » go hand-in-hand in the ethos of 20th century philosophy and theology. He calls them “the joint disappearances of Man and God”.

On one hand there is in the 20th century philosophy the movement that radicalizes Kant’s approach by enslaving man in his own emancipation (i.e., German idealism: our [finite] subjectivity creates our world). This line runs from Kant via Fichte and Sartre (man is condemned to freedom; man is programmed to be a man and cannot be freed from this program). On the other hand, there is the way of the radical anti-humanism of Nietzsche and Foucault: the absence of God is one of the names for the absence of man.

As Foucault (he criticizes Levinas and Derrida’s anthropology as religion or theology), Badiou does not think this either or situation leaves room for postmodern thinkers like Levinas or Derrida. For Levinas’ appeal to God’s radical otherness in order to safeguard the otherness of the human other falls short to attest to a radical alterity. (This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the other should be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. cf. Badiou, Ethics [2001], 22). As for Derrida’s deferral of presence (différance), a sort of religion of messianic delay, Badiou sees something too artificial in its ramification upon the relation between philosophy and religion (cf. P. Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth [2003], 157). Postmodernity has become boring.

Badiou searches for what is empty and open in a time when the [human and divine] subject has disappeared. There is no other possibility than to accept this aporia, this emptiness, and to retain a prospect to point beyond death. For Geyer, this means the resurrection and the coming of the Messiah— within the perspective of time. Biblically speaking this is the time that remains, a time of intense expectation (cf. Isa 21:11). [2]

Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin’s disciple, in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans declares “what remains is what separates us from the Messiah”. More than the Messiah’s coming close is the Messiah himself.

Giorgio Agamben descubre el limbo
Agamben

[1] The polemical context which Geyer (and possibly Benjamin) set out to argue against includes the following features (i.e., wrong assumptions):

1)       non-realism,

2)       post-structuralism,

3)       the totalitarian features of modernity in the 1960s (for which Geyer thinks Horkheimer’s treatment in the 1930s is exemplary. He lost faith but has not abandoned the project of human transformation of the society into a utopia).

4)       reciprocal freedom: the promises that somebody gives to someone else are ruled by a relationship of absolutely free reciprocity and by a reciprocal freedom.

[2] Here one may become somewhat apologetical over against Badiou. Badiou teaches with Nietzsche that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is dead. According to Nietzsche, faith in God as a supernatural power in general will no longer have any real influence, since God is not ascribed any power anyway. There is no such metaphysical God. However, it is precisely this faith that would be necessary to determine the convictions and the actions of man. This may be the case, Geyer answers Nietzsche. But even if God has lost his power over man and that super-sensual heaven has no meaning for the sensual earth, it does not necessarily follow the death of Christian theology.

Through Barth, Geyer has found a way forward: Christian theology has the task to lead faith out of its dogmatic identification with the concept of religion that is still metaphysically determined. Geyer rejects Nietzsche’s analysis that lumps together the God of metaphysics and the God of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike the metaphysical God, the God of the Bible can die.

On the basis of this God’s death, people in faith received the power to be really earthly finite and to be able to die. In the Christian faith, God’s identity can only be thought of appropriately when we take as point of departure the view that the death of Jesus Christ on the cross is God’s act on behalf of all.

The occurrence of cross in history demands remembrance and mimesis: the imitation of God in the praxis of love for one’s neighbor. God is a name that has to be continued in a passionate plea to practice love, as opposed to a concept that asks for ideological representation. Remembrance implies mimesis, through which we anticipate the coming of God in the Parousia.

4 thoughts on “[書摘] The Time that Remains: Hans-Georg Geyer in the Intellectual Debate about a Central Question in the Twentieth Century”

  1. 我有些看法,不知道您的意見如何。
    Geyer對於Moltmann的批評,如果我們暫且將其批評的對象限定於Trinity& The kingdom of God以及之後的系統神學系列,那麼兩位神學家的差異與其說是metaphysical,我會認為比較接近methodological。莫特曼在Trinity& The kingdom of God開始建立他的神學系統以及社群式的三一論之後,比起Theology of Hope,的確更為系統化,這也使得他用更為系統化的方式來看待歷史和歷史的結束,以及在邁向新天新地的歷史中三一上帝的做為。所以莫特曼神學的中心就不只是parousia,而是在終末來臨的過程中,三一上帝是如何 »互動 »,也勢必會以終末的角度looking backwards, that is, presence。
    但是Benjamin-Agamben卻缺少(或是忽略)了對於三一上帝的論述,聚焦於彌賽亞的來臨(parousia)。因此他們談彌賽亞的來臨,卻很少談到父與聖神以及三一之間的互動。Agamben在Time that remains說:時間的縮減contraction,也就是 »剩餘的 »時間,最能代表彌賽亞的處境situation,也就是真實的時間。
    由此看來,莫特曼在神學方法上應該是接近Hegalian dialectics,但是Benjamin-Agamben是以類似巴特的路線採納dialectics of eternity and time。而以時間感來說,莫特曼的神學是 »向前進的歷史 »(雖然他的書是The Coming God),而Benjamin-Agamben則是以 »時間倒數 »的方式來看歷史,所以是 »剩餘時間 »。
    Transcendence is devoured by immanence. 這句話我基本上是同意的,但如果不從三一論來理解這句話,那麼當然會認為Moltmann/Pannenberg的神學建立在所謂 »metaphysical correlation »。

    1. 應該說,很明顯地,Moltmannian social Trinitarianism 在形容三位格互動與時間關係時,把 economic Trinity 的作為,直接對應在人可經歷的時間以及對人的倫理(神學倫理)要求上。這確實使之太過接近 Hegel,而使這種系統中的 divine transcendence 和 divine aseity 變得不安全。

      你可看像是這篇文章:kunglapyan.blogspot.com/2012/04/151-41.html
      我對於這種把三位格互動實描在客觀歷史中的 Moltmann 式解經,都認為有踩到紅線、讀入過多神學想像的不安。

      而反過來說,為什麼 Barthian dialectics (actualistic ontology) 會提供很安全和寬敞的操作空間,正是它以道成肉身的基督為中心(Christocentric)來連接歷史與永恆,甚至父與靈兩個位格。(在 Barth 思想中較為不明顯的 Pneumatology 近年系統神學界已有研究補上。)

      儘管一個成熟的三一論確實不在第一身份並非基督教神學家的 Benjamin 和Agamben的視野中,這是很明顯的,但在這裡也恰好帶來了方法論上的節制,以致於可被嵌入新約經文的有機脈絡中,特別是「去奧古斯丁」、「去希臘哲學化」的、近年被恢復的猶太式與父格上帝保持謹慎敬虔距離的三一論建構神學。

      更具體地說,基督復活的時刻(post-Easter moment),為我們帶來神學思想更新的就是從基督論來切入神論,從而展現「三位一體」的上帝觀;而非拿一個已經在形上學範疇運作過的三一論(這是希臘化以降的神學一直在犯的錯誤)回來指導基督論、終末論。

      從這樣看,的確首先也最主要的,兩組人馬的差別在於 methodology,但隨後 metaphysics 的差異不可謂不大。

      1. Moltmannian social Trinitarianism,縱使為他開啟了更為成熟的系統神學,但系統化不可避免帶來僵化。所以縱使後期著作的確精彩無比,我還是更為讚賞Theology of Hope。
        但以一個outsider的角度來看Benjamin-Agamben的彌賽亞神學/羅馬書釋義,我也隱約覺得不見得是如同你所說有 »方法論上的節制,以致於可被嵌入新約經文的有機脈絡中 »。進路上是採取不同方法,但是否優於莫特曼或是其他神學家,以及勝於 »已經在形上學範疇運作過的三一論 »,限於能力我還無法在此給出判斷與完整論述。這也是我讚賞Theology of Hope的原因,此書的2,3章有進入聖經脈絡中。
        感謝你的回應。

    2. 我想這是你必須在我說「一個已經在形上學範疇運作過的三一論是個希臘化的錯誤」這點上多做一些琢磨。
      希伯來神學一直保持著一個對聖父本體(ontology)有些不可知論的謙卑,而新約繼承了這一點。尤其是耶穌說:「若不藉著我,沒人能到父那裡去」、「看見我就看見了父」。

      因此,唯一能從三一論神學做下來的條件是:我們能透過啟示把神學做上去上帝三一的內在生命中。
      能達到這個要求的啟示,只有道成肉身(Jn 1)的、在基督裡的啟示。

      幾年前我曾在講座中向 Barth 研究泰斗的Bruce McCormack 當場問過 Volf 的social Trinitarianism有無可能兼容於這個要求。而他回答是 Volf 與其師 Moltmann 的 social Trinitarianism 並沒有任何實質差異(即使我認為他拉了 Ratzinger 作伴)。
      那時我還無法很好把握的差異,一兩年之後回頭看清楚許多。

      反觀 Agamben 的理論,受到 Benjamin、 Taubes 和 Derrida 的影響,這三位猶太人的基督教神哲學都是猶太彌賽亞式,也都維繫了上帝本體那不可知論的謙卑、或我說「方法論上的節制」(不把聖父的本體當作一個可以輕易言說的對象)。

      更進一步說,我們對三位一體上帝之美妙的最適神學論述,就是頌讚(doxology; Eph 1:1-4)。Barth 神學對此有很深的著墨。

      這個 theological prolegomonon 的比較問題還可以從很多角度論證,如參考:
      http://theoremes.revues.org/629
      或在本版搜尋 Barth/巴特 speculation/玄想 這組字彙,應有一些幫助。

      最後,如果有興趣繼續研究下去,我認為 Robert Jensen 的三一論思想會是最可能調和兩造的差異的資源。

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